

DYNAMO

SYRIA DYNAMIC MONITORING REPORT

Prepared by: Information Management Unit

Assistance Coordination Unit

The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) aims to strengthen the decision-making capacity of aid actors responding to the Syrian crisis. This is done through collecting, analyzing and sharing information on the humanitarian situation in Syria. To this end, the Assistance Coordination Unit through the Information Management Unit established a wide network of enumerators who have been recruited depending on specific criteria such as education level, association with information sources and ability to work and communicate under various conditions. IMU collects data that is difficult to reach by other active international aid actors, and publishes different types of information products such as Need Assessments, Thematic Reports, Maps, Flash Reports, and Interactive Reports

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SUMMARY

The Information Management Unit (IMU) of the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) conducted a multi-sectoral assessment for the sixth release of its periodical Dynamic Monitoring Report (DYNAMO). A total of 105 sub-districts within 11 governorates was assessed to give a comprehensive account of the humanitarian situation there, and to inform a proper response in all sectors.

DEMOGRAPHY



The population covered in DYNAMO6 increased as a result of expanding the coverage to include some sub-districts in Dar'a and Quneitra in the south of Syria. The total population in the assessed sub-districts was (11,470,348). 43% of them were IDPs. Although the IDPs place a burden on host communities, their suffering is the biggest in all assessed communities. IDPs' suffering increases in the absence of sources of income as study results show that 56% of IDPs have settled in rented places. Moreover, sixty percent of the assessed sub-districts face difficulties in accessing humanitarian aid.

FOOD SECURITY



Although agriculture is the first source of income in Syria according to study results, the agricultural sector faced many difficulties in the light of the deteriorating security conditions and the high cost of farming. The deterioration of the food security sector increased the number of PiNs within assessed sub-districts. Forty-seven percent of bakeries in assessed sub-districts were not functioning due to many reasons according to the nature of the sub-district. One of the most important solutions to face the challenges of food security sector is to increase the number of development projects. Agricultural lands in eighty percent of the assessed sub-districts were ready for the cultivation and production of strategic crops, and 73% of the assessed sub-districts were ready for the establishment of livestock care centers.

HEALTH SECTOR



The problems related to the health sector were obvious in all assessed sub-districts including the fact that 260 medical centers were not operating within the assessed sub-districts and the absence of surgeons in some assessed sub-districts, in addition to a severe lack of medicines. The most influential problem in the health sector is the lack of medical equipment and the inability to maintain these devices due to the inability of transferring them neither to regime-held areas nor to neighboring countries for maintenance. So that the only solution is replacing them with new equipment.

EDUCATION SECTOR



The severity of the education sector appears in the high drop-out rates such as school enrolment of students was very low in 53% of the assessed sub-districts. Education stopped in most of the assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa, Al- Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor. Too many children at the age of 11 years have not received any education knowing that the highest dropout rates were in displacement communities. It should be noted that some covered sub-districts apply new curricula that affect the young students' mind.

WASH SECTOR



Water affects most humanitarian field sectors and directly affects the health of civilians, especially children where diarrhea cases appeared as a result of contaminated water. Study results showed that there is not water sterilization in 61% of the assessed sub-districts and that the damaged sewerage networks cause water leaks in the land. In addition to an increase in the percentage of drainage in dumping holes and in the open. All these reasons lead to an increase in the percentage of groundwater that civilians use for drinking and other uses.

SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS



There were various destruction percentages in the buildings in 58% of the assessed sub-districts. The first sector priority was a housing rehabilitation program. Moreover, there was an acute need for cash assistance to pay the house rent because the largest percentage of the IDPs lived in rented houses. The severe need for heating fuel appeared because data collection period was the preparation period for winter.

SERVICES



The biggest challenge in the services sector is the unavailability of electricity for many hours during the day. Some people in some assessed sub-districts started to suffer from vision problems as a result of the loss of electricity and light for long periods of time. Study results showed that the breakdowns of electricity networks in 82% of the assessed sub-districts are repairable.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACU	Assistance Coordination Unit
DYNAMO	Syria Dynamic Monitoring Report
ESQWA	Economic and Social Commission for Westren Asia
EWARN	Early Warning and Response Network
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HC	Host Communities
HNO	Humanitarian Need Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMU	Information Management Unit
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
KI	Key Informant
LNGO	Local Non-Governmental Organization
LC	Local Council
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSAG	Non State Armed Groups
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PiN	People in Need
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
RC	Relief Council
SARC	Syrian Arab Red Crescent
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

The sixth edition of the DYNAMO report is issued with the entry of the Syrian revolution its sixth year, and the importance of obtaining accurate data on the humanitarian needs of people inside Syria at a time when over half of all Syrians have been forced to leave their homes. According to UN statistics “Of the 13.5 million people in need, in 16 areas across the country currently categorized as besieged, some 974,080 people in need face a life-threatening situation due to an acute lack of access to food, water, and health care, extreme restrictions on freedom of movement and, in some areas, the intensity and proximity to conflict and aerial bombardment.”¹

Many developments have happened in the Syrian arena since the issuing of DYNAMO 5 by IMU at the fifth of June 2016 as the air force continued committing massacres in Syria using poisonous chlorine weapons and many other internationally prohibited weapons and violating numerous declared truces in gross violation of UN Security Council resolutions 2042, 2118, 2209, 2235 and 2254. For example, a relief convoy consisting of about 20 trucks belonging to the SARC has been bombarded as they were crossing Big Orm village in Aleppo, killing some martyrs and wounded, and causing the outbreak of the fire in some trucks. Moreover, Syrian regime continued imposing the siege applied on NSAG-held areas and preventing the entry of assistance to them in a clear violation of Security Council resolution 2165 of 2014.

Syrian Regime forced NSAG forces to withdraw from some of their controlled areas in Qudsiya, Hama, and At Tall in Rural Damascus to Idleb governorate. The regime continued depopulating the armed opposition areas in an attempt to change the demographic composition of the population in many areas including Darayya. Moreover, Syrian regime forces also took control of eastern Aleppo city and emptied it of its population after an unprecedented intensity of fire by Syrian regime and Russian forces. The IDPs were also targeted during their displacement from many besieged areas including a massacre against people fleeing from the bloody bombardment of Aleppo in the month of November 2016.

Many schools and testing centers were targeted by aerial bombardment. The school compound and the market in Has village in Idleb was bombed in October 2016, killing at least 26 persons, mostly students and teachers, as well as numbers of wounded. The frequency of targeting hospitals and medical facilities increased in clear violation of international humanitarian law, which grants special protection of medical facilities. On the other hand, Free Syrian Army with the support of the Turkish army restored the control of Jarablus from ISIL within the ongoing Euphrates shield operation.

Strategic and operational decision-making and prioritization require definitive and timely data. Information concerning the needs of conflict-affected populations and the capacities and locations of humanitarian actors is critical for efficient coordination. The Information Management Unit (IMU) of the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) plays a central role in data collection and producing humanitarian reports supporting the humanitarian response to the needs of the populations affected by the Syrian crisis. The main objective of the IMU is to help aid actors in responding to the Syrian crisis by strengthening their decision-making capacity through data collection, analysis, and sharing, to enhance the humanitarian response for crisis-affected populations. The IMU is committed to meet this objective by providing reliable and impartial information reports and to ensure a continuous exchange of information with all aid actors involved in the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis. DYNAMO 6 provides an overall assessment for the basic sectors needed by afflicted people by the current crisis within the assessed sub-districts on Syrian lands.

DYNAMO assessment is based on enumerators network of 90 enumerators who gather basic information based on certain rules in health, FSL, education, WASH, Shelter, and NFIs, in addition to in-

1- https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf

formation regarding demographics, humanitarian access, and services at the sub-district level. This report covers 105 out of 272 sub-districts in Syria, with an increase in the coverage of 11 sub-districts compared to DYNAMO 5.

The IMU shares findings from the DYNAMO in the form of substantive analytical reports structured around the main sections outlined below. The IMU aims to develop user-friendly reports in which analyzed data will be presented both in written and visual form through figures, tables, heatmaps, and maps. The contents of sections related to assistance sectors are adjusted based on reviews of the DYNAMO questionnaire to meet information needs of key stakeholders and based on the evolution of the situation on the ground. The sections listed below are included in the current report:

- **Demographics:** this section contains approximate numbers on the current population with number of individuals. Information on internal displacement is also added to this part with IDPs' numbers, in addition to number of IDPs and their living places.
- **Humanitarian Aid Accessibility:** this section describes the level of access of humanitarian actors to beneficiaries' areas within assessed sub-districts, as well as beneficiaries' ability to access relief aid.
- **Food Security and Livelihoods:** this section focuses specifically on Food Security severity such as bread price, and bakeries' functionality, including an analysis of the reasons why bakeries are not able to function, in addition to functioning development projects and implementable development projects.
- **Health:** This sector covers the health services assessment within assessed governorates, in addition to accessibility to health facilities, health services costs and health sector priorities.
- **Education:** educational severity is covered in this section, number of schools, the security situation impact on school functionality, number of enrolled students at different school stages, number of teachers, and difficulties that prevent students from accessing the education.
- **Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene:** this section describes the types of water sources and the quality of water available to conflict-affected populations, including causes for lack of access to water, as well as the sanitation infrastructures and practices for waste management.
- **Shelter and NFIs:** this section provides an analysis of the level of damage to private housing caused by the conflict and the priorities of shelter and NFI sectors.
- **Services:** this part includes a study on main electricity sources within assessed sub-districts and electricity network requirements. As well as, the situation of roads and the available communication channels in sub-districts. The part also covered the challenges faced by civil defense centers in case of their availability in assessed sub-districts.
- **Priorities:** this section describes priority interventions by sector of humanitarian assistance.

THE AIM OF THE DYNAMIC MONITORING REPORT (DYNAMO)

The periodic needs assessment report (DYNAMO) aims to give a comprehensive description of the humanitarian situation and to provide accurate information in order to identify the accurate needs of the affected population within assessed sub-districts according to basic humanitarian needs. The main objectives of DYNAMO 6 are:

- Providing approximate figures about the number of population and IDPs within the assessed sub-districts to facilitate response planning by all humanitarian active actors.
- Setting the priorities of the fundamental assessed sectors.
- Covering the largest possible number of assessed sub-districts by primary data collection.

METHODOLOGY

The DYNAMO assessment started on 1 September 2016 and was completed by the release of the final Arabic report on 25 January 2017 in Arabic and it was simultaneously translated into English. Data collection period by 90 IMU enumerators lasted for 20 days and covered November and December 2016. Health and WASH data was triangulated with EWARN enumerators data.

After receiving the raw data, revision of missing and odd values was conducted during 5 days. Next, the data analysis process started and lasted for 20 days, and the final number of assessed sub-districts in this version was 105 sub-districts.

Ideally, all of Syria would be assessed. However, IMU enumerators could only assess 105 sub-districts within 11 governorates due to the following reasons:

- ◇ The geographical area assessed is limited to areas that can be accessed by the IMU enumerators. IMU enumerators could not cover larger areas due to restricted resources. Therefore, areas with one or more of the following characteristics have so far been excluded:
 - Enumerators are unable to obtain reliable data from the area due to restricted access to key informants (e.g. often in regime/ some armed party controlled areas).
 - Enumerators are unable to obtain data due to lack of security in the area.

The units of measurement covered in this assessment include; individuals (e.g. number of IDPs); institutions (e.g. number of schools); and sub-districts (e.g. needed health interventions in each sub-district).

01: SECONDARY DATA REVIEW

To present a comprehensive view of the humanitarian situation in the assessed sub-districts, the DYNAMO 6 drew on the available secondary data. Multiple sources of secondary data such as pre-crisis information, public reports and assessments such as HNO 2017. In addition to information gathered from local and international actors participated in consolidating the collected primary data and informing both the debriefing and the final report.

02: ASSESSMENT SAMPLE

Sampling was conducted at the sub-district level. The objective is to assess all sub-districts within enumerator areas. The sub-district population was compared with the population figures projected by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESQWA) in 2011 using 2004 census figures.

03: ASSESSMENT TOOLS

IMU developed a new questionnaire for this assessment during two stages: Designing the first draft for the new DYNAMO questionnaire, then reviewing it with other ACU departments and UN Cluster Leads, working in the Syrian crisis before issuing the last version. IMU received feedback from health and FSL sectors coordinators, and some appropriate suggestions were taken into consideration. Analysis team designed the KOBO form to enter data using smartphones.

04: DATA COLLECTION

The primary data collection methods used in DYNAMO 6 report include key informant interviews, direct observations, and evidence recording.

All enumerators received the questionnaire via KOBO and entered collected data directly into the questionnaire. The data collection phase lasted 20 days, considering that some enumerators covered secondary sub-districts as well the primary sub-district. The enumerators identified key informants and conducted interviews using the questionnaire as a basis to record information, or a notebook if it was unsafe to fill in the questionnaire onsite. The enumerators recorded observations to verify key informant information and obtained evidence of records where possible for further verification and improvement of confidence level. Then, the enumerators sent the final version of the filled-in questionnaire to the IMU through KOBO collect program (app).

Triangulation process

1- Level 1

Conducted by the enumerators to

- obtain data
- ascertain confidence level of data.

1- Level 2

Conducted during de-briefing with enumerators to

- obtain data
- ascertain confidence level of data.

Figure 01: Triangulation Process



05: ODD VALUES REVISION PROCESS

Enumerators sent their questionnaires to the IMU where the following steps were conducted:

- Questionnaires were compared with secondary data sources, including ACU data.
- Questionnaires were checked for sources (obtaining additional details about the source for verification).
- Questions were checked for inconsistencies.
- Communication with enumerators via skype program to check all questions that appeared while data revision.
- Enumerators reassessed the situation on the field when necessary to obtain clarification.

06: CONFIDENCE LEVELS

Table 01: Confidence Levels

Code	Category	Description
1	High confidence level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Three or more different sources of data providing the same range of figures. ● Records available with all the sources and are available for sharing and cross-checking. Records are updated on regular basis. ● Direct observation matches the data presented and the general opinion of at least 3 key informants totally matches the data provided. ● Evidence is available and should explain precise cases (such as photos for all destroyed health centers for instance).
2	Good confidence level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Three different sources are providing a very close range of figures. ● Records available with at least one of the sources and are available for sharing and cross-checking. Available records are updated on regular basis. ● Direct observation matches the data presented, and the general opinion of at least three key informants is in line with the data provided. ● The evidence is available and should explain the general situation (such as photos for all possible shelters of IDPs).
3	General confidence level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Only one key informant can be found on the topic of interest. ● The key informant has no records available. ● Direct observation would show substantial differences with the data provided, even if the opinion of at least three people from the local population did not show critically great differences and these people stated an upright level of trust with the source. ● The evidence is not available due to security reasons or different reasons that enumerators are supposed to explain during reviewing.

07: DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Enumerators filled in the questionnaire electronically through KoBo Collect program and network coordinator team received questionnaires as data which was exported to Excel database. After that, the analysis team used the SPSS statistical program to explore the odd and missing values. Some odd and missing values have appeared. Here the coordinators reviewed the questionnaires which included those incorrect values with enumerators. These values have been corrected, and data reviewing phase took five days.

Analysis team produced the report visuals which included cross tables, figures, and heatmaps using Excel and SPSS programs that constitute a significant part of assessment result analysis.

IMU GIS officer produced the report maps using Arc GIS software, and the designer designed the report visuals using the Adobe package of programs and shaped the report layout.

IMU Reporting Officers produced a first draft of the report and submitted it for review by IMU team Health, FSL, and WASH sectors of DYNAMO 6 were revised as well by the corresponding ACU departments, and appropriate changes were applied. The reporting officers proceeded with the report translation to The English language. The IMU has actively disseminated the findings through the release of the final report, uploading it on ACU's website, disseminating it to all relevant stakeholders and interested organizations on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

Data analysis shaped the structure of the report and informed the development of the priority interventions and recommendations outlined in the conclusion.

08: LIMITATIONS

ACU enumerators obtained the population figures and compared to existing registration lists, beneficiary lists, and local knowledge or secondary data verifications. Several limitations need to be taken into consideration when using DYNAMO population figures:

- Population movement in Syria is highly dynamic, and no existing tracking system currently captures displacement patterns in real time.
- IMU enumerators were not able to assess some areas due to security issues although the situation there might be worse than some of the assessed areas.
- For the purpose of protecting our enumerators and KIs, we keep all their personal information confidential and identify this information in the correspondent databases as codes.
- Only 3% of our enumerators are females, and the majority of interviewed KIs are males due to the lack of security which limits the ability to have female enumerators and KIs.

09: INFORMATION VISUALS IN THIS REPORT


The questionnaire used for the DYNAMO 6 included questions covering various types of information such as ranking, multiple choice, single choice, severity scale, the percentage of damaged infrastructure and quantitative figures.

All severity scale questions were visualized as figures with total numbers, heatmaps at governorate level and maps at sub-district level.

Numbers within some heatmaps in the report represent number of sub-districts, and color gamut from dark to light represent the severe need and the importance level of the studied variable.

10: ASSESSMENT WORK PLAN

Figure 02: Assessment Work plan



GENERAL INFORMATION


THE COVERAGE

ACU enumerators collected data from 105 out of 270 sub-districts in 11 out of 14 Syrian governorates, covering 73% of the villages in the assessed sub-districts. ACU enumerators were not able to cover all villages in the assessed sub-districts due to several reasons. First, some villages are located within clash points and have consequently turned into military barracks and many of them are depopulated. The highest coverage percentage of villages was in the governorates of Dar'a and Al Hasakeh (98%) and Idleb (94%) because these governorates did not witness clashes and were under bombardment only.

Only the besieged Yarmuk neighborhood was assessed in Damascus City and only the besieged Al-Wa'ar neighborhood was assessed in Homs City due to the tight Syrian Regime's control on most of Damascus city and its complete control of Homs city except Al-Wa'ar neighborhood. Yarmuk and Al-Wa'ar neighborhoods witnessed an exacerbated humanitarian situation due to the long-lasting blockade by Syrian Regime forces.

ACU enumerators were able to assess the two parts of Deir-ez-Zor City. One part is controlled by the Syrian Regime including the ISIL-besieged Al-Qusoor and Al-Joura neighborhoods and the other part includes the ISIL-held rest of the city. Two separate questionnaires were administered in each part of the city and the collected data was triangulated to assess the current situation within the city.


The largest number of assessed sub-districts was in Aleppo (21 sub-districts), followed by Idleb and Damascus (16 sub-districts in each) and Deir-ez-Zor (13 sub-districts).




%73

of Villages Coverage
in Assessed Sub-districts

Figure 03: Number of Assessed Sub-districts by Governorate





Map 01: Coverage Map



The following map shows the controlling forces within the sub-districts by ACU enumerators and the security situation within those sub-districts in terms of bombing and clashes. Control forces include Syrian regime forces, Non-State Armed Group (NSAG), Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Kurdish forces. 58 sub-districts are dominated by NSAG including all assessed sub-districts in Idleb, Dar'a and Quneitra, 22 sub-districts are controlled by ISIL including the besieged Yarmuk Camp in Damascus. 13 sub-districts are controlled by Kurdish forces including border sub-districts in Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa and most of Al-Hasakeh sub-districts, and 12 sub-districts are controlled by the Syrian regime.

Map 02: Security Situation and Control Forces - October 2016





DYNAMO 6 covers
the Fully Besieged Neighborhoods
Al-Wa'ar and Yarmuk Camp

DEMOGRAPHY

The demographic distribution map in Syria changed dramatically within the past five years as a result of displacement movements which accompanied on ground security changes in Syria. This made Syrian demography complicated daily changing issue and made Syria a land for the worst world displacement crisis for decades. According to HRP Monitoring Report 2016 within Key facts and figures "6.1M people are internally displaced, including 1.7M living in tented settlements and collective shelters"¹ Demography section in DYNAMO 6 covers more than 4 million IDPs within 105 assessed sub-districts and the percentage of their distribution places.



1-https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2016_pmr_syria_160905_0.pdf

(رئالیت 2) بیجا نیو ایلیز - آف پی - قرحما اعصه



4.2m

Internally Displaced People Within Assessed Sub-districts


01: INFORMATION SOURCE EVALUATION

The quality of information sources is a basic factor for data credibility and the exact assessment of the situation on the ground as much as possible. A question has been added on the quality of information because of the difficulty to access information sometimes or the unavailability of credible information sources. The collected information in this study is classified into three different types: high-quality information which is collected from high reliable sources, and shows exact results during data triangulation and requires the enumerator’s continuous access to information and making sure that data is refreshed continuously, good quality information is collected from reliable sources too, and shows similar results during data triangulation but the information source does not refresh his information continuously, and general information where information source is unreliable and information is uncertain and shows different results while data triangulation.

Information sources differ according to collected data and controlling forces. The basic information sources for demography section were It should be noted that SARC was the basic source of information within the regime-held areas.

The quality of most of the information within demography section was good-quality information within 58% of the assessed sub-districts, while 38% was high-quality information, whereas 4% of demography data was general information collected from ISIL-held Sosa and Maskana, Kurdish-held Tall Refaat, and Regime-held Az-Zabdani. In general, controlling forces were the main obstacle for enumerators to collect high-quality information.

Figure 04: Information Source Evaluation



02: POPULATION NUMBER WITHIN ASSESSED SUB-DISTRICTS


The population within assessed sub-districts was 11,470,348 individuals with 1,075,827 individual increase compared with DYNAMO 5² issued by IMU in June 2016. This increase can be referred to many reasons headed by change of DYNAMO 6 coverage where many sub-districts were recently covered in Dar’a and Quneitra governorates in the south of Syria. In addition, 75% of the assessed sub-districts suffered from deteriorating security conditions, and consequently these sub-districts witness frequent displacement waves where IDPs constitute more than one third of the population within assessed sub-districts. Those IDPs are displaced from a village or neighborhood to a safer village or neighborhood within the same sub-district, or externally displaced persons who come from other sub-districts within the same governorate or from other governorates. Besides, controlling forces sometimes use the policy of forced displacement as in the following sub-districts: Suluk and Ein Issa in Ar-Raqqa, Tall Refaat in Aleppo, and Tadmor city in Homs. The most densely populated sub-districts were Hama (920,000), Qudsiya (900,000) and Al Tall (700,000) individuals.



2- <http://www.acu-sy.org/en/syria-dynamic-monitoring-report-DYNAMO-v5/>

It should be noted that the numbers in the map below represent the number of residents and IDPs within assessed sub-districts except for Homs and Damascus cities, where the besieged Yarmuk Camp neighborhood in Damascus and the besieged Al-Wa'ar neighborhood in Homs were the only two covered neighborhoods in these two cities.

Map 03: Population Numbers



03: NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

The movements of displaced people towards safer places started within the same governorate with the beginning of the Syrian crisis 6 years ago where civilians tried to avoid arrest. The mass movement of displacement increased with the start of military actions including shelling and clashes, which forced increasing numbers of civilians to leave their homes searching for more secure places.


4,176,435
IDPs in Assessed
Sub-districts

%34
IDPs

11,470,348
Population in Assessed Sub-districts

Population movements started within the same governorate from one village to a safer one or from one neighborhood to a safer one, which is known as internal displacement where displaced people stay within the same sub-district. However, when the military situation gets worse within the whole sub-district forcing civilians to leave their sub-districts towards other sub-districts or even their governorates towards safer governorates which is called external displacement.

Map 04: IDP Numbers




04: DISTRIBUTION PLACES OF IDPS

Syrian Civilians had to leave their homes temporarily when they felt insecure towards the closest safer areas until security conditions are stable again so that they can come back home. This happened and is still happening in many sub-districts in Syria including most of Idleb and western Aleppo countryside sub-districts where families flee their homes in the morning towards the nearest village and then they come back home in the evening when shelling stops. But conditions became complicated so that families' return became hard or even impossible in some cases.

At other times Syrian regime prevented people from coming back to their homes after their temporary departure aiming at forced evictions and displacement of some regions such as Darayya and Madamiyet Elsham sub-districts where inhabitants were forcibly displaced to Idleb. In addition, forced displacement by dominant forces increased in many sub-districts such as Suluk and Ein Issa in Ar-Raqqa where displacement percentage exceeds 70%, the same case takes place in Tall Refaat sub-district in Aleppo governorate where most of its residents live in random camps. Syrian regime displaced most of the inhabitants from Palmyra city after it controlled the city almost completely.

Nearly 2,000,000 IDPs out of more than 4,000,000 IDPs within assessed sub-districts live in rented places, and 180,000 IDPs live in the open or in random camps. The largest number of these IDPs was 25,000 within Hamra sub-district in Hama and 20,000 within Atareb sub-district in Aleppo. The percentage of IDPs distributed in living places is shown in the adjacent figure.

Figure 05: Distribution Places of IDPs



05: Humanitarian Access

According to OCHA's definition, humanitarian access is "the ability of humanitarian actors to reach people affected by the crisis, as well as an affected population's ability to access humanitarian assistance and services".¹

In 22 November 2015, in efforts to ensure that humanitarian assistance reached people in need throughout Syria by the most direct routes, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2258 (2015), thus renewing for a period of 12 months two decisions taken in its resolution 2165 (2014) that authorized passage of aid into the country.


HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACCESSIBILITY

Humanitarian access is the ability to deliver a convoy of humanitarian assistance to assessed sub-districts covered within DYNAMO report. In NSAG control sub-districts in the north of Syria, humanitarian access is the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to these sub-districts through Turkish borders. Whereas, in NSAG control sub-districts in the south of Syria, humanitarian access is the ability to deliver humanitarian assistance to these sub-districts through Jordanian borders.

Regime controlled areas depend in delivering Humanitarian assistance on the Syrian Red Crescent and working organizations there, where the part of Deir-ez Zor city controlled by regime suffers from difficulties in humanitarian access due to the imposed siege.

Humanitarian access was easy in most of Idleb governorate, which is out of regime control except for Sanjar sub-district. On the other hand, all assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa and most assessed sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor suffer from difficulties in humanitarian access.


Figure 06: Difficulties in Humanitarian Aid Accessibility



3-<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12179.doc.htm>

Control forces constitute one of the main factors that affect accessibility. 43% of NSAG-held assessed sub-districts face difficulties in humanitarian assistance accessibility to PiNs. While 57% of NSAG-held assessed sub-districts in Idleb, Dar'a and Quneitra face difficulties in humanitarian access operations. The Syrian Regime imposed siege created difficulties as well in NSAG-held in the assessed sub-districts of Homs and Rural Damascus governorate. Most of the sub-districts controlled by Kurdish forces face difficulties in Humanitarian accessibility because of the conditions imposed by Kurdish forces on humanitarian actors within their areas of influence. Most of the regime-controlled sub-districts within assessed sub-districts face difficulties in humanitarian accessibility because of the obstacles imposed by Syrian regime on humanitarian actors within its areas of influence. The Syrian regime does not only impose previous permission by humanitarian actors but he is also involved in the development of response plans and setting priorities.


Map 05: Humanitarian Accessibility and Control Forces




Humanitarian accessibility to civilian areas is a key factor that affects the conduct of humanitarian operations. Accessibility is studied on two levels: relief agencies' accessibility to beneficiaries and civilians' access to humanitarian aid as well. Each level was studied to define the reasons that hinder humanitarian access.

Relief agencies' accessibility to beneficiaries is very difficult or mostly impossible in 51 out of the 105 assessed sub-districts. Study results showed that the main factors that hinder relief agencies accessibility to beneficiaries are restrictions on the movement of relief agencies, continuous insecurity and civilians access to humanitarian aid. Eleven sub-districts faced difficulties in relief agencies accessibility to beneficiaries despite civilians access to humanitarian aid if available because relief agencies need the approval of controlling authorities.

Figure 07: Type of Difficulties in Humanitarian Aid Accessibility





51 Sub-Districts

face difficulties that prevent PINs' access to humanitarian aid and relief agencies access to PINs

FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS

Food security has become worse in the sixth year of the Syrian crisis and hunger is still a weapon that kills Syrians in besieged areas together with chemical weapons, shelling, and warplanes where "An estimated 69 per cent of people now live in extreme poverty, supporting their families on less than US\$2 per day, of which an estimated 35 per cent live in abject poverty,16 characterized by severe deprivation of the basic food required to survive." 1

The intensification of the Syrian conflict in its sixth year increases the suffering of the Syrian people in the food sector although farming was the primary source of income for half of the population before the crisis, it is still despite its decline due to siege, difficulties and dangers the first source of income for Syrian citizens. Farming before the crisis was supported by the Syrian regime which in turn received support from international organizations.

The continuous conflict, aerial bombardment and imposed siege on some Syrian districts increased the number of people in need of food aid. The escalating crisis and siege caused many deaths as a result of malnutrition in Syria and the humanitarian situation deteriorated in Rural Damascus. According to HNO 2017 "9M people are in need of food, agriculture and livelihoods assistance, out of which 7M are food insecure, and a further 2M are at risk of food insecurity"2



1-https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf

2-https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf



FOOD SECURITY SEVERITY


15%
bad

45%
average

40%
good

01: INFORMATION SOURCE EVALUATION

Figure 08: Information Source Evaluation in Food Security



02: FOOD SECURITY SEVERITY


Food security continued deteriorating in the sixth year of the Syrian crisis and Syria became more dependent on humanitarian assistance. Food quantities decreased and the quality of food worsened and food prices increased due to the large decline in the Syrian currency against the US dollar. Besides, the number of people in need of food assistance increased while the quantity of provided food decreased in the country and the situation is even worse in besieged areas. According to HNO 2017 page 40: "In August 2016, the national average cost of a standard food basket was SYP32,332 (\$64), an increase of 15.7 per cent relative to January 2016. This is 23.6 per cent higher as compared with the same month in 2015, and 487.5 percent compared to 2012."³

The DYNAMO study depended on special criteria for the assessment of food security severity within assessed sub-districts that included the availability of bread, vegetables, meat, and consumer products such as rice, oil, legumes and sugar in terms of quantity, quality and price. Data analysis results showed that food security sector was bad in some governorates and average in some other governorates. Rural Damascus, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Al- Hasakeh suffered poor nutritional situation according to the above mentioned criteria, and the hardest hit sub-districts were the following: Hajar Aswad, Qudsiya, and Madaya in Rural Damascus, Tal Hmis in Al- Hasakeh, and Jebel Saman in Aleppo. The situation was not better in many other sub-districts such as the besieged Al-Waar neighborhood in Homs which was deprived of bread for several months forcing people to use the available flour or even legumes to bake bread at home. Besides, the Syrian regime is still preventing the entry of food assistance to certain districts such as Eastern Ghota. On the other hand, ISIL forces deny the access of humanitarian assistance to Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa center, and food situation is very bad in Suluk in Ar-Raqqa where commercial markets were closed by PKK, forces who the sub-district.


Study results show that the worst food situation was in Rural Damascus, where there are some besieged sub-districts that lack food so that they had to start some development projects to produce food such as growing wheat projects. Despite the imposed siege on Homs sub-districts some humanitarian NGOs manage to enter food assistance who implement some projects for bread production as well. However, the deteriorating food security severity in Al-Waar neighborhood affected negatively food security severity in Homs governorate. It is worth mentioning that food status is very bad within Yarmouk Camp Neighborhood in Damascus although it seems good because humanitarian assistance was delivered during data collection period.

³https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf

Map 06: Food Security Severity




Heatmap 01: Food Security Severity



03: INCOME SOURCES

Farming remained the major sources of income in assessed governorates as in DYNAMO 5⁴ despite the numerous difficulties facing the agricultural sector, as stated above, and there are insufficient agricultural pharmacies in 22 assessed sub-districts. Large percentage of Syrians had to depend on remittances from their relatives outside Syria because most of them have lost their source of income and because of the dramatic rise in food prices and the falling value of the Syrian pound against the US dollar. Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, Dar'a, and Homs topped the governorates in dependence on remittances as the main source of income especially within besieged sub-districts. The other sources of income included self-employment, livestock sales, trading, humanitarian assistance offered by associations and organizations, and wage labor. It is noteworthy that commercial activity declined markedly in most assessed sub-districts because of imposed blockade and the dangers surrounding the transport of goods. In addition, the excessive selling, slaughtering, and smuggling of livestock outside Syria might eliminate the livestock, and it is noteworthy to mention that wage labor is unstable and insufficient source of income.

Heatmap 02: Sources of Income within Assessed Governorates



04: BREAD AND BAKERIES

The consumption of bread (the primary food in Syria) increases with the shortage of other foodstuff because people compensate the loss of foodstuff by consuming more bread. Civilians' suffering has been increasing since the beginning of the crisis due to the shortage of food in general and bread in particular and the functionality of bakeries and civilians' accessibility to them. DYNAMO 6 report covered the number of functioning and non-functioning bakeries and the main reasons for bakeries stop functioning within assessed sub-districts.

Data analysis show that there are 26 sub-districts that do not contain any functional bakeries, 5 of which do not have any bakeries at all, Hajeb and Banan in Aleppo where civilians buy bread that is brought from neighboring sub-districts; Al- Khashniyyeh and Al Fiq sub-districts in Quneitra governorate reported the unavailability of bakeries at all where residents buy bread from the city center of Quneitra. A total of 1,207 bakeries exist in the covered sub-districts where 47% of them are out of service. The known amount bread share per capita is 200 gr and this quantity increases during the

3- <https://goo.gl/OVScN0>

humanitarian crises. The most significant constraint for the civilians is the absence of coordination to support bakeries with flour, whereas some sub-districts are supported with big amounts of flour and on the other hand, other sub-districts are not supported at all and bread is not delivered to those sub-districts; in this case civilians are forced to travel for long distances to get bread. High transportation costs are added to the bread costs and make it even more expensive. It should be noted that some merchants buy bread in other sub-districts with high prices.

Map 07: The Number of Functioning Bakeries within Assessed Sub-districts




Table 02: Bakeries Information




Governorate	Number of functioning bakeries	The daily total maximum production capacity of the functioning bakeries (by tonne)	Number of non-functioning bakeries
Idleb	135	741	24
Al-Hasakeh	73	237	15
Ar-Raqqa	37	141	54
Quneitra	1	15	0
Aleppo	154	707	251
Hama	71	210	32
Homs	21	69	24
Dar'a	44	218	28
Deir-ez-Zor	65	135	59
Rural Damascus	36	179	63
Damascus	0	0	20

The shortage of flour was the most important reason for bakeries to stop functioning within the assessed sub-districts knowing that Syrian regime used to support bakeries with flour before the crisis and that the main governorates that provided Syria with wheat were the eastern governorates such as Al- Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa which are now controlled by Kurdish forces and ISIL. The cease of the regime’s bread support led most often to an increase in bread price or non-functioning of a large number of bakeries. Other reasons for bakeries non-functionality include non-availability of operational costs because some organizations support bakeries with flour only without covering operational costs and still ask bakeries’ owners to sell bread at subsidized price. The inability of bakery owners to cover high operational costs forced a percentage of them to stop bread production despite the availability of flour. Other reasons for non-functioning bakeries included machinery malfunction, unavailability of spare parts, completely destroyed buildings or the existence of the bakery within clash area.

Heatmap 03: Main Reasons for Non-functioning Bakeries


Figures represent the number of sub-districts where the reasons were found knowing that there may be more than one reason in the same sub-district



05: FOOD SECURITY PRIORITIES


The need for food kept increasing during the six years of the Syrian crisis with the siege circumstances, soaring prices and decline in per capita incomes. Food baskets headed people's needs within the food security sector in most of the assessed sub-districts due to low purchasing power of the population and high food prices, followed by baby food supplements and flour as shown in the following heatmap.

Heatmap 04: Food Sector Priorities



06: DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN FOOD SECURITY SECTOR

Development projects started in many liberated areas in a trial to achieve stability in food security sector because provided humanitarian assistance did not meet civilians' needs. Compared to DYNAMO 5⁴, the percentage of assessed sub-districts with active development projects increased from 41% to 62% during the previous six months. In addition, this study included active development projects and deliverables within assessed sub-districts. In other words, the availability of appropriate conditions for the implementation of development projects such as the availability of agricultural lands that can be planted with strategic crops such as potatoes, wheat and legumes. Forty-eight assessed sub-districts were planted with strategic crops especially in Idleb, Aleppo and Rural Damascus.



On the other hand, livestock development projects were implemented only in few sub-districts knowing that food baskets do not include meat and most families cannot afford to buy meat because of its rarity and high price. This, among other factors, leads to undernutrition among civilians especially women and children.

There were not any active development projects within 38% of the assessed sub-districts including all the assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor where humanitarian organizations are not allowed to work. A decline in agriculture was registered in Dana sub-district in Idleb due to the spread of IDP camps on a wide agricultural area.

Heatmap 05: Active Development Projects

Figures represent the number of sub-districts that contain development projects knowing that there may be more than one project in the same sub-district

Governorate	Livestock Development Projects	Simple handicrafts	Centers for providing agricultural inputs	Strategic crops (potato / wheat / legumes)
Idleb	6	8	9	10
Al-Hasakeh	2	3	0	2
Ar-Raqqa	0	0	0	0
Quneitra	0	4	3	2
Aleppo	5	6	7	9
Hama	1	1	2	2
Homs	1	2	2	4
Dar'a	3	0	4	4
Deir-ez-Zor	3	3	3	6
Rural Damascus	6	7	6	8
Damascus	1	1	0	1
Total	28	35	36	48


N/A Big Number

It is important to know deliverables within assessed sub-districts especially those that do not contain any functioning development project because these projects contribute to the investment of natural resources and securing employment opportunities, both for specialists, expertise and manpower in the district aiming to achieve food security. These projects can cover a part of civilians' needs instead of depending completely on intermittent food assistance which is affected by the security situation, accessibility, and the status of the roads. This was assured by FAO: "Restoring Syrian agriculture wherever possible is significantly cheaper than importing food assistance. For example, \$100 in support enables a farmer to produce 1 tonne of wheat, whereas the same amount of cereal is much more expensive to import."⁵ Croplands ready to be planted with strategic crops formed eighty percent of the assessed land area within assessed sub-districts, and there is a possibility for establishing livestock development projects within 73% of the assessed sub-districts.

4- <http://www.acu-sy.org/en/syria-dynamic-monitoring-report-dynamo-v5/>

5- <http://www.fao.org/news/story/pt/item/380279/icode/>

Heatmap 06: Implementable Development projects




Figures represent the number of the available implementable development projects in the sub-districts knowing that there may be more than project in the same sub-district

N/A Acute Need

Local population manage the largest percentage of development projects, along with LCs, LNGOs, and other authorities that also manage development projects. Whereas INGOs administrate some projects only within Jawadiyah sub-district in Al- Hasakeh and Sahnaya in Rural Damascus.

Heatmap 07: The responsible parties of project management




Figures in the heatmap represent the number of sub-districts according to the managing party of the project

Large Number N/A

07: LIVESTOCK


Livestock exist in 86% of the assessed sub-districts and there is a possibility to establish livestock care centres and other development projects related to livestock especially that the livestock is in average or good status in 78% of the assessed sub-districts where livestock breeding continues and there are not dangerous diseases that affect the cattle or lead to their death, although some challenges face cattle breeders due to current crisis. There is a possibility for implementing livestock development projects in 77 sub-districts. On the other hand, there are not any active development livestock projects within 13 assessed sub-districts in Al- Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Dar'a and Eastern Aleppo countryside where the livestock are in miserable conditions.

THERE IS LIVESTOCK IN
 **%86**
 of assessed sub-districts

IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT LIVESTOCK PROJECTS IN **77**
 of assessed sub-districts


The following figure shows the status of livestock in assessed governorates.

Figure 09: Livestock Severity within Assessed Sub-districts



Aiming at improving Syrian livestock as a basic foundation for achieving food security DYNAMO 6 covered the most important difficulties that livestock face within assessed sub-districts. Most of the assessed sub-districts face difficulties in livestock breeding headed by soaring fodder price and lack of fodder, in addition to the spread of diseases among the cattle in all assessed governorates. People in Jizeh, Hirak, Mseifra, and Busra Esh-Sham sub-districts complained about Shortage of veterinarians and high prices of veterinary drugs. Lack of proper pasture and salty undrinkable wells' water were the two main difficulties in Elhole and Markada sub-districts. Frequent shelling and poor security conditions threatens the cattle and forces owners to sell them in some sub-districts such as Heish in Idleb, Sokhneh in Homs and Haritan in Aleppo.

Heatmap 08: Difficulties Facing Livestock



08: AGRICULTURE

Agriculture prevails in 92% of assessed sub-districts because agricultural lands spread over large areas in Syria. The Syrian regime policy of siege and starvation increased awareness of the importance of farming all available agricultural spaces even within the residential blocks in cities such as Aleppo, Al-Waar and Yarmouk camp neighborhoods to face the policy of starving which is one of the deadliest methods. Study results showed that although agricultural status is good within only 20% of assessed sub-districts within 7 of the 11 assessed governorates. We mean by good that that farmers still grow their lands and that no agricultural pests threaten the crops although farming sector deteriorated during the crisis years. The agricultural sector faces many difficulties in crop lands including: the soaring prices of fuel if available especially in Aleppo and Idlib, the high cost of seeds and lack of specialized staff. In this context, the first complaint of farmers in Jizeh, Hirak, Mseifra and Busra Esh-Sham was that they buy seeds and other agricultural inputs in US dollar and sell their crops in Syrian pound which causes losses because of the continuous inflation of the Syrian pound.

Irrigation problems ranked second especially in many sub-districts in Idlib and Rural Damascus governorates and farmers in 45% of assessed sub-districts rely on rainwater because of the high cost of other irrigation methods. It is noteworthy that regime forces in Az- Zabdani sub-district do not allow farmers' access to their land and almost daily cuts the fruit trees which constitute 90% of farming in the sub-district.

of assessed sub-districts

45% depend on **RAIN WATER**



92% 


Cultivation spreads in assessed sub-districts

Figure 10: Agriculture Severity within the Assessed Sub-districts



Figures represent the number of sub-districts, whereas agriculture is not spread in some of them.


Heatmap 09: The Difficulties that Face Agriculture




09: IRRIGATION SOURCES

Water is an essential factor in the development of the agricultural sector and livestock breeding. Irrigation projects were implemented within 33 out of 105 assessed sub-districts. Hence, irrigation difficulties ranked second among agriculture difficulties as stated above. irrigation sources which are rainwater, groundwater and surface water vary from one district to another. The largest number of assessed sub-districts depend on rainwater such as Markada in Al- Hasakeh, Ziyara in Hama, Al- Khashniyyeh in Quneitra, Qourqeena in Idleb, Tall Refaat in Aleppo despite the fact that these sub-districts are agricultural sub-districts. Deir-ez-Zor centre, Abu Kamal, Jalaa and Susat sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor depend completely on Euphrates river water. Whereas Madaya in Rural Damascus, Bennsh in Idleb and Muharda in Hama depend completely on ground water for land irrigation.

Figure 11: Irrigation Sources



The figures represent the percentage of irrigation source in each governorate




10: AGRICULTURAL PHARMACIES

The continuity of agriculture and stock-breeding require nearby agricultural pharmacies that provide fertilizers and seeds in addition to insecticides, veterinary medicines and other basic items needed for agriculture in addition to veterinary medicines. There was not any agricultural pharmacy within 24 assessed sub-districts although 19 of them are agricultural sub-districts and that there are stock-breeding activities in 15 of them.


The high cost of needed items and veterinary medicines if available headed the considerable difficulties that agricultural pharmacies faced in all assessed sub-districts, followed by unavailability of all the necessary items in addition to lack of specialized staff which affects negatively agriculture and stock breeding. Farmers in nine assessed sub-districts had difficulties in access to agricultural pharmacies including Areesheh in Al- Hasakeh, Tell Abiad in Ar-Raqqa, Banan and Maskana in Aleppo, and Kafr Nobol in Idleb.

Figure 12: The Sufficiency of Agricultural Pharmacies in Terms of Number and Materials



Figures represent the number of sub-districts, and some sub-districts do not have agricultural pharmacies

Heatmap 10: Agricultural Pharmacies Difficulties



N/A Big Difficulty



HEALTH SECTOR

“Even war has rules” that is what United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s declared after the adoption of the text of the resolution 2286 of the Security Council in May 2016, which strongly condemns the attacks against the medical facilities and personnel in crises. Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis is not an exception, but rather the medical facilities have been subjected for the sixth consecutive year to the bombardment, at a time when the medical personnel is risking their lives to save the injured and treat them. 101 attacks on hospitals and health-care centers were reported from January to August 2016 killing 14 healthcare workers and injuring a further 40.”

The health sector is considered one of the fundamental and important sectors and is closely linked to the food security and WASH sectors, where the food shortage causes population malnutrition and other diseases. In addition, water sterilization and potability directly affect the civilians’ health. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview, HNO 2017 page 11 “12.8 million people across Syria are without adequate health assistance” .

The DYNAMO 6 health sector assesses the adequacy of the health services, its costs, and the accessibility of health services in all assessed sub-districts; it covers the number of the out of service medical facilities, the bombed ones, and the main reasons for non-functionality; covers the number of the medical facilities, the personnel and the priorities of the health sector.

1- <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12347.doc.htm>

2- <http://hno-syria.org/flip/index.html>

3- <http://hno-syria.org/flip/index.html>






260

**NON-FUNCTIONING MEDICAL POINTS
IN ASSESSED SUB-DISTRICTS**

01: INFORMATION SOURCE EVALUATION

The enumerators were able to access accurate sources of information regarding the health sector, as most of them headed to medical facilities and specialized doctors. Therefore, 98% of the information on the assessed sub-districts was with high or good quality where 2% of the information on the covered sub-districts was general. The enumerators in Tell Rifaat sub-district in Aleppo Governorate were not able to access accurate information due to the Kurdish forces military influence on the sub-district and the displacement of the majority of its residents. Likewise, the enumerator in Abu-Kamal did not manage to access accurate information as well.

Figure 13: Information source evaluation in health sector




02: HEALTH SERVICES ASSESSMENT

The health services include three levels of treatment; the first level is carried out in the dispensaries and the maternal and child healthcare centers. This level includes the medical inspection, and this is wherein the first aid and other easy surgeries are performed. The second level is carried out in the hospitals that include all the specialties, the fully equipped operation rooms, and is wherein performed the surgical operations for the injured and sick. The third level includes the physical therapy and rehabilitation centers, in addition to the artificial-limb centers.

The medical performance was limited, during the ongoing events, to the first level. Despite the large number of the available hospitals in the covered sub-districts herein, the lack of the specialized physicians, the necessary equipment, and the equipped operation rooms led these hospitals to perform in the first level of treatment.

The following heatmap represents the the health performance level in the covered governorates in the assessment by comparing the ratio of the number of the hospitals and the physicians to the population. The health services costs were ranked according to being free or paid partly or totally by the civilians and according to the accessibility of the centers in terms of distance and safety. After taking all the results of the previous factors, the final ranking of the health situation in the assessed governorates was developed.


Heatmap 11: Health Services Assessment within the Assessed Governorates



The health situation in Idleb was the best compared the other governorates; there were a large number of hospitals and equipped medical facilities, which are accessible and mostly free of charge with a good number of physicians. There is Bab Al-Hawa Hospital in Dana Sub-district, which is an integrated hospital that includes a big number of operation rooms and physicians of different specialties, in addition to Ma'arrat An Nu'man Hospital which is functioning in the current conditions and considered the first surgical hospital in out of regime control Northern Syria. Another two hospitals exist in the same sub-district Aqrabat Hospital or Kuwaiti Hospital and Al-Salam hospital that includes surgical services.

Similarly, the health situation was good in Hama Governorate, where DYNAMO 6 assessed sub-districts were few compared to the number of the medical centers. Moreover, the open roads between Hama Countryside and Idleb made it easier to access Idleb, which resulted in better health situation in the covered sub-districts of the both governorates.

Map 08: Health Services Assessment in the Assessed Sub-districts



On the other hand, the governorates of Homs and Quneitra recorded the worst health situation during the assessment period. The majority of the assessed sub-districts in Homs Governorate are besieged, including Al-Waer Neighborhood in the city center, and suffer from the lack of specialized physicians. The besieged neighborhood of Al-Waer suffers from the lack of physicians in all specialties, but rather there is one, and only general surgeon who performs all the surgeries, and the patients need a security approval to access the hospitals in the Syrian Regime-held sub-districts. Palmyra Sub-district as well suffers from the lack of physicians and functional medical centers. The number of physicians in Quneitra Governorate is considerably small compared to the population, and there is an acute shortage of medical supplies.

The sub-districts in the western countryside of Aleppo Governorate such as Zurbah, Tall Ed-daman, Banan, and Hajeb suffer from the almost total absence of the health services. The situation is slightly better in the sub-districts of Daret Azza and Atareb, while the border sub-district of A'zaz contains the functioning Bab Al-Salameh and Al-Ahli hospitals but the high population density in that area makes an overload on both hospitals. The sub-district of Jebel Saman was under siege during the data collection period. Therefore the health situation there was deteriorated.

Regarding the health situation in the eastern governorates, it was normal in the ISIL-held governorates of Deir ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa compared to the other governorates, given that these governorates have sufficient hospitals, but the problem lies in the absence of the specialized physicians. The health situation in the besieged and the Syrian Regime-held neighborhoods in Deir ez-Zor City is seriously deteriorated. All the hospitals in those neighborhoods are hard to reach, and the civilians rely on the Red Crescent dispensary, which provides the first aid services apart from other clinics.

03: SECOND: MEDICAL FACILITIES ACCESSIBILITY

The civilians' access to the medical facilities depends on the security factors or terrains, where the checkpoints of the control forces significantly affect this accessibility. Bombardment and clashes are key impediments to the secure access to the medical facilities, as the ambulances are often targeted by aircraft during the transporting of the injured or patients. Terrain also plays an important role in the accessibility to the medical facilities, where the far distance along with the lack of the transportation means in several villages are the main impediments to access them.

Despite the total siege laid to the covered sub-districts in Rural Damascus Governorate, most of the medical facilities in these sub-districts are accessible. Accessing the medical facilities in these sub-districts is considered easy only because of the absence of the tension among the control parties over these sub-districts. On the other hand, there is no access to the medical facilities in the regime-held sub-districts which are neighboring the same countryside.


Most of the covered sub-districts in Aleppo Governorate reported difficulties, ranging from normal to high, in accessing the medical facilities. Hajeb and Banan sub-districts faced big difficulties in accessing the medical facilities, where the patients and injured there have to travel a long distance to access the hospitals in Idlib Countryside. Only a few medical facilities exist there and provide first aid services, and there are no functional medical facilities in the neighboring sub-districts as well. Access level to the most of the medical facilities in the eastern neighborhoods of Jebel Saman Sub-district in Aleppo Governorate was average according to the continuous bombardment during the data collection period.

The difficulty of accessing the medical facilities in the recently Kurdish-held southern areas in Al-Ha-sakeh Governorate such as Hole, Shadadah, and Areesheh sub-districts is moderate because of the checkpoints established by these forces.

During the data collection period, the bombardment was escalated on Idlib Governorate posing a moderate difficulty in accessing the medical facilities in several covered sub-districts, but the biggest ratio of the medical facilities in this governorate remain accessible.

Figure 14: Health Facilities Accessibility within the Assessed Governorates

Numbers represent the count of medical facilities




04: MEDICAL SERVICES COST

The services costs of the medical facilities depend on the received fund. Many hospitals and dispensaries receive the fund to support their needs such as medicine, equipment, and the salaries of medical personnel, which results in providing free health services to the injured and patients. On the other hand, there are other medical facilities that receive partial support; those facilities get partial costs for their services from the injured and patients to cover their uncovered requirements. Other medical facilities do not receive any fund, which makes their services fully paid. Most of the time, these medical facilities are private clinics or hospitals like in Deir ez-Zor Governorate.

Most of the medical facilities in Rural Damascus Governorate provide paid services. A total of 200 out of 224 medical facilities of this governorate are in the regime-held sub-district of Kisweh, and most of these facilities are private clinics. Whereas, most of the medical facilities in the NSAG-held sub-districts provide free of charge or low costs services. The majority of the medical facilities in Idleb Governorate were providing free services. There were 62 medical facilities including several hospitals in the assessed sub-districts providing free services, and as we mentioned above, Idleb was ranked in the first place in the medical services level ranking among the sub-districts of the assessed governorates.

Figure 15: Health Facilities Costs in the Assessed Sub-districts



05: NON-FUNCTIONING HEALTH FACILITIES

The health facilities may stop functioning for several reasons, mainly security and/or financial reasons. Often, the targeted medical facilities are partially reconstructed and partially resumed functioning again. It is worth mentioning that the majority of the medical facilities use only the basements, which are less vulnerable for bombardment, while the administrators of these medical facilities are always working on ensuring the support for their medical facilities to maintain the continuance of operating.

The figure below represents the number of the medical facilities that were out of service during the data collection period. There were 82 facilities out of service in Aleppo Governorate, including 35 medical facilities in Atareb Sub-district, due to security reasons. The sub-district was subjected to bombardment during the assessment period, and there was no possibility of reactivating the targeted medical facilities. The administrators of the sub-district are working to secure safer medical facilities to maintain providing the health services in the western countryside. The security situation in Haritan Sub-district in Aleppo Governorate is bad because of its vicinity to the front lines, what led to the close down of all of the 14 medical facilities. The residents receive the health services from the medical facilities in Anjara and Daret Azza sub-districts in the same governorate. Some hospitals in Manbij Sub-district are still out of service because of the planted mines inside many of them, as the Kurdish forces did not dismantle these mines after taking control of this sub-district.






Figure 16: Number of Non-Functional Health Facilities within the Assessed Sub-districts



Map 09: Functional Health Facilities




The regime-held sub-district of Kisweh in Rural Damascus Governorate contains 25 private clinics out of service since their owners had left Syria. The sub-districts of Al-Nashabiya, Madaya, and Hajar Aswad in the same governorate also contain non-functional medical facilities due to the continuous aerial bombardment.

The Kurdish-held sub-districts of Areesheh and Tal Hmis contain 32 out of service medical facilities because the Kurdish forces prevent the humanitarian organizations from operating and the administrators of these medical facilities from reactivating them. There are also two non-functioning medical facilities in Al-Ma-likeyyeh Sub-district due to the lack of funding.

There are 31 medical facilities out of service in the assessed sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, 20 of them due to security reasons, the bombardment in most cases, and the other 10 due to the lack of funding, knowing that the only donor in this sub-district is the controlling party. In Basira Sub-district in the same governorate, all the medical facilities were out of service due to the lack of medical personnel.

Heatmap 12: Reasons of Health Facilities Non-Functionality in the Assessed Sub-districts

The figures in the heatmap represent the number of the sub-districts that reported the most important reasons for closing down of their medical facilities, knowing that the sub-district may report more than one reason.




06: TARGETING HEALTH FACILITIES WITH BOMBING

DYNAMO 6 covers medical facilities exposure to bombardment within the assessed governorates. The numbers in the following figure represent the count of health facilities which were targeted with bombing during the data collection period and not the number of the bombardment incidents. Usually, the same health facility was being targeted dozens of times to destroy it and make it out of service. The administrators of the small health facilities often relocate them after being bombed for the first time, as they may be targeted again. However, it is still difficult to relocate the hospitals or dispensaries once targeted, so they were targeted several times. In addition, the hospitals contain several sections and operation rooms with certain degrees of sterilization, which makes it impossible to be relocated.

The health facilities in Jebel Saman center reported being continuously targeted, while they provide the health services only in the basements, as it was difficult to relocate those medical facilities.

Figure 17: Number of Targeted Health Facilities in the Assessed Sub-districts




07: THE NUMBER OF THE HOSPITALS, DISPENSARIES, AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL

A total of 197 hospitals exist in the assessed sub-districts, 31 of them in Idlib, and 37 in Aleppo Governorate, and there are 285 dispensaries in the assessed sub-districts as well. All the hospitals and dispensaries provide the first level of treatment including the medical inspection and first aid services. The hospitals carry out only the simple surgeries, while the critical cases or severe injuries were transferred to Bab Al-Hawa Hospital in Dana Sub-district or to Bab Al-Salameh Hospital in A'zaz Sub-district in Aleppo Governorate, and afterward, those cases are moved to Turkey to receive the second and third levels of treatment. The critical medical cases in the southern governorates are transferred to the neighboring countries, and it is known that the entry to Jordan is difficult even for the critical cases despite the deteriorating health situation in Dara'a and Quneitra governorates. The health services in the assessed besieged sub-districts in Rural Damascus and Homs are still below the second and third treatment levels, where the patients are forced to acquire a security approval to access the hospitals in the regime-held sub-districts, and in case the patient's name is listed on the wanted list, he will be arrested on the regime's checkpoint.

The total number of the physicians in the assessed sub-districts was 3,007 except dentists, while specialized doctors are still not available. There were very few vascular surgeons or orthopedic surgeons in the assessed sub-districts, which resulted in more amputation cases among the injured.

Table 03: Number of hospitals and medical personnel within the assessed sub-districts




Governorate	Female Nurses	Male Nurses	Midwives	Total Physicians	Dispensaries	Hospitals
Idlib	119	872	85	280	45	31
Al-Hasakah	195	231	79	238	23	20
Raqqah	42	40	15	49	8	3
Quneitra	6	35	10	18	2	3
Aleppo	375	494	110	507	48	37
Hama	268	619	157	559	57	23
Homs	87	163	33	164	11	13
Daraa	62	200	25	125	11	15
Deir ez-Zor	333	386	101	474	39	26
Rural Damascus	263	472	88	588	41	26
Damascus	10	15	2	5	0	0

08: HEALTH SECTOR PRIORITIES

Medicine topped the priorities of the health sector within the assessed governorates. It is hard to ensure several types of medicines unless from international organizations, especially the chronic diseases medicines such as diabetes and heart diseases. The patients with kidney diseases suffer from the lack of the materials of dialysis sessions in many sub-districts. The cancer patients need to be moved to the neighboring countries for periodic therapy sessions. The need for epilepsy medicines emerged among the epileptic patients, while the high prices of medicines imposed a new burden on the consumers, especially that these prices were not subjected to any control but the control of the traders in these sub-districts. The vaccines were ranked second among the priorities due to the lack of the ordinary vaccination services in the assessed governorates. In addition, because of the irregular vaccination campaigns particularly within the sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh governorates due to security reasons. Whereas, the vaccinations are not effective unless taken regularly.

The need for providing support to the medical equipment and devices was ranked third among the priorities, where the medical equipment are expensive, and there is no entity able to ensure this equipment. The need for supporting the medical personnel by providing the operational costs ranked fourth among the priorities. The Syrian regime deliberately was stopping salary payments to the health sector workers when a sub-district was out of its control. Currently, many local and international organizations support the medical personnel with varying salaries. The absence of the financial support resulted in an irregular performance in the health sector and even in the emigration of the medical expertise out of Syria, which led to a loss of a big number of medical specialties.

Heatmap 13: Health Sector Priorities






EDUCATION SECTOR


About six years after the onset of the Syrian crisis, the education sector in Syria reached a broken state. Urgent action needs to be taken by the international community and the UN system and all interested parties in order to avoid the loss of future generations, and to address the devastating impact of the conflict on children in particular. According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview HNO in Syria for 2017: "Over 6 million children and education personnel are in need of education assistance. 1.75 million children and youth are out of school and 1.35 million at risk of dropping out. 1 in 3 schools is either damaged, destroyed, used as collective shelters or otherwise inaccessible."¹

Education in Syria was compulsory and free at the basic education stage, and free but not compulsory at the preparatory education stage. The fees for higher education were nominal. Basic education consists of two phases: the primary phase (from the first grade to the sixth grade) which children start at the age 6, and the preparatory stage (starting from the seventh grade) which the children join at the age of 12. At the end of this stage, they apply for the preparatory education certificate exam and if they pass this exam, they complete their compulsory basic education phase. Then, they move to secondary education, which is divided into two types: general secondary education, and professional secondary education.

DYNAMO 6 need assessment covered important aspects of the education sector, the most important of which are the severity of the education sector, which is based on several factors, namely: the student enrollment, the adequacy of teachers, the adequacy of schools. As well as the number of teachers, students, and functioning schools according to the security situation and the control forces, the most important difficulties that impede children's access to education, and the priorities of the education sector.

¹https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2017_syria_hno_2.pdf





EDUCATION SECTOR SEVERITY

32%
bad

38%
average


30%
good



01: INFORMATION QUALITY

The quality of the information regarding the education sector in the 94% of the assessed sub-districts ranged between good and high quality. IMU enumerators have reliable sources in most sub-districts, and they have been able to collect data on education at the school level for over three consecutive years, which enabled them to create a reliable database, and to follow up the changes on the ground regarding the education sector.

Figure 18: Information Source Evaluation for the Education Sector



02: STUDENT ENROLLMENT

According to the HNO 2017 “An estimated 1.35 million children are at risk of dropping out. There are over 1.3 million children in hard-to-reach locations, over 300,000 in besieged areas and 353,000 million encircled by military actors.”¹


In this study, the proportion of enrolled students was calculated through the ratio of enrolled students to the total number of children at school age. The results showed that the enrollment ratio was bad in all sub-districts of Ar-Raqqah, where no sub-district had any operating schools, except for Tell Abiad. ISIL forces closed schools in Ar-Raqqah city, the education was prohibited in Kurdish-held Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts, and the schools were allowed schools to operate only in Tell Abiad sub-district. However, the poor educational conditions related to the curriculum and teachers prevented parents from sending their children to schools.

The educational process also stopped in all the ISIL-held sub-districts of Deir-ez-Zor, except for some parts of Deir-ez-Zor city center under the control of the Syrian Regime, where the enrollment ratio was medium. The enrollment rate was poor in the five sub-districts of Al-Hasakeh governorate that were previously under the control of ISIL, and have been taken by the Kurdish forces recently, which are Shadadah, Areesheh, Hole, Tal Hamis, and Markada. On the other hand, the enrollment rate in other sub-districts (Jawadiyah, Malikeyyeh, Quamishli) ranged between good and medium.

The enrollment rate was bad in four sub-districts in Idlib: Bennsh and Sanjar (because of the security situation there), and Harim and Qourqeena (due to the large number of IDPs who often refrain from sending their children to school.) The enrollment ratio was poor in Sokhneh sub-district in Homs governorate. Tadmor sub-district, in the same governorate, did not have any functioning schools, but due to the presence of small number of population in this area resulted in low student enrollment ratios. The eastern ISIL-held sub-districts in Aleppo, had a poor enrollment rate, and so did the southern sub-districts such as Tal Ed-daman, which is under NSAG control, due to the adverse security situation there. The educational process did not start in Suran, and Aghtrin sub-districts in the same governorate. NSAG forces has taken over these two sub-districts and has not been able to rehabilitate the schools until the moment the data collection. The study showed that, due to the constant bombardment of schools, the enrollment rate was bad in the NSAG-held eastern neighborhoods of Jebel Saman, during the data collection. Enrollment rate is considered bad in most areas of Rural Damascus, especially NSAG-held areas, due to the hazardous security situation.

¹https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2017_syria_hno_2.pdf

Figure 19: The level of school enrollment in the assessed governorates



03: ADEQUACY OF TEACHERS

One of the conditions to have ideal education is that each teacher should teach a limited number of students, so the teacher can supervise the students and improve their level of education. If the number of students per teacher is big, the educational process will be adversely affected.

The study included an assessment of the ratio of teachers to students, if the number of students per teacher was 30 students, the ratio is considered good. If each teacher teaches from 30 to 40 students, the ratio is considered medium, but if each teacher teaches more than 40 students, the ratio is considered bad. The assessment results have shown that the number of students per teacher was good in 56% of the assessed sub-districts. Most of the sub-districts in this category were in Aleppo, Idleb, Al-Hasakeh, and Rural Damascus. The number of students per teacher was medium in 6% of the assessed sub-districts. This category included Darkosh sub-district in Idlib governorate, and Hajar Aswad in Rural Damascus. The ratio of students per teacher was bad in 38% of the assessed sub-districts including the sub-districts of Madaya, At-Tall, Sahnaya, and Yabroud, and Ein Elfjeh in Rural Damascus.

It is worth mentioning that the assessment covered the adequacy of the teachers in terms of number without addressing their specialization. It did not address the question whether the personnel engaged in the educational process are professional teachers with prior experience before the crisis, or volunteers who pursued teaching during the current crisis.

Figure 20: Teacher adequacy in the assessed governorates



04: ADEQUACY OF SCHOOLS


The adequacy ratio for schools was measured by calculating the ratio of enrolled students to the number of schools. The school size varies by type, as many schools did not exist before the Syrian crisis, but the bad conditions imposed the emergence of these schools. For example, the lower floors of the buildings were used instead of schools as safe educational locations, due to shelling. In addition, temporary learning spaces appeared, which often consisted of a tent or a prefabricated room that accompanied IDPs in their locations. Sometimes, IDPs allocate rooms for education in their areas.

The DYNAMO 6 survey covered only regular schools that existed before the current crisis, or schools that have been established during the crisis and have met the conditions of the regular schools, such as the availability of sufficient number of classrooms with sizes that fit the number of students, high ceilings and secure windows, and enough bathrooms commensurate with the number of students, in addition to the availability of training halls. It is worth mentioning that schools, before the current crisis, are divided into two types: the first type is regular schools that meet all the required conditions, and the second type is the rural schools that are located in small villages, and consist of rooms that have been converted into classes, and a single room often contained several classrooms.

If the number of students per school was less than 1,000 students, the school is considered non-crowded and the ratio of students per year is good. If the number of students per school ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 students, the school is considered moderately crowded, and the student to school ratio is considered medium. If the number of students per school is more than 2,000 students, the school is considered crowded and the ratio of students per school is bad.

All the sub-districts of Idleb had schools in proportion with number of students, except for Dana, which had a medium ratio because it received a large number of IDPs in classrooms. Madaya in Rural Damascus also had inadequate classrooms for the number of students and some of the houses were used for learning. Al-Khashniyyeh sub-district in Quneitra governorate suffered from the huge number of students within classrooms.


Figure 21: Schools adequacy within the assessed governorates



05: EDUCATION SEVERITY

A general evaluation of the educational situation was conducted within the covered sub-districts, through comparing the governorate enrollment ratio of students to teachers, the adequacy of schools for students, and the quality of the taught curriculum. There are several types of curricula in Syria during the crisis: the Syrian regime curriculum approved before the crisis, the modified curriculum (the same as the regime except that it does not include the parts that glorify the regime and the National Education subject), and other curricula such as ISIL curriculum which propagates jihad, or the Kurdish curricula. The Syrian regime curriculum and the modified curriculum were considered good in comparison to the other curricula, which were considered bad.


Map 10: Education Sector Severity



The best educational situation was within the sub-districts of Idleb governorate, in comparison to the other assessed governorates. The amended curriculum was taught, the enrollment rate was good, and the proportion of schools was sufficient for the number of students in the majority of sub-districts covered in the assessment. The number of teachers was good in 13 sub-districts, moderate in one, and bad in only two sub-districts.

The worst educational situation was in the governorates of Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqah, where all schools in the sub-districts of Deir-ez-Zor stopped functioning, except the parts of Deir ez-Zor city under the control of the Syrian regime. All the schools in Ar-Raqqah, Suluk, and Ein Issa sub-districts in the governorate of Ar-Raqqah stopped working while schools in Tell Abiad in the same governorate still work under bad educational conditions.

Heatmap 14: Education Sector Severity



05: NUMBER OF SCHOOLS

The DYNAMO 6 assessment covered regular schools that existed before the start of the crisis, or that have been established during the events and have met regular school conditions. Most of the educational sector data was collected from functioning schools. Information was also gathered from the non-functioning schools to have a complete picture of the educational situation in the assessed sub-districts, and to explore the main reasons for the decline of the educational process and the main reasons for schools to stop functioning.

The number of schools in the assessed sub-districts was 5,361 schools. 50% of these schools, i.e. 2648 schools, were functioning schools. The highest percentage of functioning schools was in the NSAG-held governorate of Idlib. The percentage of functioning schools was 75% of the total schools in the assessed sub-districts in this governorate. On the other hand, the lowest percentage of functioning schools was in Deir-ez-Zor governorate, which was approximately 1% of the total assessed schools in this governorate. Functioning schools were concentrated in parts of Deir-ez-Zor sub-district controlled by the Syrian regime while all schools in the areas of the governorate under the control of the Islamic State group stopped working.






Figure 22: Number of schools within the assessed governorates




NUMBER OF FUNCTIONING SCHOOLS BY CONTROL FORCES

The results of the study showed that the highest percentage of functioning schools was in the Syrian Regime-held areas with a percentage of operating schools amounted to 89%. This can be attributed to the fact that schools in the Regime-held areas are still receiving support from the Regime's Ministry of Education, as teachers receive salaries, examinations are conducted on a regular basis, official certificates are granted to students from the Regime government. All these factors motivate teachers to keep up the educational process, and parents to send their children to school. NSAG-held areas held second position in this regard, with the percentage of functioning schools amounting to 61% of the total number of schools in these areas. Many organizations interested in education are active in this area, and they support the educational process in an irregular way. Teachers often serve as volunteers or receive nominal wages. The lack of recognized certification does not encourage parents to send their children to schools. The Kurdish control areas ranked third in terms of operating school ratio, which amounted to

46% of all schools in these areas. The percentage of functioning school is higher in the north of Al-Ha-sakeh governorate under the control of Kurdish forces, including Quamishli and Jawadiyah, Malikeyyeh, where parents did not hesitate to send their children to school despite the Kurdish curriculum imposed by the control forces since the majority of residents in these areas are Kurds. The percentage of students going to school in the southern parts of the same governorate were less due to the Kurdish curriculum imposed by the dominant forces while the majority of the population of these areas are Arabs and who do not speak the Kurdish language. The educational process has stopped in the sub-districts of Suluk and Ein Issa in Ar-Raqqah Governorate under the Kurdish control due to displacement policy practiced in these sub-districts by the Kurdish forces. There is a similar situation in Tall Refaat in the governorate of Aleppo.

The lowest percentage of functioning schools was in ISIL-held areas where the functioning school ratio was %7 of the total schools and the educational process is almost non-existent in these areas.


Figure 23: Number of functioning schools by control forces



THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SCHOOLS


Given the significant impact of the security situation on the educational process, a triangulation analysis has been conducted involving the number of schools depending on the severity of the security situation. The analysis results show that the highest percentage of functioning schools, from the total number of schools, was in areas that are not exposed to shelling or clashes. 66% of schools were functioning in those areas because the schools in these areas and roads leading to schools are considered safe and do not constitute a danger to the students, which encourages parents to send their children to schools. There were less functioning schools in the areas exposed to shelling and intermittent clashes. Some areas are exposed to bombing once or twice a week. This rate of bombing or clashes is high and poses a threat to the educational process. However, given the catastrophic situation in Syria, this rate will be considered moderate. The ratio of functioning schools in these areas, under the medium-security conditions, was 46% of the total number of schools. While the percentage of functioning schools in areas prone to shelling and frequent clashes was 37% of the total schools in these areas. Schools and roads to schools are considered unsafe, which discourages parents from sending their children to schools.

Figure 24: Number of functioning schools according to the security situation



In general, the situation in the areas out of the regime control is not secure. The security situation changes very quickly. These areas are often vulnerable to shelling and sporadic clashes and soon the shelling and clashes become frequent, which leads directly to irregular school attendance through the days of the school year in those areas.

Map 11: Number of functioning schools




07: NUMBER OF TEACHERS

Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the Syrian regime stopped providing teacher salaries in the majority of areas out of his control, after obliging teachers to go to education directorates in areas under his control to collect their salaries. Teachers cannot teach the national education subject, or any material that glorifies the regime and its prominent figures within out of regime-held areas. Therefore, they may be arrested if they enter the regime-controlled areas to collect their salaries. This policy led many teachers to work in the regime-controlled areas or abandon teaching for fear of regime prosecution. These reasons led to a severe shortage of teachers in the areas outside Syrian Regime control. This shortage resulted in an increase in volunteer teachers, i.e. people who are not qualified to teach, and did not graduate from college or institutions to teach or follow any teacher training programs. Most of these volunteers hold a high school certificate, or are university students in the early years of their study. It should be noted that all teachers in the areas outside regime control work for nominal wages, and sometimes without wages at all.

Numbers in the figure below do not represent the real numbers of teachers in the Syrian governorates. The numbers are increased in the governorates that have high coverage and decrease in other governorates with low coverage. These numbers can inform us regarding the qualification of teachers in the covered governorates. For example, regular teachers represent 91% of teachers in Idleb, and volunteer teachers represent 9% of teachers at the same governorate. The percentage of volunteer teachers in Ar-Raqqah governorate was 78% of all teachers in the governorate. It should be noted that the only sub-district with operating schools was Tell Abiad, under the control of Kurdish forces. These forces imposed a curriculum in the Kurdish language on the population, which led the majority of regular teachers to refrain from work in these schools. Thus, the control forces recruited a number of high school certificate holder or even basic education certificate holders, to teach at schools.

Figure 25: Number of teachers within the assessed governorates




08: NUMBER OF STUDENTS

Number of students enrolled at schools have decreased since the start of the Syrian crisis for many reasons. This coincided with the decline of the educational process. Because of the absence of specialized teachers, and lack of proper certificates, the educational process in the areas the outside the Regime control become restricted to teaching how to read, write, and perform simple calculations. There is a noticeable rise in enrollment in the basic stage of education, especially primary education, and a decline, almost absence, in enrollment in the secondary level.

The percentage of enrollment in the primary level is %60 of students. The lower-secondary level constitutes %28 of students, and the percentage of the upper-secondary level was %12. These percentages reflect the seriousness of the education sector within the 105 areas that have been covered. It should be noted that the students enrolled in Ar-Raqqa governorate are located in Tell Abiad sub-district only, and there are no upper-secondary students in this area at all. It should be noted that the students in Deir-ez-Zor governorate are located in the parts of the city under the control of the Syrian Regime.

Table 04: Number of students in the assessed governorates by educational stage




Governorate	primary level students	ower-secondary level students	upper-secondary level students
Idleb	172,249	69,489	25,657
Al-Hasakeh	48,800	32,250	14,500
Ar-Raqqa	150	70	0
Quneitra	500	0	0
Aleppo	124,237	36,571	17,158
Hama	73,804	62,259	40,362
Homs	34,594	10,425	3,606
Dar'a	74,199	29,573	15,909
Deir-ez-Zor	16,650	8,000	2,000
Rural Damascus	106,628	52,767	21,383
Damascus	500	300	150

09: DIFFICULTIES THAT PREVENT STUDENTS FROM ACCESSING EDUCATION

There were many difficulties that prevented parents from sending their children to school after the beginning of the crisis in Syria. The financial factor was the most prominent factor among these reasons. Under almost total absence of public transportation, or the high costs thereof, and the reduced number of functioning schools, parents are forced to send their children to far places and at high costs, which is an impediment to children and parents. Since the beginning of the crisis, schools were, and still are, the target of shelling and bombardment, in many sub-districts covered in the assessment. As such, schools are not a safe place for both students and teachers. In some cases, the Kurdish forces deliberately recruited students at advanced school levels, such as upper-secondary school, as child soldiers in the areas under their control. Because of the low income of families, there was a need for children to help their families, where students are forced to leave school and work instead of studying. In addition, the acute shortage of books was the most important obstacles to students' access to education. The need for books was urgent, particularly in the besieged areas of Rural Damascus, where no organization managed to deliver of textbooks to these areas and the Syrian regime did not send any books since the start of the current crisis, i.e. for more than six years.

Heatmap 15: Difficulties to access education in the assessed governorates.




Governorate	Financial reasons	School is considered a dangerous place	Child labor	Lack of educational materials	Damaged school	Certificates unavailability
Idleb	12	10	6	7	4	11
Al-Hasakeh	6	2	6	6	3	6
Ar-Raqqa	1	2	0	2	1	0
Quneitra	3	3	0	2	0	0
Aleppo	7	12	11	10	10	2
Hama	5	7	4	3	4	3
Homs	4	5	3	3	5	1
Dar'a	6	1	7	1	1	2
Deir-ez-Zor	1	5	1	3	3	3
Rural Damascus	13	4	10	8	3	3
Damascus	1	1	0	0	0	0
Total	59	52	48	45	34	31

Most Frequent Least Frequently

10: EDUCATION PRIORITIES

The success of the educational process depends on teachers. The role of the teacher, particularly in areas outside the Regime control, is not limited to teaching. Teachers supervise the student from the moment they enter the school until they leave, and sometimes teachers are even responsible for taking students back to their homes in areas with high security risk. Therefore, supporting teachers and the staff is the first priority in the education sector, as this support enhances the educational process and increases teachers' commitment, which reflects on the students and education. Renovating schools and refurbishing their facilities is the second priority. Children spend half their day at school, which requires that schools be a healthy and convenient environment for students. This can be achieved by fixing all doors, windows, and furniture, and keeping bathrooms regularly maintained. The costs of such activity are high and there is no entity capable of doing that unless external funds are provided. The third priority is to provide protection and safety for students and teachers, especially in areas where the control forces prohibit education. In addition, there is a need for training courses on how to proceed with education in wartime, for students and teachers in areas where education is still active. They should be trained on evacuation plans in case of shelling to minimize the damages. It is also important to provide schools with fuel for heating, especially as the temperature is very low during most of the school year, and parents often refrain from sending their children to schools in the cold days for fear of disease considering the deteriorated health situation.

Heatmap 16: Education Priorities



WASH SECTOR

WASH is one of the most significant sectors, and there is an urgent need to pay attention to this sector because of its correlation to all other sectors, especially at times of war. The lack of clean water leads to the spread of water-borne diseases and the accumulation of garbage leads to the prevalence of disease vectors and the spread of infectious diseases among civilians. According to HNO 2017, "restrictions on water supply led 50% of the population to fulfill their basic needs of water from alternative sources, including water transfer using trucks and resorting to unsafe open wells." Institutions affiliated to the Syrian regime were responsible for managing the services sector before the Syrian regime lost control over most sub-districts. However, as these institutions became out of service in these areas outside the control of the Syrian regime and became completely ineffective in areas that remained under the control of the Syrian Regime, the need increased for the emergence of many local and international organizations working in this area.

The WASH sector includes all aspects related to cleanliness in the assessed sub-districts, starting from personal cleanliness aspects such as the delivery of potable water and garbage bins to public sanitation including sewage and garbage management.



1-https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2017_syria_hno_2.pdf



WASH SECTOR SEVERITY

11%
bad


56%
average

32%
good

WATER

figure indicates the quality of information. The quality of information is evaluated based on the enumerator's ability to reach reliable sources of information.

Figure 26: Information Source Evaluation



01: WATER SEVERITY


Water severity depends on several factors including the amount of water (the distance from the rivers and water bodies or groundwater associated with rainfall), water quality (represents water potability), and the water pricing (linked to essential factors: the availability of water and the fuel price). We find low water prices in areas that contain rivers and bodies of water and when fuel is available while prices are high in the areas that need tankers to transfer water.

An indicator has been set to indicate the status of water in each governorate after calculating the average for the sub-districts of that governorate. This indicator reflects three main factors: the amount, the quality, and the price of water. Hama had the highest indicator as water was available in all the nine covered sub-districts of the governorate with averages between 50 and 100 liters per capita per day. The nine sub-districts had potable water, and six of them had cheap water.

Idleb governorate ranked second in terms of water assessment. Three sub-districts of sixteen had good quality water available, exceeding 100 liters per capita per day. Eight sub-districts had water available in moderate amounts, and three sub-districts had water in small quantities not exceeding 50 liters per capita per day. The water was in all sub-districts was safe to drink except for Ariha where water was medium quality in terms of potability.

On the other hand, the status of water was bad in Yarmouk neighborhood in Damascus which ranked last. Although water was of good quality in terms of potability, but the small quantity and high price contributed to the deterioration of the water status in this neighborhood.

Heatmap 17: Water Severity in the Assessed Governorates



WATER SEVERITY ACCORDING TO CONTROL FORCES

Due to the considerable influence of the control forces on the work of humanitarian organizations, DYNAMO 6 has included water severity according to the control force in the assessed sub-districts. The humanitarian organizations cannot work in any area without the consent of those controlling these sub-districts or coordinating with them, especially in areas held by the Syrian regime or Kurdish forces while ISIL forces prevent the work of humanitarian organizations in areas under their control.


The analysis results showed that the water severity was ranked the best in NSAG-held areas while areas held by the Syrian regime ranked second. The poor water severity in the regime-held areas is due to the situation in the parts of Deir-ez-Zor besieged by ISIL forces. The majority of the Syrian regime-held areas covered by ACU enumerators have a deteriorated humanitarian situation as the Syrian regime does not pay attention to improving the situation in these areas and does not allow humanitarian organizations to work without security clearance. People in neighborhoods held by the Syrian regime in Deir-ez-Zor do not receive enough water to meet their minimum daily needs. Water is pumped into the home network in the city for only a few hours over few days, prompting civilians to dig wells for water extraction.

ISIL-held areas ranked third, and often the individual in these areas receives sufficient amounts of water, except both Tadmor and Sokhneh which are desert areas with low water supply. Water is not sterilized in most ISIL-held regions. Areas under Kurdish control had the worst water status as some sub-districts are depopulated and do not have humanitarian organizations working in them.


THE BETTER STATUS OF WATER WITHIN ASSESSED SUB-DISTRICTS



Heatmap 18: Water Severity According to Control Forces



Map 12: Water Severity in the Assessed Sub-districts



02: WATER SECTOR MANAGEMENT


Water institutions remained functional in several sub-districts covered in the assessment. They appeared as the second party to manage water. It is noteworthy that these institutions are still managed by the Syrian regime in its control areas while control forces in areas outside the Syrian regime’s control managed these institutions.

Local Councils topped the parties that manage water sector for many reasons including that the largest number of assessed areas was under the control of NSAG. In 11 out of 16 assessed sub-districts in Idleb, local councils managed water sector. In 18 sub-districts, there was not any entity managing water. These sub-districts include areas under ISIL control, areas of rural nature and neglected by the Syrian regime (such as Basira, Thiban, and Susat) and areas besieged by the Syrian regime such as Madaya and Yarmouk neighborhood in Damascus, as well as sub-districts that have been recently regained from ISIL control into the control of Kurdish forces that do not allow any organization to work there without getting a permission from the Kurds.

The private entities manage water in seven sub-districts, where there is a number of wells owned by individuals who distribute water from these wells to civilians by tankers. These sub-districts include Sarin, Hajeb, and Banan in the countryside of Aleppo in addition to Ma'arrat An Nu'man in the countryside of Idlib and the sub-districts of Quneitra governorate. Control forces manage water in Ar-Raqqa city center and the inhabitants are responsible for water management in the sub-districts of Suluk and Ein Issa in the same governorate. It should be noted that there are several entities that manage the water sector within the same sub-district. The survey covers the largest number of beneficiaries within a sub-district.

Heatmap 19: The body responsible for management of the water sector

Figures represent the number of sub-districts



Governorate	Local Councils	Water Institution	N/A	Other	Private Sector	International Organizations
Idlib	11	2	0	0	1	2
Al-Hasakeh	0	4	3	1	0	0
Ar-Raqqa	0	4	0	0	0	0
Quneitra	1	0	0	0	2	0
Aleppo	9	4	4	1	3	0
Hama	6	2	0	1	0	0
Homs	2	1	0	2	0	1
Dar'a	8	0	0	0	0	0
Deir-ez-Zor	0	1	9	3	0	0
Rural Damascus	6	7	1	1	1	0
Damascus	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total	43	25	18	9	7	3


03: WATER DELIVERY

The Public network constituted the main source of water for more than 90% of the Syrian areas before the onset of the crisis. This network was often fed by rivers and water bodies and in some cases through the groundwater. After the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the use of tankers spread as an alternative to the public network due to the damage to the network and as some water plants went out of service.

The highest rate for the use of tankers was in the sub-districts of Quneitra governorate, where the increase amounted to 83% of the total means of water delivery, and as stated in the preceding paragraph, private bodies manage water in these sub-districts, where these bodies, who own wells, distribute water to civilians in exchange for cash. The inhabitants of Rural Damascus resort to the use of tankers, as the water from the public network is not available in all sub-districts. The bulk of Ar-Raqqa city center also gets water from the public network, because the network was not affected significantly and the water institutions which are managed by the control forces pumps Euphrates River water to the areas covered within the governorate.

It is worth mentioning that water transfer using tankers often lead to increased prices. The prices of water transferred in this manner are linked to fuel prices. In addition, areas that receive water in tankers do not get, in most cases, sufficient amounts of water to fulfill their needs.

Figure 27: Method of water delivery




THE IMPACT OF THE BOMBING ON THE MEANS OF WATER TRANSFER

Continued bombardment in some sub-districts lead to damage to public water network. It has been noted that sub-districts not exposed to shelling and clashes still use the public water network. Often these areas are either still under the control of the Syrian regime or they got out of the Syrian Regime's control without serious clashes taking place. In addition, sub-districts that are exposed to clashes use tankers to transport water, and despite the fact that the eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo City used the public network by the Department of events, but the heavy shelling has led to damage to the network in all the neighborhoods. Even though water is pumped into the network, it does not reach many of the neighborhoods with high altitude, which use tankers due to the low pressure within the pipes due to the great damage in the public network.

The besieged areas do not receive maintenance equipment for networks or stations, increasing the use of tankers and the majority of the tankers get water from wells. It is noteworthy that a large number of wells began to dry up during the two months of data collection due to the shortage in rainfall and the lack of good management in water extraction from them, in addition to the spread of the phenomenon of dry wells in the villages in Mzeireb sub-district in Dar'a governorate.

Figure 28: Means of water transfer by sub-district exposure to the bombing and clashes



WATER STERILIZATION

The majority of water institutions were using liquid chlorine to sterilize the water before the start of the crisis, where the water was amassed in large tanks and chlorine is added to it. It remained within these reservoirs until the chlorine reacts with it and sterilization is achieved, and then it is pumped to the public network. Many advanced means of water sterilization entered as the city of Aleppo used sophisticated methods of water sterilization before pumping it.

Humanitarian organizations are distributing tablets to sterilize the water within the places that receive water from tankers. Due to cessation of work of organizations in the majority of sub-districts under ISIL control in the city of Deir-ez-Zor, 69% of the districts of the governorate are suffer from lack of water sterilization. In addition, water is not sterilized in any of the assessed sub-districts of Quneitra governorate because private actors manage water. The siege imposed on sub-districts in Rural Damascus and the lack of water sterilization materials made 81% of water in these sub-districts unsterilized while water in all the assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa was sterilized by control forces. It is worth mentioning that the highest rates of water sterilization are within the Syrian regime-held areas, where the majority of sub-districts get water from public networks.






Figure 29: Water status assessment in the assessed governorates



THE READINESS RATE OF THE WATER NETWORK

The public water network is considered the main way for the delivery of water within the sub-districts, but a large part of the water networks is damaged in a number of sub-districts as a result of the bombing since the onset of the crisis. The public water network within the study is assessed on several levels:




Analysis results showed that the readiness of the water network in the four assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqah was very good despite the exposure of these sub-districts to bombing, especially Ar-Raqqah city center. However, what distinguishes the city of Ar-Raqqah is that it is new. Thus, despite the shelling, the network is still ready by more than 90%. The network readiness is reflected on water delivery means, as it appeared that 99% of Ar-Raqqah gets water through the public network.

The water network is considered very bad in Yarmouk neighborhood in the governorate of Damascus. This was also reflected on the water delivery means in this besieged neighborhood. The study showed that 60% of the neighborhood receives water through tankers.

The study showed that the water network was very bad in 16 sub-districts, bad in 11 sub-districts, medium in 25 sub-districts, and good in 45 sub-districts, which means that the water network in 97 districts out 105 is not considered fully ready. The lack of readiness of the water network affects not only civilians' access to water, but also reflects negatively on the infrastructure of the sub-districts. In most sub-districts, which suffer from a significant damage to the water network, there is leaking of water under the ground, and this could lead in the future to collapse in residential buildings as a result of moisture or sliding soil in leaking locations. Some bodies deliberately stop the water supply as a temporary solution when there is a break in water pipes. However, these fractures are not fixed and no study of water leak is conducted because of the high cost and lack of equipment.

Figure 30: Water network readiness assessment in the assessed governorates.



04: THE PRIORITIES OF THE WATER SECTOR

Cash support came as the first priority for the water sector in most assessed sub-districts. This support includes covering of water extraction and transfer expenses and operational costs for those in charge of the water as most of the workers in the water sector are the staff who had served in water institutions under the Syrian regime who deliberately stopped their monthly salaries.


The second priority was the need for mechanical and electrical equipment including pumps and electrical appliances required for recycling. This equipment needs maintenance on a regular basis and often needs to be replaced, sometimes because of unavailability of spare parts and sometimes because they are completely destroyed in shelling or clashes as the stations are often located in the areas of engagement as is the case with Aleppo water station or water plants in the city of Deir-ez-Zor, which makes them exposed to shelling.

The drilling wells is an alternative solution to the lack of water in all the Syrian territories. The locals and organizations drilled wells and tapped into groundwater when the network suffered major damage, or in case of siege in some areas preventing access to water. This need urgently appeared in some areas in Aleppo governorate as well as in Rural Damascus and some areas in al-Hasakeh governorate.

The priority, in areas that suffer from problems in the water networks, was for means of water transfer (tankers) and means of storage (reservoirs). Civilians need large reservoirs to store water for a whole week or more. This need showed up in the sub-districts of Rural Damascus and Hama governorates. It is worth mentioning that the reservoirs are often damaged as a result of bombing.

Most sub-districts of Deir-ez-Zor governorate demanded the provision of chemicals to sterilize the water since there is no point in providing chlorine to these areas with the knowledge that all these sub-districts use the Euphrates River water without resorting to sterilization.

Heatmap 20: The priorities of the water sector



SEWAGE SYSTEM


01: SEWAGE SYSTEM

The ideal situation of sewage is to be a part of the regular drainage network, which ends with recycling and processing plants. Although the bulk of the water is being discharged into drainage network. However, these networks suffer from partial destruction as a result of exposure to bombing. Sewage water leaks through cracks under the ground, which affects the infrastructure. The results of the analysis showed that the largest percentage of the sewage networks in the Syrian regime-held areas are within the regular network, because it was not subjected to shelling and is, therefore, intact.

Many villages within the assessed sub-districts adopted, before the start of the current crisis, sanitary pits for drainage, this option has increased due to the destruction of the regular network and the inability to fix it. The impact of this method of drainage (sanitary pits) on groundwater, especially in light of the increased use of groundwater without sterilization due to the lack of sterilization materials and the absence of responsible bodies. Sanitary pits often flood in the winter and need suction tanks. Most of the villages within the assessed sub-districts in Quneitra governorate depend on sanitary pit drainage. This method of drainage has also spread in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa governorate.

Many villages have resorted to drain into the open and exposed locations. For example, Kelly, a town in Maaret Tamsrin sub-district, Idlib governorate, drains its sewage system into exposed places, despite the overcrowding in this town.

Figure 31: Sewerage system within the assessed governorates



02: SEWAGE SYSTEM PRIORITIES


Most of the sewage networks, even those in use, need maintenance operations. As these networks suffer from cracks and wastewater leaking into these cracks. Many sewage networks, which are out of service, need rehabilitation to reactivate their operation.

The local council is often responsible for conducting maintenance operations to sewage networks, and maintenance operations are on simple levels that end up cutting off the network wherever it breaks. The local councils often resort to the civil defense machinery because of they lack machinery. It is worth noting that all these teams are working without pay in most cases and they need fuel for their vehicles. The need for stipends and fuel is within the priority of monetary support for the sewage sector and for the body supervising the work of this sector within the assessed sub-district.

Most of the sub-districts that rely on sanitary pits as a sewage system requested suction tanks to drain water from the pits. This need increases in the winter as most of the sanitary pits flood. The largest percentage of this need in the sub-districts of the governorates of Aleppo, Dar'a, and Hama.

There was a need, in the border sub-districts, in the governorates of Aleppo and Idlib, for the implementation of a new sewage system because the old networks were not capable to absorb wastewater. These networks need to be expanded or replaced.

Heatmap 21: The priorities of the sewage system




SOLID WASTE

Solid waste disposal mechanisms are considered an urgent need to curb the spread of pests and disease vectors. Therefore, garbage must be removed from the streets on a daily basis to prevent its accumulation. Before the start of the current crisis, the regime's institutions were responsible for the removal of garbage on a daily basis. It was disposed of using primitive mechanisms: transferring it to remote places and, most often, burning it. The current crisis led to the cessation in the work of these institutions, and other ones emerged undertook solid waste management.

The results from DYNAMO 6 assessment, which included 105 sub-districts, showed that local councils are responsible for solid waste management more than 57% of the assessed sub-districts in the NSAG-held areas, including 15 sub-districts in Idlib governorate while NGOs managed this process only in Salqin because of its huge population. The percentage of sub-districts where the inhabitants manage this process amounted 25% of all assessed sub-districts while the contribution of organizations in this regard amounted to 2%.

Some sub-districts, including Suluk and Ein Issa in Ar-Raqqah governorate and Madaya in Rural Damascus, suffer from the absence of bodies supervising this process (solid waste disposal). In these sub-districts, garbage accumulates in the streets and public places while control forces manage garbage disposal in 11% of the assessed sub-districts. The citizens of Deir-ez-Zor governorate, held by the ISIL forces, manage solid waste disposal in 10 sub-districts while ISIL manages this process in three sub-districts only. In Ar-Raqqah, ISIL manages solid waste disposal only in the city.

Figure 32: Forces responsible for the management of solid waste management



01: SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL MECHANISMS

Due to the lack of means for refining solid waste or benefit from it in Syria. The best way to handle it was to get rid of it by burying in a sanitary landfill. The mechanisms of solid waste disposal varied due to various circumstances in each sub-district. Several besieged sub-districts had no means of solid waste disposal where the garbage accumulated in the streets or vacant spaces. This phenomenon spread in the Syrian regime-held parts of Deir-ez-Zor besieged by ISIL forces, and in Madaya sub-district in Rural Damascus under the control of NSAG and besieged by the Syrian Regime forces, as well as in Hamra sub-district under the control of ISIL forces and suffering from bad security conditions. Harasta, Duma, and Darayya in Rural Damascus suffer from a partial siege by the forces of the Syrian Regime, and they dispose of their solid waste by burying it.

The process of transfer of solid waste to outside the area is the most prevalent method. This method was used in 64 of the assessed sub-districts, where waste is collected in the empty spaces and far from residential areas. This method is the least expensive and most dangerous. The garbage is not sprayed with any chemicals to limit the spread of contamination in the environment. The specialized authorities resort to this method when the sub-district is open to its surrounding land and not besieged.

Thirty-two sub-districts used cremation to dispose of solid waste. This method is more effective in times of crises, but requires great care and selection of suitable places for the burning process. Those places should be far from residential areas and the wind direction should be observed so that odors and fumes from burning process may not be transferred to civilians and trash must be sprayed with chemicals after cremation.

Figure 33: Solid waste disposal mechanism by assessed governorates





Figure 34: Solid waste disposal mechanism by control forces




02: THE PRIORITIES OF THE SANITATION SECTOR

The need for garbage collection mechanisms came as a top priority for the sanitation sector. Where 97 sub-districts reported its need to provide garbage collection mechanisms, considering that this need was existing prior the beginning of the crisis, and it increased during the current events. The local councils use the civil defense machinery most of the times when the garbage collection mechanism are not available. Sixty-six sub-districts reported their need to cover operational costs, including fuel for machinery, stipends for staff, and expenses for periodic maintenance of machinery. Therefore, monetary support came as the second priority.

There was a need for pesticides and chemicals in most sub-districts. Disease vectors spread in many sub-districts in the governorate of Hama, especially as a result of weak performance of organizations spraying pesticides in these sub-districts. In addition, there was a shortage in containers in the sub-districts that received considerable IDP influxes, where the number of containers was not proportionate with the number of the civilians living in those sub-districts, which led to the accumulation of garbage in the streets.

Heatmap 22: The priorities of the sanitation sector





SHELTER & NFI


Syrians' suffering in NFI cluster started six years ago when they were forced at the beginning of security sweeps to leave their homes to safer neighborhoods fearing of arbitrary arrests. With the start of clashes, sniping and shelling the percentage of people departing their neighborhoods and villages increased, and gradually with the escalation of military actions civilians were forced to leave their towns seeking safety in other cities, even that too many Syrians had to leave to neighboring countries because they no longer felt safe inside Syria.

Since the beginning of the above mentioned displacement waves, civilians suffered from both inadequacy and high costs of rented houses so that a large percentage of them were forced to live in collective shelters such as schools. Later on, random and formal camps started to appear when houses and collective shelters were no longer enough to accommodate the increased numbers of IDPs. According HNO Report 2017, "4.3M people are in need of shelter, 3.8M of whom face acute and immediate needs"

Barbaric bombardment by various weapons caused severe destruction within houses in some sub-districts making them uninhabitable even if hostilities calmed down. Syrian families got used to put their official papers and important needs in a bag to be ready for emergency displacement at any moment. Displaced families could not carry anything with them during displacement so that they were in need of everything in their new shelter including mattresses, blankets and clothes. The severe need is even clearer with families that were displaced several times. UN assures that "Over half of all Syrians have been forced from their homes since the start of the conflict in 2011"



1- https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/2017_Syria_hno.pdf



NON-FOOD ITEMS SEVERITY

62%
bad


22%
average

16%
good

SHELTER

Ninety-three percent of the data was collected from good or high-quality information sources because of the deterioration of the humanitarian conditions in the shelter sector and the high destruction percentages are clear for all humanitarian actors and the permanent onsite presence of enumerators helped them to document destruction percentages and the basic sector needs.

Figure 35: Information Source Evaluation




01: RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS DAMAGE

All the assessed sub-districts suffered from destruction due to shelling or clashes with various percentages, where the number and the total area of destroyed buildings vary within the assessed sub-districts.

Fifty-eight percent of the assessed sub-districts were undestroyed, and the largest number of undestroyed buildings was in Al-Hasakeh (79%) where the northern sub-districts such as Quamishli, Al-Malikeyyeh and Jawadiyah did not witness shelling or clashes during the crisis. Even the clashes percentage within Al-Hasakeh centre was much less than other sub-districts.


There were slightly destroyed buildings within seventeen percent of the assessed sub-districts in all covered governorates. This slight destruction may be caused by the pressure of bombardment on the neighborhood that breaks windowpanes and door panels. On the other hand, buildings within 9% of assessed sub-districts were partially destroyed. The highest percentage of this partial reparable destruction that may include the destruction of the roof and the walls of the building was recorded in Yarmouk Camp neighborhood in Damascus.

Figure 36: Percentage of Damage to Residential Buildings



The highest destruction percentage within data collection period was recorded in Eastern Aleppo that was controlled by opposition forces due to intensive barrel bombs and excessive shelling that exceeded 50 barrels a day.


Percentage of Damage to Residential Buildings



Figures represent percentages

It is worth mentioning that destruction percentages are highly correlated with shelling and clashes percentages as shown in the following figure.

Figure 37: Security situation and building status




02: SHELTER PRIORITIES

In the sixth year of the Syrian crisis, there are still more than 250,000 IDPs in Northern Syria camps in Idleb and Aleppo knowing that humanitarian law states that IDPs should not stay within camps for more than six months and UNHCR has to move IDPs to neighboring countries or facilitate their safe return to their homes in appropriate humanitarian conditions. Unfortunately, this was not applicable in the Syrian case where IDPs have been living in miserable conditions within camps for the six years so far.

The first priority of shelter sector in all assessed sub-districts was shelter rehabilitation since a large number of IDPs live in collective shelters and random or formal camps. Besides, the monthly rent of rented houses where many IDPs live increased in many sub-districts especially the ones that received a large number of IDPs such as the northern sub-districts of Idleb and the Western Aleppo countryside and A'zaz sub-district. According HNO Report 2017, "Over 1M Syrians live in shelters of 'last resort' such as collective centres (schools, public buildings, mosques), camps or makeshift shelters, many of which are located in rural areas, where people are almost four times more vulnerable than in urban areas"

The clearest need for temporary shelter appeared in Aleppo and Idleb due to the daily population displacement to farms in the morning and coming back homes in the evening trying to escape constant shelling of homes. This was accompanied with an increased demand for both ground insulators and rain insulators.

Heatmap 23: Shelter Priorities




NON- FOOD ITEMS

Sudden displacement movements that often happen in most Syrian sub-districts increases the need for non-food items such as clothes, mattresses, blankets and kitchen kits because civilians during sudden forced displacement which is often accompanied by shelling or clashes are mostly unable to carry even their simple needs. In addition, the weakness of civilians' purchasing power increased the need for distributing NFI humanitarian assistance in afflicted areas. Another major reason for the loss of NFI within assessed sub-districts is that civilians are most often forced to burn blankets and simple furniture for cooking or heating during winter season.

Triangulating the quality, availability and prices of NFI showed that the best NFI status was in besieged Yarmuk camp neighborhood in Damascus where moderate amounts of medium quality NFI items were available with reasonable prices.


Analysis results showed that the worst NFI status was in the assessed sub-districts of Homs and Quneitra governorates. Most of the available NFI products in Al-Waar neighborhood in Homs were old/second hand or damaged after more than three years of the imposed siege on the neighborhood that prevented the introduction of NFI. Moreover, severe need for NFI products in general and children's clothes in particular, was registered in Talbiseh, Taldou, and Ar-Rastan sub-districts in Homs knowing that children consume more clothes as a result of the natural growth of their bodies and the quick damage of their clothes. These factors led to the spread of used clothing markets where most of the available clothes are damaged, but the severe need pushes people to buy them.

Heatmap 24: NFI Severity



Most inhabitants in Suluk and Ein Issa sub-districts complained about the looting of their properties by Kurdish forces which controlled these sub-districts after the withdrawal of ISIL forces. On the other hand, the markets in these two sub-districts are still closed and NFI assessment was too bad with a severe need.

Map 13: NFI Severity




01: NON-FOOD ITEMS PRIORITIES

Data collection period was during October and November, with the preparation for the advent of harsh winter as expected by meteorological centres. The first need priority in most assessed sub-districts including the assessed sub-districts of Aleppo, Hama and Deir-ez-Zor sub-districts was winter kits and heaters such as A'zaz sub-district where the available winter kits were not enough in the sub-district that hosts a large number of IDPs within small geographical area, knowing that the only access to A'zaz sub-district is by the Turkish borders especially after Kurdish forces controlled Tall Refaat sub-district separating A'zaz from Idleb countryside.

Heating fuel ranked second among IDPs' needs in most assessed sub-districts with the advent of winter. It even that it ranked first within Idleb, Dar'a, Rural Damascus and the besieged Yarmuk Camp neighborhood in Damascus. Civilians in the besieged sub-districts of Rural Damascus burn plastic despite its dangers for heating and cooking or even burn their furniture instead of fuel. On the other hand, the assessed sub-districts in Idleb and Hama sub-districts get fuel from eastern governorates so that fuel supplies are interrupted during clashes between opposition and Kurdish forces in the sub-districts of Nabul district in Aleppo. Moreover, a severe need for winter clothes especially kids' clothes was registered in the assessed sub-districts in Quneitra and Homs governorates.

Heatmap 25: Non-food items priorities



SERVICES

All countries attract investment to raise the quality of services and reduce costs. Some services sectors such as telecommunication are an important funding source in some countries. Some other countries have benefited from their strategic locations and established roads network and bridges, raising the state's economic standard. Services, in general, include all the sectors needed for citizens' daily lives such as electricity, road networks, and telecommunications.

The Syrian economy is a closed economy and Syria, the economically developed country, tightens foreign investment and keeps the main service sectors such as electricity, telecommunication, and roads in the hands of the state despite the poor conditions of these sectors and their high cost if compared to per capita income. Even when investment was allowed in mobile telephone companies, most of their shares went to people identified by the regime.




1-https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2017_syria_hno_2.pdf



01: INFORMATION QUALITY

In the absence of services that the regime used to provide before the current events, local councils and some relief organizations took the responsibility of organizing this sector. Enumerators were able to collect high-quality information where 97% of information sources were good or high-quality information.

Figure 38: Information Quality in services sector



02: ELECTRICITY


Electricity sources

The public electricity network was the main source of electricity in Syria before the crisis. The Syrian ministry of electricity generates electricity through various means including generating electricity through some dams on rivers or through natural gas generators. Recently thermal power plants that rely on the sunshine to generate electricity have been established. Despite the availability of these means, the electricity sector was deteriorating, and citizens had to pay expensive electricity bills despite frequent power outages especially in winter. In general, the electricity network was very bad.

At the beginning of the current crisis, the regime started to cut off electricity for long hours every day after losing control on dams and gas sources. Gradually, the Syrian regime deprived most areas out of its control of electricity after it lost control on more electricity sources. Thus, most NSAG controlled areas do not have access to electricity from the main energy network anymore, or have access for two hours a day.


Other sources for power generation started to appear in many Syrian sub-districts such as private networks which are large private diesel generators that distribute electricity to homes through small private networks within the same neighborhood where civilians have to pay depending on the number of amperes (unit of electricity measurement) that they need. Generators' owners operate generators for daily periods that last between two and eight hours according to fuel availability within the sub-district. On the other hand, private diesel or petrol generators that generate electricity at the house level started to appear.

Figure 39: Electricity resources within the assessed governorates



The public network provides electricity for ten hours a day in Ar-Raqqa governorate because ISIL generates electricity through Euphrates dam in Ath-Thawrah sub-district and Kurdish forces generate electricity through Tishrine dam in Menbij sub-district in Aleppo. So, the four assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa governorate get electricity for the largest number of hours through the day among assessed sub-districts. On the other hand, the assessed sub-districts in Idleb governorate do not get electricity through the public electricity network because the regime cuts off the electricity supply to the city since it lost its control of the city. Thus, Idleb started to depend on the private network for 6 hours a day because of the high fuel prices in this governorate if compared to ISIL-held governorates, namely, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor. Whereas, the besieged Yarmouk neighborhood camp in Damascus gets electricity only for four hours a day through private generators.

Electricity resources within the assessed governorates




Figures represent the number of hours during a day

Breakdowns in Public Electricity Network

The reparability assessment of electricity networks breakdowns shows that electricity networks within assessed sub-districts are damaged due to clashes and shelling. Moreover, some electricity networks in some sub-districts were dismantled because they had never been used for years.

The analysis shows that 82% of the breakdowns in the electricity networks within assessed sub-districts were repairable, whereas 18% were irreparable due to the destroyed networks that need replacement or the totally damaged power transformers in these sub-districts.

All breakdowns within the assessed sub-districts in Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh were irreparable; whereas, breakdowns within ISIL-held neighborhoods in Deir-ez-Zor center sub-district were irreparable due to the huge destruction in these neighborhoods. It is noteworthy that shelling is still continuing as we write this report. Whereas, breakdowns in all the other sub-districts in Deir-ez-Zor governorate were repairable.




All electricity networks in Tefnaz, Khan Shaykun, Darkosh, Sanjar, and Harim sub-districts in Idlib governorate and Sokhneh sub-district in Homs need replacement because their breakdowns were irreparable. On the other hand, all the breakdowns in Homs governorate except for Sokhneh sub-district were reparable.

Damage percentages were high in most electricity networks in Syria because they are aerial networks. Thus, any shelling in the city damages a large part of the network. In the absence of the electricity sector support, responsible parties for electricity sector resort to temporary band-aid solutions to the network breakdowns.

Figure 40: Reparability Assessment of Electricity Networks Breakdowns


Figures represent percentages



Electricity Priorities

The first need priority in most assessed sub-districts was repairing the public electricity network although that 82% of electricity network breakdowns were irreparable. The second priority was providing electrical transformers that regulate voltage because most of them were damaged and some other public transformers were consumed due to lack of performing maintenance for long periods. Also, transformers were most often transferred from clash areas and empty areas and relocated to other areas where they are needed due to the unavailability of new transformers. Another reason for transformer breakdowns is that many neighborhoods use the same transformer. Many assessed sub-districts where breakdowns are irreparable demanded fuel for public and private generators as a substitute for electricity from the public network. The assessed sub-districts in Dar'a required technical staff support, and the first priority in Quneitra was technical staff recruitment.


Heatmap 26: Electricity Sector Priorities



03: THE STATUS OF ROAD NETWORKS

No maintenance of the road networks was performed in all assessed sub-districts during the crisis six years although roads need periodical maintenance. Roads were totally damaged because of bombardment and passing of heavy machinery. Eighty-nine percent of the roads were damaged and in acute need of maintenance. Moreover, most of the bridges on Euphrates River in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor were totally destroyed. Therefore, civilians use small boats to cross the river.

Figure 41: The status of Road Network




Ways to Improve Road Network Status

Parts of the roads in most assessed sub-districts were damaged. These roads need maintenance to be qualified to work again. It is worth mentioning that the public road network in Syria was bad even before current events. There was a difference between roads projects studies and designs and the actual implementation where the road's shape and slope mostly differ. Due to sharp turns of the roads, unconsidered curves, and the deterioration of the roads network caused a large proportion of car accidents and increased breakdowns in means of transport in Syria before the crisis.

Some of the assessed sub-districts required the construction of new safer roads because the roads now pass near military barracks or clashes areas. Most of the bridges in assessed sub-districts need maintenance, and there is a need for building new bridges in Deir-ez-Zor sub-districts after all the bridges were destroyed there due to bombardment. It is worth mentioning that Euphrates river divides Deir-ez-Zor into two parts which constraints the movement of the civilians.

Heatmap 27: Electricity Sector Priorities



Figures represent the number of sub-districts that need improving road network knowing that there may be more than one reason in the same sub-district

Governorate	Building new bridges	Bridges maintenance	New roads	Old roads maintenance
Idleb	0	1	8	13
Al-Hasakeh	2	3	2	7
Ar-Raqqa	0	1	1	4
Quneitra	0	0	0	3
Aleppo	1	4	12	17
Hama	1	0	3	7
Homs	0	0	3	6
Dar'a	0	1	0	6
Deir-ez-Zor	6	9	0	9
Rural Damascus	0	1	3	10
Damascus	0	0	1	1
Total	10	20	33	83

Acute Need N/A


04: MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Since the beginning of the current events the landline phone network went out of service, and the mobile coverage was cut off in almost all areas out of regime control. Hence, controlling forces or civilian authorities reactivated landline phone network within the same telephone exchange or nearer telephone exchanges within the sub-districts controlled by the same controlling party. Satellite internet sets appeared with the necessity of communication within the whole of Syria and with Syrian expatriates outside Syria. These sets were available in internet cafes or owned by individuals. The Internet is being distributed by re-transmitting the signal using broadcasting points so that the internet covers greater distances. Civilians pay subscription fees for this service. On the other hand, residents in cross-border sub-districts use the mobile network of the neighboring countries.

Tadmor sub-district in Homs, Shadadah sub-district in Al- Hasakeh, and Maskana and Abu Qalqal sub-districts in Aleppo suffer from a complete absence of any communication means, where civilians need to travel long distances to adjacent sub-districts to secure connection. It is worth mentioning that some controlling forces tighten communication means. So that the only means of communication in ISIL-held areas is internet cafes where civilians have to provide their personal information to the owner of the internet cafe before any contact. Moreover, ISIL members inspect mobile phones on a permanent basis. Kurdish forces also prevent all means of communication within some assessed sub-districts in Aleppo countryside and Ar-Raqqa and Al- Hasakeh governorates.

Figure 42: Means of Communication

Figures represent the number of sub-districts where means of communication are available knowing that there may be more than one means of communication in the same sub-district




05: CIVIL DEFENSE

The regime used civil defense and fire brigades which were regime institutions with the beginning of the current events to disperse the demonstrations, abolishing their human side. When the regime loses its control in any area, civil defense centers stops working there. The heavy shelling increased the need for specialized teams to rescue civilians and remove the rubble. Here the free civil defense was formed making use of some of the available mechanisms with the support of active humanitarian actors. All civil defense centers were connected, and the staff was trained on removing the rubble and rescuing survivors safely from under the rubble. Free Syrian civil defense, known as white helmets, which works only within NSAG-held areas, rescued more than 56,000 civilians.

There is not any civil defense center in most of the sub-districts controlled by ISIL and Kurdish forces in Ar-Raqqa, Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and in the assessed sub-districts in Quneitra.



Figure 43: The Existence of Civil Defense Centers in the Assessed Sub-districts



Sub-districts with no Civil Defense Centres

Civil defense centers are available only within 65 assessed sub-districts which means they are not available within 40 assessed sub-districts. Therefore, the study covered the availability of close civil defense centers to those sub-districts that can provide timely response there, considering that war disasters require immediate response and that civilians may lose their lives under the rubble before the arrival of the rescue teams. Moreover, civil defense vehicles are sometimes exposed to shelling during movement between sub-districts over long distances. Study results showed that 16 sub-districts only benefited from the services of civil defense centers in close sub-districts. Civil defense centers in Idleb covered the whole governorate, Whereas, Tall Refaat and Maskana sub-districts in Aleppo were not served by civil defense.

Figure 44: The Availability of Civil Defense Centers close to Sub-districts



Obstacles Faced by Civil Defense Centers

The lack of equipment is one of the most important challenges facing the civil defense teams, and it was the first obstacle that hindered increasing the number of civil defense centers although this increase is necessary as it is hard to move from sub-district to another or even from village to another during the escalation of bombing. Such an increase involves providing all kinds of needed equipment such as cars and bulldozers that facilitate removing the rubble without hurting civilians trapped underneath.


It is well known that civil defense centers and civil defense teams are targeted by aerial bombardment and sometimes by a second wave of bombardment especially while civil defense workers perform their noble tasks of removing the rubble and rescuing the wounded. This second wave of bombardment causes deaths among the white helmets' staff and destroys their vehicles.

Increasing the number of civil defense centers needs increasing staff members. It is worth mentioning here that many of the staff are volunteers who are unpaid workers or who work for low salaries. Therefore, it is necessary to raise the operating expenses. That includes cash expenses for vehicle maintenance, in addition to hazard expenses for these workers who may be injured or may lose their lives while performing their tasks.


Civil defense was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for the year 2016 because it had a great role in saving the lives of Syrian civilians and found recognition by many countries and international humanitarian organizations.

Therefore, its centers and teams should be neutralized from any military actions. Moreover, the international community has to adopt a law that protects all humanitarian workers, particularly civil defense staff against threats or targeting.

Figure 45: Obstacles Faced by Civil Defense Centers



Figures represent the number of sub-districts that face difficulties knowing that there may be more than one obstacle in the same sub-district




PRIORITIES

Setting priorities was a result of a comprehensive study of all sectors and triangulating study results with the information from sources in the field. Priorities were shown at governorate level to help decision-makers to direct aid to the neediest civilians. The health sector was the first priority within most assessed sub-districts as it was the first priority in seven out of eleven assessed sub-districts and the second priority in three other governorates.


Education sector came second because a large percentage of students were not attending schools. Even enrolled students learn in unfavorable conditions. Moreover, large numbers of children under 12 years old were illiterate.

Food security sector came as the third priority especially in besieged sub-districts or those where no development projects were implemented, so they were unable to provide basic food products.


Heatmap 28: Most Important Sectors in Need of Support




Map 14: First Priority



Map 15: Second Priority



Map 15: Thired Priority



RECOMMENDATIONS

- To providing medicines and medical supplies to build a comprehensive medical system that provides all treatment phases based on needs assessment and to cover all Syria with vaccination campaigns.
- To support the food security by increasing the number of development projects, and including their products in food baskets based on needs assessment study that balances between products and market needs.
- To set plans for distributing food products in besieged areas based on needs assessment, and execute these plans by INGOs without asking for regime's permission in case of regime's refusal to break the siege, or to deliver aid from the air as in the regime controlled neighborhoods in Deir-ez-Zor.
- To maintain water and drainage networks and rationalizing groundwater consumption and finding solutions for contamination of drinking water sources, and the adoption of healthy ways to get rid of the waste to prevent the spread of disease vectors and to provide operational expenses to reactivate suspended water stations.
- To plan for maintenance of destroyed buildings to encourage IDPs in camps to come back to their homes in a step for resettlement of IDPs and rebuilding Syria.
- To find active solutions for students' dropouts, supporting educational process, and developing curricula for children that match their ages taking into consideration the years of dropout. and to set exam criteria so that students get certificates that qualify them to continue their education under the supervision of international organizations working in the education sector.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

- To put an end to bombing civilians and to protect all humanitarian actors and their working places such as hospitals, civil defense centers, schools and other public utilities against the destruction machine of the regime and its allies.
- To break the siege of the besieged areas and the immediate entry of humanitarian aid to besieged areas and preventing the regime from using starvation as a weapon against besieged areas.
- An immediate stop of forced displacement by the regime and some armed groups and ensuring civilians' ownership of their lands after their forced displacement. In addition to reactivating civil registry services that facilitate civilians' registration of births, deaths and all other civil affairs and issuing identification papers in the areas controlled by the moderate opposition.



ANNEX Naming of assessed sub-districts

No.	Governorate	District	Sub-district	Total # of Villages	The Covered Villages
1	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Hasakeh	Areesheh	11	11
2	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Hasakeh	Hole	18	18
3	Al- Hasakeh	Quamishli	Tal Hmis	99	99
4	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Malikeyyeh	Jawadiyah	43	43
5	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Hasakeh	Shadadah	10	10
6	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Hasakeh	Markada	9	9
7	Al- Hasakeh	Quamishli	Quamishli	57	57
8	Al- Hasakeh	Al- Malikeyyeh	Al- Malikeyyeh	98	90
9	Ar-Raqqa	Tell Abiad	Suluk	59	59
10	Ar-Raqqa	Tell Abiad	Ein Issa	35	35
11	Ar-Raqqa	Ar-Raqqa	Ar-Raqqa	67	34
12	Ar-Raqqa	Tell Abiad	Tell Abiad	44	44
13	Quneitra	Quneitra	Al- Khashniyyeh	13	1
14	Quneitra	Quneitra	Khan Arnaba	17	1
15	Quneitra	Al Fiq	Fiq	2	1
16	Idleb	Ariha	Ehsem	19	19
17	Idleb	Idleb	Bennsh	3	2
18	Idleb	Idleb	Teftnaz	5	5
19	Idleb	Al Ma'ra	Heish	15	15
20	Idleb	Al Ma'ra	Khan Shaykun	8	8
21	Idleb	Harim	Dana	13	13
22	Idleb	Jisr-Ash- Shugur	Darkosh	19	19
23	Idleb	Harim	Salqin	19	19
24	Idleb	Al Ma'ra	Sanjar	56	54
25	Idleb	Harim	Qourqeena	13	12
26	Idleb	Al Ma'ra	Kafr Nobol	26	17
27	Idleb	Idleb	Idleb	14	13
28	Idleb	Ariha	Ariha	23	20
29	Idleb	Harim	Harim	6	6
30	Idleb	Al Ma'ra	Ma'arrat An Nu'man	33	33
31	Idleb	Idleb	Maaret Tamsrin	16	15
32	Aleppo	A'zaz	Aghtrin	41	24
33	Aleppo	As-Safira	Hajeb	24	19
34	Aleppo	Al Bab	Ar-Ra'ee	29	12
35	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Zarbah	26	26
36	Aleppo	Menbij	Abu Qalqal	45	45
37	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Atareb	24	24
38	Aleppo	As-Safira	Banan	9	4
39	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Tall Ed-daman	164	164
40	Aleppo	A'zaz	Tall Refaat	12	1
41	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Haritan	17	7
42	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Daret Azza	13	13
43	Aleppo	Ain Al Arab	Sarin	100	100
44	Aleppo	A'zaz	Suran	17	4
45	Aleppo	Jarablus	Ghandorah	27	15
46	Aleppo	A'zaz	Mare'	16	1
47	Aleppo	A'zaz	A'zaz	20	8
48	Aleppo	Al Bab	Al Bab	29	29
49	Aleppo	Jebel Saman	Jebel Saman	16	1
50	Aleppo	Jarablus	Jarablus	27	3
51	Aleppo	Menbij	Menbij	121	0
52	Aleppo	Menbij	Maskana	20	8
53	Hama	Hama	Hamra	40	36
54	Hama	As- Suqaylabiyah	Ziyara	19	15
55	Hama	Hama	Harbanifse	25	4
56	Hama	Hama	#N/A	23	18
57	Hama	As- Salamiyeh	Oqeirbat	26	26
58	Hama	As- Suqaylabiyah	Madiq Castle	23	16

No.	Governorate	District	Sub-district	Total # of Villages	The Covered Villages
59	Hama	Muhradah	Kafr Zeita	7	6
60	Hama	Hama	Hama	59	20
61	Hama	Muhradah	Muhradah	19	19
62	Homs	Tadmor	Sokhneh	6	4
63	Homs	Ar-Rastan	Talbiseh	12	9
64	Homs	Homs	Taldu	22	6
65	Homs	Ar-Rastan	Ar-Rastan	18	15
66	Homs	Tadmor	Tadmor	3	1
67	Homs	Homs	Homs	38	1
68	Dar'a	Dar'a	Jizeh	3	3
69	Dar'a	Izra'	Hrak	6	6
70	Dar'a	Dar'a	Mseifra	5	4
71	Dar'a	Dar'a	Busra Esh-Sham	9	9
72	Dar'a	Izra'	Jasim	2	2
73	Dar'a	Dar'a	Da'el	2	2
74	Dar'a	Dar'a	Mzeireb	11	11
75	Dar'a	Izra'	Nawa	6	6
76	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Tabni	11	11
77	Deir-ez-Zor	Abu Kamal	Jalaa	6	3
78	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Basira	14	14
79	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Khasham	8	7
80	Deir-ez-Zor	Al Mayadin	Thiban	10	9
81	Deir-ez-Zor	Abu Kamal	Susat	5	5
82	Deir-ez-Zor	Al Mayadin	Ashara	7	7
83	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Kisreh	15	15
84	Deir-ez-Zor	Abu Kamal	Abu Kamal	9	7
85	Deir-ez-Zor	Al Mayadin	Al Mayadin	8	8
86	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	15	1
87	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	#N/A	1	1
88	Deir-ez-Zor	Deir-ez-Zor	Muhasan	7	6
89	Rural Damascus	Darayya	Hajar Aswad	1	0
90	Rural Damascus	Rural Damascus	Kisweh	23	5
91	Rural Damascus	Duma	Nashabiyeh	21	5
92	Rural Damascus	Duma	Harasta	4	3
93	Rural Damascus	Darayya	Sahnaya	2	2
94	Rural Damascus	Rural Damascus	Arbin	2	2
95	Rural Damascus	Az- Zabdani	Ein Elfijeh	6	6
96	Rural Damascus	Rural Damascus	Qudsiya	7	3
97	Rural Damascus	Rural Damascus	Kafr Batna	8	8
98	Rural Damascus	At Tall	At Tall	7	1
99	Rural Damascus	Az- Zabdani	Az- Zabdani	7	4
100	Rural Damascus	Darayya	Markaz Darayya	2	1
101	Rural Damascus	Duma	Duma	12	1
102	Rural Damascus	Yabroud	Yabroud	5	5
103	Rural Damascus	Az- Zabdani	Madaya	2	2
104	Rural Damascus	Az- Zabdani	Madaya Horira	1	1
105	Damascus	Damascus	Damascus	1	1

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