




FIELD DEVELOPMENTS

NORTHEAST AND NORTHWEST 22-30 April; 2022

3,107 violations of truce committed by the Regime and its Russian ally

After the Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement in Idlib governorate on March 5, 2020, the Syrian regime and its Russian ally did not bomb northwest Syria with warplanes. However, the regime continued to bomb these cities and towns with heavy artillery and rockets from ground launchers. On June 2, 2020, Russian warplanes resumed bombing cities and towns in northwest Syria, and the regime continued to bombard them with heavy artillery and rockets from ground launchers. Through its network of enumerators, ACU worked on documenting the regime's breach of the ceasefire. As of the date of preparing this report, the Syrian regime and its Russian ally have violated the ceasefire 3,107 times.



After the ceasefire came into effect, Turkish and Russian forces began conducting joint military patrols on the contact lines between the regime forces and the opposition forces, as these patrols run along the M4 international road. These joint forces aim to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and de-escalation on the contact lines. However, Russian forces stopped participating in these patrols in mid-September 2020.

Since the beginning of the truce and until this date












Result of the hostilities of the regime and its allies in northwest Syria


Controlling Parties 30 April 2022 Al-Hasakeh Aleppo Ar-Ragga Idleh attakia Hama Deir-ez-Zor Homs Regime Rural Damascus Opposition groups neitra Turkey-backed opposition groups Dar'a As-Sweida Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Conflict zone- frontlines




Northwest Syria

Violation of Truce - Shelling

Last week










Result of the hostilities of the Regime and its allies in northwest Syria

IIn northwest Syria: three IEDs exploded, killing one civilian and injuring three others.

In northwest Syria camps 7 accidents led to the burning of 7 tents.

In the northern countryside of Aleppo, on 22 April 2022, the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) shelled the city of Mare' with heavy artillery, killing one Turkish soldier, injuring six others, and burning their military vehicle. On 26 April 2022, SDF shelled Mare' city with rocket launchers, injuring six civilians, including three children.

In the camps of Idlib governorate, on 23 April 2022, 100 IDPs were poisoned in the camps of Atmeh and Killi towns as a result of eating Ramadan Iftar meals (for fasting people) distributed by an organization, and most of the poisoned IDPs were children, women, and the elderly. On 26 April 2022, 20 children were poisoned as a result of eating Iftar meals distributed by an organization operating in the area. On 28 April 2022, the Free Civil Defense teams recorded 15 traffic accidents in northwest Syria within 72 hours. The accidents killed 5 civilians, including 1 child, and injured 11 civilians, including 3 children.



In Deir ez-Zor, on 23 April 2022, new military reinforcements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived at Deir ez-Zor military airport, where Russian forces have a military base in Deir ez-Zor governorate. The past two months have seen the entry of military convoys affiliated with the Iranian militias into Deir ez-Zor military airport. These reinforcements coincide with the handover by Russian forces of two military sites to Iranian forces as they engage in war with Ukraine, as Russia has reduced its forces in Syria to move them to Ukraine. According to news reports, Russia has withdrawn from Tadmur military airport and handed it over to Iranian militias. Also, Russian forces had previously handed over Maheen armories (which is the second largest ammunition depot in Syria) east of Homs to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and the

Syrian regime's pro-Iranian 4th Division. Russia has already reduced the number of its fighters in Aleppo city, stationed at the outskirts of the Hamdaniya neighborhoods and in the vicinity of the Ramosa Terminal, in addition to the areas of Jamiyliyyeh and Mashhad. On 24 April 2022, protesters took control of some of the military checkpoints belonging to the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor governorate, in connection with the killing of a young man from the area by the bullets of an SDF fighter. The protesters threatened to escalate if the youth's killer was not held accountable. Since the beginning of last March, protests against SDF have been taking place in the areas of the Shu'aytat tribes east of Deir ez-Zor to protest against the deteriorating living situation. SDF conducts security operations in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, where ISIS cells are active, but its arrests are also heavily targeted at civilians. In mid-March, SDF besieged the villages of al-Safafnah, Arqoub, Marshada, and al-Souse in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor for more than ten days, in conjunction with a massive arrest campaign, after protests in the region. On 26 April 2022, SDF bombed a convoy of oil tanks in the regime-controlled areas in the al-Sha'fah town desert. The 10-tank convoy was burned, four people were killed, and 9 others were injured. The tanks carried oil that was smuggled from SDF-controlled areas to regime-controlled areas across the Euphrates River. SDF commanders were involved in smuggling the oil in cooperation with the regime forces.

in the northern countryside of al-Hasakah, On 24 April 2022, a displaced woman in al-Hol camp was killed at the door of her tent in the fifth sector which is only for Syrians. On 29 April 2022, the Syrian regime and the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ended the siege imposed on the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyah neighborhoods in Aleppo city and on the regime-controlled areas in al-Hasakeh and al-Qamishli cities.

The failure of the agricultural season forced farmers in al-Hasakah governorate to sell their crops to livestock breeders (as collateral), due to the weak growth of wheat and barley crops, and in the event that they are harvested, they will not cover the bulk of the costs. Rainfall scarcity for the second consecutive year has led to a decline in the production of rainfed land (rainfed irrigation). Also, the growth of crops in irrigated land depends on the number of irrigations, which were few this year because of the lack of rainfall and the high costs of irrigation, which resulted in damage to irrigated land, but to a lesser extent than rainfed land. Livestock breeders buy agricultural crops (buying the crop without harvesting it) to provide pastures for their livestock in the absence of pastures and high feed prices, as livestock breeders were also affected by the lack of pastures due to the decline in rainfall for the second consecutive year.

Important links

























