EASTERN DEIR-EZ-ZOR GOVERNORATE

INTRODUCTORY REPORT OF THE AREA

The report of the eastern Deir ez-Zor governorate highlights the reality of the areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorate, which are under the control of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The report examines Deir ez-Zor governorate from three levels. The first level presents information about the entire governorate, and this level was used in the following sections: the clans, the oil and gas wells, and the campaigns for spreading Shiism. The second level displays information on the east of Deir ez-Zor governorate only (areas outside the regime control), and this level was used to present demographic information, economic reality, and job opportunities, in addition to serving these areas within the basic service sectors (medical, civil defense, and bakeries). The third level presents information at the neighborhood level for six major cities.
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EASTERN DEIR-EZ-ZOR GOVERNORATE
INTRODUCTORY REPORT OF THE AREA

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THE POPULATION OF DEIR EZ-ZOR DISTRICTS OUTSIDE THE SYRIAN REGIME’S CONTROL

1,070,736 PEOPLE
Table of Contents

First: Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 11

1. Methodology: ............................................................................................................................ 11

2. Demography in eastern Deir ez-Zor: ......................................................................................... 11

3. The most prominent clans in Deir ez-Zor governorate: ............................................................ 11

4. Campaigns for spreading Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate: ................................................... 12

5. Oil and gas: ................................................................................................................................ 12

6. Services in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control: .............................................. 12

7. Governance and government buildings: ................................................................................... 13

8. Economy and sources of income: .............................................................................................. 13

9. Agricultural sector: .................................................................................................................... 13

10. Kasra city: ............................................................................................................................... 14

11. Sur city: .................................................................................................................................. 14

12. Basira City: .............................................................................................................................. 14

13. Hajin City: .............................................................................................................................. 15

14. Thiban city: .............................................................................................................................. 15

15. Sosa city: ................................................................................................................................ 15

Second: Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 16

1. Timeframe ................................................................................................................................. 16

2. Tools and software used: .......................................................................................................... 16

3. Difficulties and Challenges: ....................................................................................................... 17

Third: Demography in Deir-ez-Zor Districts outside the Regime Control ....................................... 18

1. Population Census ..................................................................................................................... 18

2. Numbers of IDPs and areas they came from ............................................................................. 19

3. The places where the IDPs have settled .................................................................................... 21

4. Vulnerable and marginalized groups ......................................................................................... 22

Fourth: The Most Prominent Clans of Deir ez-Zor Governorate .................................................... 22

Fifth: Converting to Shiism Campaigns in Deir ez-Zor Governorate ............................................. 26

1. The history of Shiism in Syria .................................................................................................... 26

2. History of Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate ............................................................................ 27

3. Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011 ....................................................................... 27

4. Deployment of Shiite militias in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011 ...................................... 29

5. Shiite militias in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011 .............................................................. 29

6. The relationship between Shiite militias and other international forces in Syria ................... 30

Sixth: Oil and Gas in Deir ez-Zor Governorate ................................................................................. 36

1. Production volume before 2011 ............................................................................................... 36

2. Oilfield locations: ...................................................................................................................... 36

Seventh: Services in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control ...................................... 40
1. Medical Sector ........................................................................................................................... 40
2. Civil Defense .............................................................................................................................. 43
3. Bakeries ..................................................................................................................................... 44

Eighth Governance and Government Buildings:
1. Members of the local councils .................................................................................................. 47
2. Offices of local councils ............................................................................................................. 48
3. Sources of funding for local councils ......................................................................................... 49
4. Government buildings and their conditions .............................................................................. 50

Ninth: Economy and Sources of Income ......................................................................................... 52
1. Percentages of employed people .............................................................................................. 52
2. Available sources of income ...................................................................................................... 53
3. Level of sources of income meeting living requirements. ........................................................ 54
4. Coping strategies adopted by families with no source of income ............................................ 54

Tenth: The Agriculture Sector .......................................................................................................... 56
1. Areas of irrigated lands ............................................................................................................. 56
2. Irrigated crops ........................................................................................................................... 57
3. Irrigation methods ..................................................................................................................... 57

Eleventh: Kasra City ............................................................................................................................... 58
1. Population and age groups in Kasra city ................................................................................... 59
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Kasra city .................................................................... 60
3. Nature of residential buildings in Kasra city ............................................................................ 60
4. The standard of living of the population in Kasra city ............................................................. 61
5. Bakeries in Kasra city ................................................................................................................. 62
6. The water network in Kasra city .............................................................................................. 63
7. The sanitation network in Kasra city ....................................................................................... 64
8. Electricity network in Kasra city ............................................................................................... 65
9. The public road network in Kasra city ..................................................................................... 65

Twelveth: Sur City .................................................................................................................................. 66
1. Population and age groups in Sur city ....................................................................................... 67
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Sur city ....................................................................... 68
3. Nature of residential buildings in Sur city ................................................................................. 68
4. The standard of living of the population in Sur city ................................................................. 69
5. Bakeries in Sur city .................................................................................................................... 70
6. The water network in Sur city .................................................................................................. 71
7. The sanitation network in Sur city .......................................................................................... 72
8. Electricity network in Sur city .................................................................................................. 72
9. The public road network in Sur city ....................................................................................... 73

Thirteenth: Basira City ......................................................................................................................... 74
1. Population and age groups in Basira city ................................................................. 75
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Basira city .................................................... 76
3. The nature of residential buildings in Basira city ...................................................... 77
4. The standard of living of the population in Basira city .............................................. 78
5. Bakeries in the city of Basira ..................................................................................... 79
6. Water network in Basira city .................................................................................... 80
7. Sanitation network in Basira city .............................................................................. 81
8. Electricity network in Basira city .............................................................................. 82
9. The road network in Basira city .............................................................................. 83

Fifteenth: Hajin City ........................................................................................................ 84
1. Population and age groups in Hajin city .................................................................. 85
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Hajin city ..................................................... 86
3. Nature of Residential Buildings in Hajin City .......................................................... 86
4. The standard of living of the population in Hajin city .............................................. 87
5. Bakeries in Hajin city .............................................................................................. 88
6. Water network in Hajin city .................................................................................... 89
7. Sanitation network in Hajin city .............................................................................. 90
8. Electricity network in Hajin city .............................................................................. 90
9. The public road network in Hajin city ................................................................... 91

Fifteenth: Thiban City .................................................................................................... 92
1. Population and age groups in Thiban city ................................................................. 93
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Thiban city ................................................... 94
4. The standard of living of the population in Thiban city ........................................... 95
5. Bakeries in Thiban city ........................................................................................... 96
6. Water network in Thiban city ................................................................................... 97
7. Sanitation network in Thiban city .......................................................................... 98
8. Electricity network in Thiban city .......................................................................... 98
9. The public road network in Thiban ....................................................................... 99

Sixteenth: Sosa City ..................................................................................................... 100
1. Population and age groups in Sosa city ................................................................. 101
2. Nature of residential buildings in Sosa city ............................................................ 102
3. The standard of living of the population in Sosa city ............................................ 103
4. Bakeries in Sosa city ............................................................................................. 103
5. Water network in Sosa city .................................................................................... 104
6. Sanitation network in Sosa city .......................................................................... 105
7. Electricity network in Sosa .................................................................................... 106
8. The public road network in Sosa city .................................................................. 106
Table of Figures

Figure (1) Population census by gender and age groups in eastern Deir ez-Zor ......................................................... 18
Figure (2) Population census by gender and age groups in eastern Deir ez-Zor .......................................................... 19
Figure (3) Number/ Percentage of IDPs by the areas from which they came ................................................................. 20
Figure (4) Number/ Percentages of IDPs according to their places of settlement ......................................................... 21
Figure (5) Number/ Percentage of vulnerable and marginalized groups ...................................................................... 22
Figure (6) Number/ Percentage of hospitals according to their ownership ................................................................. 40
Figure (7) Number of individuals per hospital ............................................................................................................. 40
Figure (8) Number/ Percentages of medical points according to their ownership ......................................................... 42
Figure (9) Number of civil defense centers ................................................................................................................ 43
Figure (10) Number/ Percentages of bakeries by ownership ....................................................................................... 44
Figure (11) Number/ Percentages of members of the local council by gender and attendance ........................................ 47
Figure (12) Percentages of local council funding sources ........................................................................................... 49
Figure (13) Percentage of employed people over the age of 18 .................................................................................. 52
Figure (14) Percentage of sources of male income ....................................................................................................... 53
Figure (15) Percentage of sources of female income .................................................................................................... 53
Figure (16) Percentage of working people whose income does not meet their daily requirements ................................. 54
Figure (17) Coping strategies adopted by families without a source of income ............................................................ 55
Figure (18) The area of irrigated lands in dunams ....................................................................................................... 56
Figure (19) Percentages/ Areas of irrigated lands by crop ............................................................................................ 57
Figure (20) Percentages / Areas of irrigated land by irrigation methods ........................................................................ 57
Figure (21) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Kasra city .......................................... 59
Figure (22) Number/ Percentages of IDPs and their places of distribution in Kasra city ................................................. 60
Figure (23) Percentages of residential buildings in Kasra city by their types ............................................................. 61
Figure (24) Percentages of the population in Kasra city by their standard of living ...................................................... 61
Figure (25) Percentages of water network destruction in Kasra city ............................................................................. 63
Figure (26) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Kasra city .......................................................... 64
Figure (27) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Sur city ........................................... 67
Figure (28) Number/ Percentages IDPs and their places of distribution in Sur city ......................................................... 68
Figure (29) Percentages of residential buildings in Sur city by their types ................................................................. 68
Figure (30) Percentages of the population in Sur city by their standard of living .......................................................... 69
Figure (31) Percentages of water network destruction in Sur city ................................................................................. 71
Figure (32) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Sur city ............................................................... 72
Figure (33) Percentage of electricity network destruction in Sur city .......................................................................... 72
Figure (34) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Sur city ................................................................. 73
Figure (35) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Basira city ........................................ 75
Figure (36) Number/ Percentages of displaced people and their places of distribution in Basira city ............................. 76
Figure (37) Percentages of residential buildings in Basira city by their types .............................................................. 77
Figure (38) Percentages of the population in Basira city by their standard of living .................................................... 78
Figure (39) Percentage of water network destruction in Basira city ............................................................................ 80
Figure (40) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Basira city .................................................. 81
Figure (41) Percentage of electricity network destruction in Basira ................................................................. 82
Figure (42) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Basira city .................................................. 83
Figure (43) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Hajin city .......................... 85
Figure (44) Number/ Percentages of displaced people and their places of distribution in Hajin city ........ 86
Figure (45) Percentages of residential buildings in Hajin by their types ...................................................... 86
Figure (46) Percentages of the population in Hajin city by their standard of living ...................................... 87
Figure (47) Percentages of water network destruction in Hajin city ............................................................. 89
Figure (48) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Hajin city ........................................... 90
Figure (49) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Hajin city .................................................. 91
Figure (50) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Thiban city .................. 93
Figure (51) The number/ Percentages of displaced people and their places of distribution in Thiban city ..... 94
Figure (52) Percentage of residential buildings in Thiban by their types ...................................................... 95
Figure (53) Proportion of the population in Thiban city according to their standard of living .................. 95
Figure (54) Percentage of water network destruction in Thiban city ............................................................. 97
Figure (55) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Thiban ............................................... 98
Figure (56) Percentage of electricity network destruction in Thiban ............................................................. 98
Figure (57) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Thiban city ............................................ 99
Figure (58) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Sosa city ..................... 101
Figure (59) Percentages of residential buildings in Sosa city by their types .................................................. 102
Figure (60) Percentages of the population in Sosa city by their standard of living ................................ 103
Figure (61) Percentage of water network destruction in Sosa city ................................................................. 104
Figure (62) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Sosa city ........................................... 105
Figure (63) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Sosa city ............................................... 106

Table of Figures Tables
Table (1) Oil well information in Sur sub-district ................................................................................................. 38
Table (2) Offices of local councils .................................................................................................................. 48
Table (3) Names of government buildings and their effectiveness ................................................................. 50
Table (4) Bakery Information in Kasra City .................................................................................................... 62
Table (5) Bakery Information in Sur City ........................................................................................................ 70
Table (6) Bakery information in Basira city ....................................................................................................... 79
Table (7) Bakery Information in Hajin City ...................................................................................................... 88
Table (8) Bakery information in Thiban city ..................................................................................................... 96
Table (9) Bakery information in Sosa City ....................................................................................................... 103
Table of Maps

Map (1) Duration to reach hospitals on foo........................................................................................... 41
Map (2) Reaching hospitals using transportation means................................................................. 42
Map (3) Access of civil defense teams to cities and towns ............................................................ 43
Map (4) Reaching bakeries on foot ........................................................................................................ 45
Map (5) Reaching bakeries using transportation means ................................................................. 46
Map (6) The neighborhoods of Kasra City ...................................................................................... 58
Map (7) The neighborhoods of Sur City ......................................................................................... 66
Map (8) Neighborhoods of Basira city ............................................................................................. 74
Map (9) The neighborhoods of Hajin City ...................................................................................... 84
Map of (10) The neighborhoods of Thiban city ............................................................................. 92
Map of (11) Neighborhoods of Sosa city ....................................................................................... 100
The report of the eastern Deir ez-Zor governorate highlights the reality of the areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorate, which are under the control of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The report examines Deir ez-Zor governorate from three levels. The first level presents information about the entire governorate, and this level was used in the following sections: the clans, the oil and gas wells, and the campaigns for spreading Shiism. The second level displays information on the east of Deir ez-Zor governorate only (areas outside the regime control), and this level was used to present demographic information, economic reality, and job opportunities, in addition to serving these areas within the basic service sectors (medical, civil defense, and bakeries). The third level presents information at the neighborhood level for six major cities.
First: Executive Summary

The report of the eastern Deir ez-Zor governorate highlights the reality of the areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate, which are under the control of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The report examines Deir ez-Zor governorate from three levels. The first level presents information about the entire governorate, and this level was used in the following sections: the clans, the oil and gas wells, and the campaigns for spreading Shiism. The second level displays information on the east of Deir ez-Zor governorate only (areas outside the regime control), and this level was used to present demographic information, economic reality, and job opportunities, in addition to serving these areas within the basic service sectors (medical, civil defense and bakeries). The third level presents information at the neighborhood level for six major cities.

1. Methodology:
Work began on the report for eastern Deir ez-Zor governorate at the beginning of January 2022, and the final report was issued at the end of July 2022. The Deir ez-Zor governorate Council, formed in al-Baab city in the northern countryside of Aleppo, contributed to the preparation of the report. The enumerators faced a set of difficulties related to the military situation and the security restrictions imposed by the controlling forces, the lack of time and the huge amount of information required, and the difficulty of obtaining information on private facilities, in addition to the difficulty of accessing specialized information. However, the enumerators communicated with the network coordinators to reach appropriate solutions and overcome the difficulties.

2. Demography in eastern Deir ez-Zor:
The population in areas outside the regime control of Deir ez-Zor governorate was 1,070,736 in February 2022. IDPs constituted 12% (126,924 IDPs) of the total population. 46% (57,962 IDPs) of the total IDPs settled in rented houses, 20% (25,808 IDPs) of IDPs settled in borrowed houses, and 6% (7,404 IDPs) of IDPs settled in random camps concentrated in Kasra and Basira sub-districts. Vulnerable and marginalized groups comprised 6% of the population and were 59,099.

3. The most prominent clans in Deir ez-Zor governorate:
There are many Arab clans in Deir ez-Zor governorate that belong to significant and widespread tribes, and they extend beyond the borders of the governorate and to neighboring Arab countries, including the tribes of Akidat and al-Bakkarah, which constitute the most significant and most widespread human population in the governorate through their multiple clans. There are also the following tribes: al-Bu Saraya, Bukhapur, Dilim, Al Obeid, the tribe of Al Kulayin, the al-Mashahda clan, and some other clans in the center of Deir ez-Zor city, including Al-Kharshan, Al-Jawashneh, Al-Luhayb, Al-Dhafir, Al-Bu Khurais, Al-Bu Arafat, and Al-Ma’amarah. Also, al-Anin and al-Rawieen spread in the cities of Al-Bu Kamal and Al-Mayadeen.
4. **Campaigns for spreading Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate:**
The Iranian regime exploited weaknesses in the social structure in the governorate's countryside, namely poverty and the low level of education, in addition to a major factor, which is turning a blind eye to the Syrian regime to the movements and practices of the Iranian Embassy and the Iranian Cultural Center in Damascus, which target the ideological structure of the Syrian society through several means, including financial and intellectual. Iranian militias are deployed on the left bank of the Euphrates River (the western bank). They rehabilitated Ain Ali well, Bint Husayniyah, and a shrine to the well in Al-Quriyah town in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, and made the well a destination for Shiite visitors, in addition to converting several names of mosques in Deir ez-Zor governorate into Shiite religious names and symbols, after they restored them. They also built several Shiite hawzas (religious centers) in the cities and villages under the regime’s control and the Shiite militias. Through its local militias and individuals, Iran buys real estate from the people at attractive prices, aiming to settle its fighters recruited from outside Syria who obtained Syrian citizenship after the revolution to change the societal structure in the governorate.

5. **Oil and gas:**
The oilfields in Deir ez-Zor produced more than half of the public production in Syria in 2011, amounted to more than three hundred thousand barrels per day, according to the statistics issued by the Ministry of Oil. (production number is doubtful, but some specialists who worked in those fields and the Ministry of Oil say that the real numbers exceed one million barrels per day). This is because Deir ez-Zor governorate includes the largest oilfields in Syria, the most important of which is al-Omar oilfield, al-Tank oilfield, the Koniko gas field, the Deiro oilfield, and the Ward and Taim fields, in addition to a large number of wells distributed in the sub-districts of Sur and Basira. SDF forces in the oilfields were attacked by ISIS cells many times, so they resorted to securing wells so that they are invested by civilian investors who occupy the wells and give an agreed profit percentage to the SDF forces. (Some estimate that investors will likely provide a percentage of the production to ISIS to avoid its attacks on wells.)

6. **Services in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control:**
There are 33 hospitals in the areas outside the regime control of Deir ez-Zor governorate, while civil defense centers are found in 4 sub-districts only, and there are no civil defense centers in the sub-districts of Kasra and Sosa. Private bakeries accounted for 84% (108 bakeries) of the total bakeries in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime’s control. Public bakeries owned by the Syrian government accounted for 10% (13 bakeries), while 6% (8 bakeries) of the bakeries were jointly owned by the public and private sectors.
7. Governance and government buildings:
The total number of members of the local councils of the sub-districts in the areas outside the regime control in the east of Deir ez-Zor governorate was 201 members, of whom 46% (92 females) were females. Full-time members accounted for 76% (153 members). The information indicates that all the local councils were appointed by recommendation, except the local council in Sosa, where the members of the local council of Sosa were elected by the council of notables representing the sub-district. ACU's enumerators were able to visit 94 government buildings in areas outside the regime control of Deir ez-Zor governorate. It was found that 59 buildings are not destroyed and are fully ready to be used, and these buildings are often used for the same function for which they were established. 25 buildings are not destroyed and need to be equipped, and these buildings are often used for functions other than those for which they were established, and military factions or displaced people often use them. 5 buildings are partially destroyed, and 5 buildings are completely destroyed and need to be rebuilt.

8. Economy and sources of income:
The results of the study showed that the percentage of male workers over the age of 18 is 56% of the total males in the region and that the percentage of female workers over the age of 18 is 27% of the total females in the region. The percentage of workers whose basic daily requirements are met by sources of income is 32% of the total workers. It was found that the largest sources of income available to males working in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control is in the agricultural sector, and the percentage of workers in the agricultural sector is 23% of the total number of workers in all occupations. In the second rank came workers in the education sector by 12%, those working in the government agencies affiliated with SDF by 12%, and then workers in livestock breeding by 10%. 33% of families without sources of income rely on remittances from family members or relatives outside Syria, and 24% of these families rely on aid provided by humanitarian organizations.

9. Agricultural sector:
The total area of land cultivated by irrigation in areas outside the regime control from Deir ez-Zor governorate is 1,264,961 dunums. These lands spread near the Khabor and Euphrates rivers and some areas containing artesian wells. There is no accurate information on the area of rainfed land. Information sources confirm that the area of rainfed land in Deir ez-Zor governorate is more than ten times the area of irrigated land, but these lands need to be reclaimed. During the winter of 2021-2022, 1,060,685 dunams were cultivated by irrigation in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate. 83% (877,448 dunams) of irrigated lands were cultivated with the wheat crop, 15% (159,219 dunams) were cultivated with barley crop, and 1% (14,818 dunams) were cultivated with winter vegetables.
10. Kasra city:
The city consists of three main sectors, namely Kasra city, Kasra Tahtani village, and Hammar Kasra village. These three sectors are divided into 9 neighborhoods that form Kasra city. The city has an area of 4 square kilometers. The population of Kasra city was 18,000, and 55% (9,900 females) of the population of Kasra city were females. Information sources confirmed that 56% of the residents of Kasra city are from the poor class, 36% from the middle-income class, and only 9% from the affluent class. There are 4 bakeries in the city, all of which are operational. 78% of the neighborhoods of Kasra city do not have a public water network. 94% of the neighborhoods do not have a sewage network. The public roads in all Kasra city neighborhoods are partially destroyed due to military activities and the lack of road maintenance for a long time.

11. Sur city:
The city comprises 6 neighborhoods, and the area is 4 square kilometers. The population of Sur city is 8,240, and 55% (4,532 females) are females. Displaced people constituted 14% (1,143) of the city’s population. It was found that 69% of the residents of Sur city are from the poor class, 22% are from the middle-income class, and only 9% are from the affluent class. There are 4 bakeries in the city, all of which are operational. 81% of the neighborhoods of Sur city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. 39% of the city’s neighborhoods do not have a sewage network, and in only 61% of neighborhoods, the swage network works well, and there is no leakage in its parts. There is no electricity network in 19% of the neighborhoods. Recently, 27% of the neighborhoods have expanded and do not contain paved roads (their roads are graveled only).

12. Basira City:
The city consists of 11 neighborhoods, and the area is estimated at 3 square kilometers. The population of Basira city is 28,070, 60% were females (16,842 females), and 6% were displaced (1,580 displaced persons). It was found that 61% of the residents of Basira city are from the poor class, 30% are from the middle-income class, and only 9% are from the affluent class. There are six bakeries in Basira city, four bakeries are operational, and two bakeries are out-of-order due to damages in the building or machinery malfunctions. 89% of the neighborhoods of Basira city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. 12% of the neighborhoods have a good sewage network, but there is leakage in some of its parts, and 11% of the neighborhoods have a good sewage network, but there is leakage in many of its parts; there is no sewage network in 3% of the neighborhoods as these neighborhoods have recently expanded and no sewage network has been established in them. The network suffers from malfunctions in 17% of the city’s neighborhoods, while there is no electricity network in 13% of the neighborhoods. 9% of the neighborhoods have recently expanded and do not have paved roads (their roads are only graveled).
13. Hajin City:
The Euphrates River surrounds the city from three sides, where its farms and houses spread over a floodplain with soil formed by the residue of the river, and its area is 30 square kilometers without the desert part of it. Hajin city consists of 8 neighborhoods. The population of Hajin city is 99,000, 55% (54,450 females) of the city's population are females, and 15% (15,000 IDPs) are IDPs. The city has 4 bakeries, all of which are operational. 13% of the neighborhoods of Hajin city do not have a public water network. 89% of Hajin city's neighborhoods do not have a sewage network. The public electricity network is completely destroyed in all neighborhoods of Hajin city, and hence electricity is not available in the public grid. The road network is intact in only 11% of Hajin city's neighborhoods.

14. Thiban city:
Its area is estimated at 30 square kilometers. Thiban city consists of 6 neighborhoods. The city is considered important for all the controlling parties that have taken control over the region because of the presence of the elders/notables of the Hafal al-Akidat clan (the house of the Hafal al-Akidat chiefdom), in addition to being an important link between the east and west of the Euphrates River at al-Mayadeen city. The population of Thiban city is 24,145. Females constituted 55% (13,280 females), and IDPs constituted 5% (2,100 IDPs). It was found that 25% of the residents of Thiban city are from the poor class, 63% are from the middle-income class, and only 13% are from the affluent class. There are 4 bakeries in Thiban city, all of which are operational. 43% of the neighborhoods of Thiban city do not have a public water network. 58% of the city's neighborhoods do not have a sewage network. There is no electricity network in 58% of the neighborhoods. A road network has not been established in 19% of the neighborhoods because these neighborhoods have recently expanded and are only graveled roads.

15. Sosa city:
Its area is 3 square kilometers and comprises 11 neighborhoods. The population of Sosa city is 35,000. Females accounted for 60% (21,000 females), while there are no displaced persons in the city, except for some families hosted by their relatives. It was found that 57% of the residents of Sosa city are from the poor class, 28% are from the middle-income class, and only 15% are from the affluent class. There are 3 bakeries in the city, all of which are operational. 3% of the neighborhoods of Sosa city do not have a public water network. And 3% of the neighborhoods have a completely destroyed water network. 3% of the city's neighborhoods do not have a sewage network, and 5% of the neighborhoods have a completely destroyed sewage network. The electricity network in Sosa city is completely destroyed due to the military activities that took place in the city. 4% of the neighborhoods do not have a road network because the city has recently expanded, no roads have been built in it, and its roads are only graveled.
**Second: Methodology**

Work began on the report for the eastern Deir ez-Zor governorate at the beginning of January 2022, and the final report was issued at the end of July 2022. The Deir ez-Zor Provincial Council, which was formed in al-Bab city in the northern countryside of Aleppo, contributed to the preparation of the report. The council contributed by preparing detailed information on the clans of Deir ez-Zor governorate and the campaigns of spreading Shiism in the governorate. The council also contributed information on the governorate's oil and gas wells.

1. **Timeframe**

The design and review of the questionnaires was completed at the end of February 2022. Then the enumerators were trained on the questionnaires at the beginning of March 2022, via Skype for business. Within 7 days, six enumerators were trained on the mechanism of collecting, triangulating, and sending data. The data collection period started shortly after and lasted 25 working days. The network coordinator continued daily communication with the enumerators to respond to any inquiries and provide alternative solutions in the event of any obstacles. The enumerators were also reviewed with the sent values, and the debriefing process was conducted on a daily basis for the sent data. The questionnaires were completed electronically using KoboCollect. The 7-day cleaning of incoming data was also carried out. Some of the data were analyzed and reflected over a period of 15 working days, starting at the end of April 2022. It ended on time, after which the report writing period began, which lasted for 30 working days and ended in mid-June 2022 when the maps were being prepared in conjunction with the writing of the report. Then came the period of translating the report, which lasted for 20 working days and ended in mid-July 2022, and after that, the graphic designer issued the final report in July 2022.

2. **Tools and software used:**

Three questionnaires were designed to conduct the data collection process; the **Key Informants (KIs)** Electronic Questionnaire 1: This was programmed electronically using KoboCollect to obtain some indicators on the general situation in eastern Deir ez-Zor Governorate, the Key Informants (KIs) Paper Questionnaire 2: This questionnaire was collected on paper so that the enumerator could add more data during the key informant interviews, and the Enumerator's General Observation Questionnaire: it is a paper-based questionnaire in which the enumerator's observation is added during the data collection period to enrich the report with information and add an explanation of the difficulties and obstacles that the enumerator faced during the data collection period and how alternative solutions were found. The enumerators need to meet at least three key informants for each sector, which means that the number of interviews exceeded 30 interviews with key informants for each city, the total number of interviews for the entire report exceeded 150 interviews with key informants, and the information in all sectors requires field visits to the cities and neighborhoods covered in the study.

The network officer trained 15 enumerators on data collection using Skype for business, which was sent electronically using KoBoCollect. Analysts released the data using Excel, where this software was used to show charts and tables. The Map Administrator used ArcGIS software to produce maps, and the graphic designer used Adobe Photoshop after translating the report.
3. Difficulties and Challenges:

- **The military situation and the security tightening imposed by the controlling forces**: The bad security situation forced the enumerators to work in complete secrecy to preserve their personal safety, as they were forced to use their personal relations to collect the data, and they avoided direct questions.

- **The lack of time and the huge amount of information required**: This questionnaire requires a huge amount of information that has not been collected before. It needs accurate details of the available facilities, which forced the enumerators to visit these facilities and see their reality. This difficulty has been resolved by dividing the work by the sectors of the report and adopting a clear division of the neighborhoods to organize the work. This division spares the enumerator from visiting the neighborhood several times, which saves time as the enumerator will interview more key informants in one day, and also knowing the weaknesses in the information of the facilities and avoiding them during the data collection period will save time and effort for the enumerators.

- **Difficulty in obtaining information for private facilities**: There are a number of service facilities owned and supervised by private entities, such as bakeries, wells, electricity generators, etc. There is difficulty in obtaining information from these facilities, so the enumerators' personal relations have been relied on to communicate with these people and obtain information from them.

- **Specialized information**: The report contains sections that require specialists to obtain accurate information, so enumerators in different disciplines, such as architects, agricultural and irrigation engineers, doctors, and water engineers, were relied on. These enumerators were trained to collect data and use it to reduce the error rate as much as possible.
Third: Demography in Deir ez-Zor Districts outside the Regime Control

1. Population Census

According to the population census conducted by the IMU enumerators in the ACU, the population in the areas outside the regime’s control from Deir ez-Zor Governorate was 1,070,736 as of February 2022.

Figure (1) Population census by gender and age groups in eastern Deir ez-Zor

Key informants confirmed that the large majority of residents of areas outside the regime’s control from Deir ez-Zor Governorate are Arabs. At the same time, several Armenian and Turkmen families were present sporadically. In terms of religions and religious sects, Sunni Muslims make up 99% of the population, while Shiites make up only 1%. It is noteworthy that the Shiite movements began to extend to areas outside the regime’s control from Deir ez-Zor Governorate in an undisclosed manner due to the pursuance of the controlling body over the governorate for these movements, forcing some residents to follow the Shiite doctrine in an undisclosed manner. Shiite movements are widely spread within Deir ez-Zor governorate in regime-controlled areas, with Iranian militias loyal to it.
2. Numbers of IDPs and areas they came from

IDPs constitute 12% (126,924 IDPs) of the total population in the districts of Deir ez-Zor Governorate outside the regime control. The most significant percentage of IDPs is in Kasra sub-district, where IDPs constitute 21% of the total population of 32,026 IDPs. IDPs constitute 15% of the total population of the Basira sub-district, which is 17,900 IDPs. IDPs constitute 14% of the total population of Hajin sub-district, which is 55,800 IDPs.

Key informants confirmed that displacement and return movements continue in Kasra sub-district, where several displaced families are permanently witnessing the arrival of the sub-district. The sub-district is the main entrance to areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorate, and it is witnessing a major economic movement. The displacement and return movements in the other sub-districts were almost non-existent and limited to displaced families released from the Al-Hol camp in Al-Hasakeh Governorate.

Figure (2) Population census by gender and age groups in eastern Deir ez-Zor

![Population census chart]

IDS (Individuals) vs. Host community (individuals)
The study found that the largest percentage of IDPs in the districts of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control came from other areas within the same governorate and accounted for 87% (110,034 IDPs) of the total number of IDPs. Key informants confirmed that most IDPs came from the regime-controlled sub-districts of Deir ez-Zor governorate. It is noteworthy that Deir ez-Zor Governorate was completely liberated from the regime’s control at the beginning of 2012. However, the regime maintained its places of control within parts of the city of Deir ez-Zor only (Al-Joura and Al-Qusour neighborhoods, in addition to Deir ez-Zor military Airport and some other military pieces). In mid-2017, with the support of Russia and Iranian militias, the regime began to regain control of the areas of Deir ez-Zor Governorate west of the Euphrates River, prompting a large portion of the population to flee to the areas of Deir ez-Zor Governorate east of the Euphrates River.

Therefore, most IDPs in Sosa sub-district came from Al-Bukamal sub-district center. The majority of the IDPs in Hajin sub-district came from the sub-districts of Al-Bukamal, Jalaa, Ashara, and Al Mayadin Center. Most of the IDPs in Thiban sub-district came from Al Mayadin, Ashara, and Muhasan sub-districts. Most of the IDPs in the sub-districts of Kasra, Basira, and Khasham came from Deir ez-Zor and Tabni. IDPs from Aleppo and Al-Hasakeh governorates accounted for 3% of the total IDPs in Deir ez-Zor areas outside the regime's control. Displaced persons from Damascus Countryside governorate constituted 2%.

Figure (3) Number/ Percentage of IDPs by the areas from which they came

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighboring sub-districts within the same governorate</td>
<td>110,034</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Rural Damascus)</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Aleppo)</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Rural Damascus)</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Rural Damascus)</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same sub-district (cities and towns within the sub-district)</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Hama)</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Homs)</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governorates (Idlib)</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The places where the IDPs have settled

The majority of IDPs live in rented houses, and they accounted for 46% (57,962 IDPs) of the total number of IDPs in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control. 20% (25,808) of IDPs live in lent houses (given by their owners to IDPs without asking for rent). 8% (9,519 IDPs) of IDPs live in empty houses (their owners were displaced and left behind, and IDPs inhabited them without their owners’ knowledge). 6% (7,615 IDPs) of IDPs live in vacant buildings (abandoned government buildings). 6% (7,404 IDPs) of IDPs live in self-settled camps concentrated in Kasra and Basira sub-districts, which is Abu Khashab Township Camp, which is one of the largest camps in Deir ez-Zor Countryside, Al-Jazra Township Camp, Mhemadeh Township Camp, Hawayej Thyab Township Camp, Zghir Jazireh township Camp, Sawa Township Camp, and Shiheil Township Camp. 3% (3,808 IDPs) of the IDPs live in scattered tents distributed in Kasra and Basira sub-districts, and some of these tents belong to shepherds.

The key informants confirmed that most of the displaced people in the self-settled camps scattered in the areas outside the regime’s control in eastern Deir ez-Zor come from the regime-controlled areas and are poor and wanted by the regime. The Autonomous Administration of SDF, and some humanitarian organizations, oversee Abu Khashab camp and respond to part of the needs of the displaced. At the same time, no one responds to the needs of the IDPs in other self-settled camps.
4. Vulnerable and marginalized groups

Vulnerable and marginalized groups constitute 6% of the population in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control, and the number 59,099 individuals. The key informants confirmed that the battles against ISIS had left the bulk of vulnerable and marginalized groups in the region. Starting with the massacre of the Shaitat clan perpetrated by ISIS in 2014, more than 1,200 people were killed in field executions, and the massacre left more than 2,262 children orphaned and in addition to widows. Finally, the battles launched by the International Coalition forces and the shelling that targeted civilian places led to thousands of deaths and left thousands of people with disabilities.

Figure (5) Number/ Percentage of vulnerable and marginalized groups

Orphans constitute 39% (23,130 orphans) of the total vulnerable and marginalized groups in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime’s control. Children responsible for supporting their families constitute 18% (10,520 children) of the total vulnerable and marginalized groups. In this case, the parents are absent from the family or suffer from an illness or disability that prevents them from supporting their families, forcing the child to support the family. Women responsible for supporting their families make up 16% (9,165). Persons with disabilities account for 12% (7,230 persons with disabilities). Unsupported older persons account for 11% (6,465 older persons). Unaccompanied children constitute 4% (2,582 children). It is noteworthy that ISIS arrested many civilians and took them to Iraq, and the fate of those people remains unknown. After taking control of eastern Deir ez-Zor, the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrested many civilians, many of whom remain unaccounted for. This has left families and unaccompanied children without any breadwinner.

Fourth: The Most Prominent Clans of Deir ez-Zor Governorate

Deir ez-Zor Governorate is characterized by its Arab tribal composition. There are many Arab clans in the province belonging to large and widespread tribes that extend beyond the province’s borders and

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to neighboring Arab countries. These include the tribes of Akidat and al-Bakkarah. They constitute the largest and most widespread human mass in the province through their multiple clans. The following is an explanation of the main clans in the province.

**Okidat Clans:** It is the largest gathering of tribes in the governorate of Deir ez-Zor, where its members are scattered in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor (cities and towns between the cities of Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal) on the banks of the Euphrates River to the border town of Al-Bukamal with Iraq. They are also spread out in the northern Deir ez-Zor countryside from Basira south to Sur sub-district to the north. The chiefdom of the tribe is the House of Al-Hafl, where sons inherited the chiefdom up to Sheikh Musab bin Khalil Al-Aboud Al-Hafl, currently residing in Qatar. The affairs of the tribe are currently managed by his brother Ibrahim, who lives in his office in Thiban sub-district.

Okidat clan assembly is mainly divided into three sections, and under each section, several clans. They are as follows:

1. **Bu Jamel clan:** Several clans are divided from it, for example:
   
   a. **Al-Bakir clan:** A widespread clan from the town of Basira south to Sur sub-district north on the banks of Khabur river. It is headed by the heirs of Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Hamada, currently residing in Turkey. However, after SDF took control of Deir ez-Zor countryside, Ahmad al-Khubail, nicknamed Abu Khawla, leader of the military council in Deir ez-Zor, was instated as the head of Al-Bakir clan and its sub-clan.
   
   b. **Bu Hasan:** The chiefdom House is for al-Najres family, and currently, Safouk Faisal Al-Najres is the successor to his deceased father.
   
   c. **Al-Qar’an:** They are located in the city of Quriyeh and Tayyana, headed by Sheikh Turki Manadi Al-Khalil.
   
   d. **Bu Rahma:** headed by the late Sheikh Arhiman Al-Jabara, who died in Turkey almost a year ago.
   
   e. **Shuwait:** They are located in the towns of Sbeikhan, Dablan, Gharibeh, and Tishreen. The chiefdom House is Al-Jijan.

2. **Bu Kamal:** It is one of the essential components of the tribe, and Al-Hassoun, Al-Damim, and Bu Marih clans are divided from it. They are located in the border area of Al-Bukamal. They lead the social activity of the region through the elders and notables of the Al-Jarrah family of Al-Damim clan and Al-Dandel family of Al-Hassoun clan.
   
   a. **Al-Hasoun:** The chiefdom House is with the Al-Dandal family, and currently, the clan is headed by Ayman Daham Al-Dandal, a member of the People's Assembly (the regime).
   
   b. **Al-Damin:** The chiefdom House is concentrated in the family of Al-Jarrah, and currently, the clan is headed by Kamal Naji Al-Jarrah, including the defected from the regime Nawaf Faris Al-Jarrah, the ambassador and the former governor.

3. **Zamil (Shu’aytat):** It is considered one of the prominent clans in the assembly of Al-Akidat clans, and a single chiefdom does not unite them. They are divided into three sub-clans: Al-Alyan, Al-Jaddou’, and Al-Khanfour. The elders of the clan are from the families of Al-Jazza’, Al-Alyan, and Al-Oqla.
Al-Baqqara (Al-Bakkara) tribe: The tribe is divided into three sections: Al-Abed, Al-Abeed and Dhana Al-Bu Sultan. These sections include some 30 clans spread from the eastern countryside to the town of Basira and in the western countryside from the northern side of the river (Al-Jazirah) to the borders of Raqqa Governorate and extending northward to Al-Hasakeh Governorate in the Jabal Abdul Aziz area. The chieftdom of the tribe is within Al-Bashir Family, and Sheikh Hajim Al-Bashir currently manages the affairs of the tribe from his house in Mhemideh to the regime-controlled areas. Among the most important dignitaries and sheikhs of the tribe are Hamad al-Jilat, Khaled Mozer al-Salem, Badr al-Bashar, Fawazal-Daboul, Dahm al-Ibrahim al-Salama, and Turki al-Ghanam. The following is an explanation of the tribal clans:

1. **Al-Abed:** Al-Bu Arab Clan - Abdul Jader – Al-hamad Abed - Al-Khanjar - Al-Rashed, Al-Rafi ' and Ali Arab, located in the villages of Mrat, Mathlum, Hseiniyeh, Jneineh, Upper Safira, Lower Safira, Mhemideh and Hawayej Thyab Shamiyeh.

2. **Al-Obeid:** The tribe of Al-bu Musa'a, Al-Obeidat, Al-Manasra, Al-Ali and Al-Hulamiyah, located in the villages of the western Deir ez-Zor countryside from the village of Hawaij Albu Musa’a, Zaghir Jazirah, Hammar Al-Ali, Hammar Kasra, Harmushiyeh, and Badiat Abu Khashab.

3. **Dhana Sultan:** And they are divided into:
   a. **Al-Mashhour:** They are located in the town of Sawa in the western countryside, and from their figures is Al-Mu'izzi family.
   b. **Bu Saleh:** They are located in the desert of Jerwan and the town of Al-Kubar, and their figures include the sons of Khider Al-Khalaf.
   c. **Bu Rahma:** They are located in the north-eastern countryside in the town of Dahleh and Al-Sadouni, and they include the sons of Aref Al-Humaidi.

In addition to the tribe of Abdul Karim and Albu Badran located in the towns of Hatla and Salhiyeh and the city of Deir ez-Zor up to the north-eastern countryside of the town of Jadid Baggara.
Bu Saraya Clan:

They are located in the western countryside (Shamia) of Deir ez-Zor city in Tabni sub-district, the towns of Ayyash, Masreb, Tarif, Shmeitiyeh, and Kharita to the village of Shulah on the road of Deir ez-Zor Damascus, and also in the eastern countryside in the village of Baqras. The chiefdom was House al-Shlash and later moved to House al-Fayyad al-Nasser. The clan is currently headed by Muhanna Faisal Al-Fayyad, a member of the regime's People's Assembly.

Bu Khabur clan: They are located in the city of Muhasan, Abed, Mreiyeh, and Toob.

Dulaim clan: They are located in the area of Al-Bukamal and Al-Asharah.

Obaid clan: They are located in the city of Albu Kamal, Basira, and the city of Deir ez-Zor.

Qali’in tribe: They are mainly located in the cities of Al-Mayadeen and Al-Ashara, as well as in Basira and Al-Bukamal, and their tribes include Albu Khalil Albu Mustafa, Al-Weisat, Al-Sinani,n and Albu Nasser.

Mashahdah Clan: They are mainly located in the cities of Al-Mayadeen and Al-Bukamal and the town of Sabha.

Many of the clans are concentrated in the city center of Deir ez-Zor (Al-Kharshan, Al-Jawasha, Al-Lahib, Al-Dhafir, Bu Khurais, Albu Arafat, and Al-Ma’amrah). Also, al-Anin and al-Rawieen spread in the cities of Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadeen.
Fifth: Converting to Shiism Campaigns in Deir ez-Zor Governorate

1. The history of Shiism in Syria

Talking about sectarian minorities in Syria was forbidden during the era of the rise of the Baath Party, in the era of the eighties and the massacres committed by the regime's army against the Muslim Brotherhood are considered to be historical periods followed by a state of terror from discussing issues related to religion, so it was forbidden to talk about Salafism Sunni doctrines or other sects, such as Alawite, Druze, Ismaili and Shiite sects. Religious rhetoric was restricted to specific topics related to religion and was limited to topics of a non-controversial nature, such as the pillars of Islam, righteousness, and piety. Therefore, minority religious identities such as Shiites were not topics allowed to discuss. In terms of history, the roots of Shiism in Syria go back to the first Hijri century (A.H.), but it began to spread in the fourth A.H. with the control of the Shiite Hamdani state over Aleppo. It continued during the era of the Fatimid caliphate, to recede with the beginning of the Ayyubid and Ottoman states because of their fight against it; and by the twentieth century, the Shiites became a very small minority in Syria. Although the twentieth century witnessed in its beginnings, specifically in the year 1925, a movement in the direction of spreading Shiism by a religious scholar named Abdul Rahman Al-Khair, the movement was not feasible or effective until after the rise of Hafez Al-Assad, who assumed the reins of power and turned against his Baathist comrades who took over the reins of government from the beginning of the sixties, particularly with the visit of Musa Al-Sadr (the Shiite authority) in 1974 to the sheikhs of the Alawite sect in the coastal region of Syria. He was preceded by Ayatollah Shirazi (the Shiite authority), who issued the famous fatwa (religious ruling), which states that the people of that region (the Alawites in the Syrian coast) belong to the Twelver Shiites. However, large numbers in Syria did not convert to the Shiite sect except due to the intense activities of Jamil Al-Assad (the religious brother of former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad) during the eighties of the twentieth century, when Jamil Al-Assad began to encourage conversion to Shiism in the same region, especially among the families of Alawite sect. The establishment of the Murtada Association by Jamil Al-Assad played a major role in spreading Shiism, which targeted more members of the Alawite sect to show that Alawites belong to the larger community of Shiites and are not a minority. Following the suppression of the Shiites by the former Iraqi regime (President Saddam Hussein's regime) in the early nineties, dozens of Shiite figures headed to Damascus and practiced a semi-official Shiite preaching activity, with a green light from the Syrian regime. Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah opened an office in the Sayeda Zainab neighborhood in Damascus for Shiism, and a space was given to the media to spread Shiism through broadcasting a television program for the Iraqi Shiite missionary Abdul Hamid Al-Muhajir. Shiism took a new turn in Syria after July events in southern Lebanon, which showed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Hezbollah, as a hero in the Syrian media and the conqueror of Israel within the so-called Operation entitled True Promise. A group of people started to feel there is nothing wrong with converting to Shiism. Campaigns were launched in Syria to collect financial donations to support the Lebanese Hezbollah, with the blessing of the Syrian regime. Following the military intervention of Shiite militias in the Syrian armed conflict Shiism took on other dimensions after the Iranian government helped the Syrian regime suppress peaceful protests by committing several massacres in Syria.
2. History of Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate

The sources confirm that the first appearance of Shiism in Deir ez-Zor was in the early 1980s, as Al-Bakara clan (one of the largest clans in Deir ez-Zor governorate, specifically Fakhez Al Bu Badran, Al Mashhour and Al Hulamiya) was influenced by the Shiite dawah. The first to convert to Shiism was first sergeant Omar Al Hamadi from Hatla village in Deir ez-Zor governorate. The sergeant was influenced by officers of the Alawite sect during his service in the army where tempting financial promises were given to him. When he returned to his hometown in Deir ez-Zor (Hatla), he was able to convince one of his cousins and son-in-law Yassin Al-Mayouf, who became Shiite and joined the Shiite Al-Murtada Association, which began its missionary activity since its founding in the early eighties. Yassin Al-Mayouf became head of the association’s branch in the town of Hatla, which was an important center for Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate as well as the eastern region. Other figures calling for Shiism also emerged in the town of Hatla, such as Hussein Al-Raja and his sons, who were receiving sums of money to spread Shiism. They were distributing monthly sums of money to those converting to the Shiite sect ranging between 5,000-7,000 Syrian pounds, which was equal to double the salary of a government employee, in addition to holding banquets and group weddings at their expense and facilitating marriage dowries, and the Shiite call to prayer was raised for the first time in Hatla town in 1992, following the return of Yassin Al-Mayouf from Iran. Hussainiyas were then established in the villages of Al-Bakara clan in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor within Al Saghir and Sawa villages, and Kasra city and.

3. Shiism in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011

The Iranian regime made use of the weaknesses in the community structure in the countryside of the governorate, which are poverty and the low level of education. In addition to a major factor, the Syrian regime has turned a blind eye to the movements and practices of the Iranian embassy and the Iranian Cultural Center in Damascus, targeting the ideological structure of the Syrian society through several means. Financial and intellectual wise, as well as interest in some mosques and their restoration in the Persian style, which, according to their belief bear the names of Shiite religious symbols such as (the shrine of Sayyida Zainab in the governorate of Damascus countryside, Uwais Al-Qarni mosque in the governorate of Ar-Raqqa, the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayya in Daraya in the countryside of Damascus, and Ain Ali water well in the town of Quriyeh in Deir ez-Zor Governorate.

After the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, several controlling forces took over Deir ez-Zor governorate, starting with the opposition factions and then the Islamic State. At a later stage, the regime, with the support of Russian forces and Shiite militias, regained control over the cities and towns of Deir ez-Zor governorate located west of the Euphrates River. In contrast, the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the support of the International Coalition, took control of the cities and towns of Deir ez-Zor, located east of the Euphrates River. After 2016, the Shiite militias (Iranian, Iraqi, Afghani, and Lebanese Hezbollah) spread in the regime-controlled areas, and these militias began to realize Iran’s ambitions to establish its project based on spreading Shiite doctrine in the Arab region to complete the Shiite crescent and secure the road (Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut) and isolate the Sunni clans in Syria, which are concentrated in Deir ez-Zor governorate, from the Sunni clans in western Iraq.

In Deir ez-Zor and the eastern countryside of Aleppo, Iran exploited members of Al-Bakara clans under the pretext that these clans could trace their ancestry back to Imam Muhammad Al-Baqir to
attract them in the Shiite campaigns, and indeed members of the clan began to convert to the Shiite sect.

Sheikh Nawaf Al-Bashir, sheikh of the Al-Bakara clan, played a role in promoting Shiism, especially after his dependence on the regime and the Iranians at the beginning of 2017, even though he was known as a political opponent since the beginning of the nineties, and was one of the contributors to the Damascus Spring through the Sahnaya Forum, headed by the Syrian opposition leader Riad Seif, which was part of six Forums formed later in the Damascus Spring. A conference, which included more than 286 personalities, was held in Nawaf Al-Bashir’s guesthouse in Deir ez-Zor governorate for the Syrian opposition entitled Deir ez-Zor Declaration in late 2004. Nawaf Al-Bashir was chosen as a member of the General Secretariat of the Damascus Declaration and then a member of its governing body. When Al-Bashir split from the Syrian political opposition, in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah, and invoked his defection as being against the use of weapons in the revolution. Iran exploited Nawaf Al-Bashir’s shift to spread Shiism, taking advantage of his clan influence. Nawaf Al-Bashir declared his allegiance to Iran since his defection, and placed himself at the disposal of the leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and was asked to recruit young people and have them convert to Shiism. During this period, Al-Bashir moved between the southern suburbs of Hezbollah headquarters in Lebanon, and Tehran, to receive directions, and then returned to Syria, to coordinate with the Imam Al-Baqir Brigade to form a militia similar to the Shiite Popular Mobilization in Iraq. Al-Bashir played two factors in attracting young people to turn to Shiism; the first is poverty that surrounds most of the young men of the tribes in light of the ongoing war. Making use of that, he worked on luring them with money; the second is a clan factor based on the tribe tracing their ancestry back to the people of the prophet’s household, and the necessity for them to defend the holy places of the Shiites. The establishment of Liwa Al-Baqir and Liwa Al-Hussein from Al-Bakara clan played a role in spreading Shiism, strengthening the position of former Shiites, and supporting new Shiites, especially through financial temptations, or restricting the Sunnis, particularly that Sunnis from Albu Badran tribe became in an embarrassing position exposed to harassment. In the past, there were Shiites who secretly received financial support and aid from Iran, but they were afraid to declare their Shiism. After the establishment of the Shiite brigades of the region’s people, the same Shiites announced their Shiism in public, and Shiites began to invade the cities of Al Mayadin, Abu Kamal and Deir-ez-Zor.
4. **Deployment of Shiite militias in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011**

The Iranian forces divided Deir ez-Zor governorate into five sectors within the operations room: Deir ez-Zor city sector, Al Mayadin sector, Abu kamal sector or what is known as Al Bawaba, the southern Badia sector, and Al-Isnad sector, meaning Deir ez-Zor - Damascus highway that passes through the campus in Deir ez-Zor city. Moreover, there are several centers for recruiting young people to fight with the Shiite militias in the city of Al Mayadin.

Iranian militias are distributed on the left bank of the Euphrates River (West Bank), where the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) are mainly stationed in the cities of Deir ez-Zor (within Deir ez-Zor military airport), Muhasan and Mahkan town. IRG and Quds Force militia are also stationed in Abu kamal City. The Zainabiyoun and Fatemiyoun brigades and (IRG) are deployed in Ashara city and Quriyeh town. While the National Defense, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Al-Baqir Brigade share control of the city of Al Mayadin. Liwa Al-Quds is deployed between the city of Al Mayadin and the Syrian desert (between Al Mayadin and Damascus, passing through the cities of Al-Sukhna and Palmyra). Most of the mercenaries of Liwa Al-Quds are Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, and a few Syrians. As for Al-Nujaba movement and the Lebanese Hezbollah, they have headquarters in the city of Deir ez-Zor and are deployed at military checkpoints between the cities of Deir ez-Zor and Al Mayadin.

Iranian forces and militias are present in several oilfields, including Al-Taym and Al-Ward oilfields, where the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Iraqi Imam Al-Murtada brigade, and local groups linked to Iran are present there.

5. **Shiite militias in Deir ez-Zor governorate after 2011**

After regime forces and Shiite militias took control of the center of Deir ez-Zor city and its eastern countryside to the city of Abu Kamal on the Syrian-Iraqi border, they rehabilitated Ain Ali water well, Bint Hosseinia and a water well shrine in Quriyeh town in Deir ez-Zor eastern countryside (under the pretext that Ali bin Abi Talib descended on Quriyeh town) and made the water well a destination for Shiite visitors, in addition to changing the names of several mosques in Deir ez-Zor governorate to Shiite religious names and symbols after they were restored by them, and building several Shiite Hawzas in cities and villages under the control of the regime and Shiite militias. This was done through several intimidating methods at times and encouraging methods at others, and by providing material and in-kind subsidies, paying the salaries of those who joined the militias backed by Iran by opening offices to receive the followers and new affiliates. Opening schools and institutes to learn about the Shiite sect through doctrinal lessons, directly targeting the small and middle age groups to spread Shiism through complete dependence on these generations, as well as carrying out cultural and social activities in cultural centers, intended to attract the largest segment of society to consolidate their sectarian project. There are several centers for recruiting young people to fight with the Shiite militias in the city of Al-Mayadin.

Through its local militias and followers, Iran is buying real estate from people at attractive prices intending to settle its members who were brought from outside Syria and who obtained Syrian citizenship after the outbreak of the revolution, in order to penetrate and change the societal structure in the governorate. In a related context, it is worth mentioning that Shiite militias control Abu Kamal border crossing with Iraq due to its importance in transporting weapons and narcotics from Iraq and Iran to the Gulf states via Jordan.
In April 2022, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, information sources confirmed that Iran is intensifying its political, military, economic and security activities in coordination with the regime, throughout Syria and Deir ez-Zor in particular, taking advantage of the Russian preoccupation with the war on Ukraine, where (IRG) militia began repairing the mosques of Deir ez-Zor destroyed by the regime's air forces, in order to use them to spread Shiite ideology among the people of the city. The militia also plans to open schools for memorization of the Qur’an and giving religious lessons and integrate the children of its foreign fighters with the people of Deir ez-Zor in order to completely change its demographics and turn it into an Iranian state, as it did in several cities in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. The Iranian Cultural Center allocated an amount of 60 million Syrian pounds to rehabilitate several mosques in the neighborhoods of Al Hamidiyah, Al Omal, and the old airport in Deir ez-Zor, which are inhabited by families of foreign Iranian militia members of Iraqi, Afghani and Iranian nationalities. The Iranian Construction and Jihad Foundation provided some building materials that were used in the rehabilitation of these mosques, with a number of its engineers supervising the restoration operations. Iran has relied on humanitarian organizations in Deir ez-Zor, since the regime took control of parts of it in 2017, as a source of funding for its military presence in Deir Ezzor, such as the Imam Al-Kadhim Organization for Development and the Imam Al-Mukhtar Foundation and Al-Furat Foundation for Peace and Social Peace operating in the governorate. Iran is not only seeking to compensate for its losses, but also seeking a long-term stay in Syria. It focuses on Deir ez-Zor because it is located on the Iraqi border, making the supplying process easy.

6. The relationship between Shiite militias and other international forces in Syria

The International Coalition forces in general and America, in particular, reject the Iranian presence on Syrian territory; several skirmishes between the two sides took place, which, in some cases, have evolved into bombings causing casualties from the two sides.

At the beginning of the ongoing war in Syria, there was no tension in the relationship between Russia and Iran in Syria. On the contrary, the two sides appeared as allies in supporting the Syrian regime against the people who demanded their rights. However, this relationship witnessed several changes, including Russia's attempts of expansion at the expense of Iranian forces (Shiite militias in general) and the reduction of Russian forces in Syria after the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The developments on the ground show that the head of the Syrian regime sought to bring Iran into Syria despite the rejection of all international parties of the Iranian presence in Syria. The head of the regime fears that Russia will overthrow it if the arena becomes vacant; This prompted the regime to create a military balance in the region that would guarantee the continuation of its rule; Sources of information confirm that the Iranian forces control military units close to the head of the regime, such as the Republican Guard; While Russia controls other military factions.

Russia tried to intensify its presence after the U.S. withdrawal from Syria was announced at the end of 2019. A hidden conflict escalated between Russia and Iran, where Russia played an ever-increasing role to be the sponsor of agreements between the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the regime, and Turkey. At the same time, Iran resorted to attracting Syrians through soft power to achieve its objectives. Iran relied on promoting Shiism by paying monthly sums of money to those affiliated with its forces.
Highlights of 2020

On 12 March 2020, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor; an unidentified aircraft, believed to be affiliated with the International Coalition, bombed the headquarters of the Iranian militias and the Lebanese Hezbollah militia in the city of Abu Kamal. The aircraft targeted the headquarters of these militias with more than 20 air raids, killing and wounding dozens of Iranian and Hezbollah fighters.

On 27 May 2020, in the northern countryside of Ar-Raqqa; an unidentified aircraft bombed a regime site south of the city of Ath-Thawrah (Tabqa); an unidentified aircraft targeted, with several air raids, the Ath-Thawrah oilfield, where the regime forces and the Iranian militias loyal to them are deployed.

On 8 July 2020, media channels affiliated with the Syrian regime and others affiliated with Iran announced signing of a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation between the two sides; many believe that signing such an agreement may hasten the end of the rule of the head of the Syrian regime; most countries in the world do not object to the Russian military presence in Syria; While the great powers see that the Iranian presence in Syria poses a threat to their interests in the region; and that it reinforces the idea of the control of the Shiite crescent (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon); Developments on the ground show that the head of the Syrian regime sought to sign this agreement to ensure Iran’s stay in Syria. The head of the regime fears that Russia will overthrow it if the arena becomes vacant for it; This prompted it to create a military balance in the region that would guarantee the continuation of its rule; Sources of information confirm that the Iranian forces control military units close to the head of the regime, such as the Republican Guard; While Russia controls other military factions.

In 28 July 2020, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor; Iran sent military reinforcements to its positions near the city of Abu Kamal; Military reinforcements entered Syrian territory through Al-Qaim border crossing between Syria and Iraq; The military reinforcements consist of 30 vehicles, including 17 trucks loaded with weapons and military equipment.

On 27 August 2020, in the western countryside of Deir ez-Zor, the Russian forces began establishing a mobile military bridge on the Euphrates River near the town of Shmeitiyeh; The military bridge links the western bank of the Euphrates River, which is under the control of the regime forces, Russian and Iranian allies, with the eastern bank, which is under the control of the so-called SDF; supported by the International Coalition and the U.S. in particular; the area will certainly witness an attempt by the Russian forces to transfer Russian military vehicles and regime vehicles to the SDF-controlled areas.

On 8 October 2020, in the eastern countryside of Deir Ez-zor; The military council of Deir ez-Zor affiliated with the so-called SDF arrested 25 members working for the Iranian militias in the city of Thiban. SDF launched a campaign of arrests in the city of Thiban and the towns of Shiheil and Hawayej; where SDF arrested 9 persons from Thiban city and 3 others from Hawayej town.
**Highlights of 2021**

On 12 January 2021, in Deir ez-Zor governorate, Israeli warplanes bombed more than 30 positions of the Syrian regime and pro-regime Iranian militias in the governorate; This bombing is considered the most severe of its kind that the regime has been exposed to in several years; the bombing focused on sites in the city of Deir ez-Zor, namely the Military Intelligence branch, warehouses in Ayyash district, Tal Al Hajeef, and several sites in Al Omal neighborhood and the vicinity of the military airport. In Al Mayadin sub-district, the aircraft bombed the farms area and an area adjacent to the sheep market and Ain Ali farms in Quriyeh town. The aircraft bombed several sites in and around Abu Kamal and the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Most of the sites targeted by the Israeli bombardment are camps of Iranian militias containing fighters of Iranian, Iraqi, and Afghan nationalities; In addition to huge military stores; Within which, Iran has kept a large number of weapons over the past two years; the bombing led to the killing of dozens of mercenaries of foreign nationalities sent by Iran to Syria, as well as the massive destruction of weapons depots; Recently, Iran began to follow a new strategy to hide from the Israeli bombing in Syria by mobilizing in the residential areas. Khamenei's advisor for military affairs announced that before his death, Qassem Soleimani had established 82 brigades of armed militias in Syria and Iraq; Of these, 60 brigades are in Syria, comprising 70,000 fighters.

On 6 April 2021, in the northern countryside of Ar-Raqqa governorate; the Iranian Fatemiyoun Militia, which is fighting with the regime, received missile launchers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. These launchers were stored in a military site that belongs to Fatemiyoun Militia in Maadan town; similarly, Fatemiyoun militia had received missile launchers in February 2021, and these launchers were installed in Imam Ali military base and Ayyash district near Deir ez-Zor city.

On 16 April 2021, in the eastern countryside of Aleppo; (IRG) began to establish a huge camp near As-Safira city, on the left side of the defense laboratories of the regime. (IRG) brought missile systems to this camp in addition to heavy machinery; according to local sources, training sites will be prepared and equipped for the camp.

On 28 June 2021, in the eastern countryside of Deir-ez-Zor, the International Coalition aircraft targeted with several air raids the sites of the pro-Iranian militia in the vicinity of the city of Al Mayadin. The Iranian militias responded by bombing the positions of the American forces in Al-Omar oilfield.
On 11 July 2021, in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor; the regime forces and the Iranian militia loyal to them bombed the American base in the Al-Omar oilfield with several missiles. It is noteworthy that this targeting is the second of its kind in the past 24 hours.

On 28 September 2021, in the eastern countryside of Deir-ez-Zor, unidentified warplanes, believed to be affiliated with the International Coalition, bombed the farms area near Al Mayadin city; the bombing targeted a center for training Iranian militias.

On 20 October 2021, drones bombed Al Tanf military base on the Syrian-Jordanian border in the 55 area; the bombed area is under the control of the International Coalition. All sources of information believe that the drones are Iranian.

In the eastern countryside of Damascus, on 16 December 2021, British forces announced shooting down a drone after penetrating Al Tanf base on the Syrian-Jordanian border, and the International Coalition forces accused Iran and its militias of carrying out the attack.

On 30 December 2021, the Iranian militia loyal to the regime redeployed in the city of Abu Kamal, and the Iranian militias brought a military shipment and a large amount of ammunition through Al Sekak crossing from Iraq to Syria. These munitions were stored at Al Hamdan Airport in the western countryside of Abu Kamal. The weapons transported by the Iranian militias included drones. Furthermore, the Iranian militias also brought a group of Iraqi fighters called the Death Squad, which consisted of 100 members, who were deployed on the bank of the Euphrates River.
**Highlights of 2022**

On 5 January 2022, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, Iranian pro-regime militias shelled the International Coalition base in Omar oilfield east of Thiban. The Coalition forces responded by shelling Iranian militia positions in the vicinity of Al-Mayadin. On 7 January 2022, the so-called SDF, supported by the International Coalition Air Force, carried out a campaign of arrest in the city of Basira. On 8 January 2022, Iranian pro-regime militias stationed in the countryside of Al Mayadin city shelled military positions of the International Coalition in Omar oilfield east of Thiban, and coalition forces responded by shelling sources of fire.

On 15 February 2022, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, Russia and Iran are competing to win the support of villages in eastern Syria, to link them to their spheres of influence. The "Cold War" between Moscow and Tehran escalated recently after Iranian militias established a bridge linking the villages of Hatla, Mrat, Mathlum, Khasham, Tabiyet, Al Saleheh and Hseiniyeh east of the Euphrates River, with the Iranian spheres of influence west of the Euphrates River in the middle of the past month; the opening of the bridge created concerns on the part of the Russian forces, which intensified their presence in those areas. Russian forces also distributed clothes for the students bearing the flags of the regime and Russia, in addition to winter clothes. Russian forces further attempted to attract the notables in the area to win support of the local people. However, the Iranian militias did not stand still in the face of the Russian attempts and responded by distributing foodstuffs to the residents of these villages. Russian forces continue their attempts to control and penetrate into the areas under the influence of Iranian militias in Syria, by getting closer to the people and delivering relief aid, in an attempt to stop the continuous Iranian expansion in the Syrian territories.

On 24 March 2022, in the northern countryside of Al-Hasakeh, Quamishli airport experienced tension between Iranian militias and Russian forces, following the attempt of the IRGC militia to test a drone in Quamishli airport. The Russian forces prevented the arrival of Iranian reinforcements, and it is noteworthy that the Iranian militias have recently brought in military reinforcements to several locations in Quamishli city, as part of their efforts to strengthen their presence in the areas of north-eastern Syria.

On 7 April 2022, in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, the residential city in Al-Omar oilfield, which is a base for the International Coalition forces east of Deir ez-Zor, was shelled by an unidentified party. The International Coalition forces later targeted positions in the vicinity of the cities of Al Mayadin and Quriyeh. Iranian militias targeted the International Coalition base in Al-Omar field with several rocket-propelled grenades for the first time in nearly three months. SDF media office said in a statement that the International Coalition has not officially announced that its military base in Al-Omar field has been targeted; according to sources, four the U.S. soldiers were injured at the military base.
On 23 April 2022, new military reinforcements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard arrived at Deir ez-Zor military airport, which Russian forces took as a military base in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

The two months preceding this date witnessed the entry of military convoys of Iranian militias to Deir ez-Zor military airport. These reinforcements come in conjunction with the Russian forces handing over two military sites to the Iranian forces in light of their involvement in the war with Ukraine. In a related context, Russia has reduced its forces in Syria to move them to Ukraine. The news indicates that Russia has withdrawn from Palmyra Military Airport and handed it over to Iranian militias. Russian forces had earlier handed over Mahin weapons depots east of Homs, which is the second-largest ammunition depot in Syria, to the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and the 4th Division of the Syrian regime, loyal to Iran. Russia has previously reduced the number of its fighters in Aleppo city, stationed on the outskirts of Hamdaniya neighborhoods and in the vicinity of Ramouseh Garage, in addition to Al Jamiliyah and Mashhad areas.

On May 29, 2022, the regime forces brought military reinforcements from Quamishli city to the western countryside of Darbasiyah, at the Syrian-Turkish border. In the northern countryside of Aleppo, military reinforcements for the regime and the Iranian militia loyal to it arrived in the villages and towns of Ziyara, Deir Jmal, Khouribkeh, Abyan, Mara'anaz, and Mennegh Military Airport within the areas of deployment of Kurdish forces and the regime north of Aleppo. The reinforcements included rocket launchers, heavy artillery, personnel carriers, and buses loaded with fighters. Military reinforcements were deployed along the lines of contact with the Turkish forces and the opposition factions (the National Army) in the northern countryside of Aleppo.
Sixth: Oil and Gas in Deir ez-Zor Governorate

The area in eastern Syria is a strategic location in the region and the world, not only because they contain the oil reserves of this country, but because they are a gateway and a node linking Turkey to the Arab world, the oil-rich Kurdistan region of Iraq and Iran to the West, and thus may constitute a node controlling the main road of oil and gas traffic towards Europe in the future. This economic and geographical importance has made eastern Syria a center of current conflicts between global powers, with oil reserves in Syria accounting for about 0.14% globally.

1. Production volume before 2011

The oilfields in Deir ez-Zor produce more than half of the public production in Syria, which before 2011 amounted to more than three hundred thousand barrels per day according to the statistics issued by the Ministry of Oil. (This level of production is doubtful, but some specialists who worked in those fields and in the Ministry of Oil say that the real numbers exceed one million barrels per day). Oil fell to low proportions of about forty thousand barrels per day after the regime lost most of the oilfields in the east of the country to ISIS until 2017, when control shifted to what is called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

2. Oilfield locations:

Deir ez-Zor governorate includes the largest oilfields in the country, followed by al-Hasakeh, and these fields are spread throughout the geography of Deir ez-Zor governorate.

- **Al-Omar oilfield**: It is located near Thibansub-district, and it is the country's largest and most famous oilfield. Currently, it is under the control of the SDF, and the coalition forces are present in it. The Al-Omar oilfield is surrounded by a group of wells whose oil was collected in Al-Omar oilfield (al-Asfar well, Al-Zuhdi well, al-Trak well, Qusayban well, Haddaj well, al-Omar well, al-Taqnat well, al-Baraka well, al-Hassan al-Hamad well, al-Sekke well, and Sharif Al-Omar well). This is in addition to a group of wells located within the Al-Omar field and exceeding 10 wells. The production of the Al-Omar field is currently estimated at about 8,000 barrels per day, and oil is transported by tankers to the regime areas through an intermediate company affiliated with the regime (al-Katerji Company), and a part of the production is burned (sorted or refined) by traders working with SDF and sold in the areas under their control, and another part of it is smuggled through the Euphrates River to the regime areas, where leaders of SDF cooperate with the regime officers to smuggle oil across the river, but SDF tries to track smuggling operations and control the transfer of oil through them only (through al-Katerji Company).

- **Al-Tanak oilfield**: It is the second-largest oilfield in Deir ez-Zor and is also controlled by SDF.

- **Conico Gas Field**: It is located in the al-Ezbe district near al-Tabiya town, and it is dedicated to the production of gas and is surrounded by a number of oil wells. The Conoco field is one of the largest gas fields in Syria, and its production was about 25 million cubic meters of gas per day before the ongoing war, but the bombing of the International Coalition destroyed this field during the war with ISIS. This field has been supplying most electrical power plants in Syria with the necessary gas. SDF controls this field, and it is discontinued because it is completely destroyed.
d. **Diero field:** It is controlled by SDF.

e. **al-Wardas al-Taym oilfields:** They are under the control of the regime and are located west of the Euphrates River. Their production is weak at the moment as they are huge stations for oil coming from the fields of al-Omar, al-Tanak, and al-Kherata, and the fields produce more than two thousand barrels per day only for the time being.

f. **Oil wells in Sur sub-district:** In Sur sub-district, there is what is called the al-Sejan field, like the al-Omar field. It is named after an old company that used to run this field, but it ended before the ongoing war, and the wells belonging to the field remained operational, operating through electric compressors (called the hammer or the horses), and they pour into pipelines to the al-Omar field and then to the oil refineries in Homs or Banyas.

During the events, when the Free Army took control of the area, the pipeline network was disrupted and sabotaged, and the equipment and power cables that were used to operate the station (the wells) were stolen. The wells were distributed to the people of the area so that they were operated by generators. After ISIS took control of the area, everything remained the same, but the return of the wells went to ISIS.

Now that the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have taken control of the area, everything has remained the same, but SDF has not been able to control these wells completely because of their difficult location (where all the wells are located in the desert of al-Huraiji village and on al-Rawda road above Abu Al-Nitel village, and they are between 5 and 10 kilometers away from the village in difficult places). SDF suffered many attacks by ISIS cells, so they resorted to securing the wells, which were invested by civilian investors who operate the wells and give an agreed percentage to SDF forces. (Some estimate that investors are likely to provide a percentage of the production to ISIS to avoid its attacks on wells.) Regarding selling the oil, it is sold through investors to the owners of the burners/refineries or sold to oil smugglers into the regime-controlled areas, and according to local sources, the production capacity of all the wells in the region is in a state of decline day after day.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>The name of the well</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>Daily production capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abu Hayyah</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Uhud</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Generator with compressors</td>
<td>400 barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>al-Mesoter</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Faysal</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Generator with compressors</td>
<td>500 barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Al-Daas</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>30 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Al-Hamish Akhdar.</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Al-Hamish Aswad</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Al-Huraiji (Al-Muzal)</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 10 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>2,500 barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Al-Duhush</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 4 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bassam 1</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 5 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bassam 2</td>
<td>Above al-Huraiji village towards the east (al-Huraiji desert) 5 km</td>
<td>Autonomous (oil is poured into pits and it is drawn by engines into tanks)</td>
<td>25 barrels are collected and then drawn after a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Abu Rasein</td>
<td>20 km above Abu Al-Nitel village</td>
<td>Generator with compressors</td>
<td>1,000 barrels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 4,605 barrels
• **Gatherings of primitive oil refineries** in Sur sub-district: There are four primitive oil refineries gatherings in Sur sub-district (al-Hurayjia, abu al-Nitl, Jasimi, and al-Muwaileh), which are named after the nearby villages. Before SDF took control of the area, all of the gatherings were operational, and after SDF took control of the area, only 8 to 10% of them became operational due to the low quantity of oil in the area, and the transfer of oil through tanks to the refineries of the cities of al-Shaddadi, al-Hasakeh, and al-Qamishli.

g. **Oil wells and stations in Basira sub-district**: The al-Siyad well (al-Sijr) belongs to the Basira sub-district, and the well is secured as it is invested by civilian investors who operate the well and give an agreed percentage to SDF forces. (Some estimate that investors are likely to provide a percentage of the production to ISIS to avoid its attacks on wells.) The well’s previous production capacity was about 5,000 to 6,000 barrels per day, but it has decreased at the present time.

• **Crude oil primitive refineries gatherings in Basira sub-district**: In al-Sajr village, there is one primitive Crude oil refineries gathering, but like its predecessor, only 5% of the wells work because of the lack of oil, its high cost, or because it is being smuggled into the regime areas.

2. Oil export destination

According to observers, the oil under the control of SDF is exported to three main destinations, most notably the regime-controlled areas, then the opposition-controlled areas in northern Syria, and part of it towards the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

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3 They refine oil into oil derivatives by heating the crude oil.
Seventh: Services in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control

1. Medical Sector

There are 33 hospitals in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, 7 public hospitals (which used to be owned by the government and are now owned by the controlling party), and 26 private hospitals. The study shows that there is no public hospital in the sub-district of Thiban, while there are 5 private hospitals in the sub-district.

Figure (6) Number/ Percentage of hospitals according to their ownership

For each hospital in Sosa sub-district, there are 97,112 civilians, and for each hospital in Sur sub-district, there are 59,000 civilians, which shows the urgent need to provide more hospitals within the two sub-districts.

Figure (7) Number of individuals per hospital
The study showed that the population of 21 cities and towns in the areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorate need 20-70 minutes to get to the health center on foot. The population of 13 cities and towns needs 90-140 minutes; in 23 cities and towns, they need 150-225 minutes. Medical points exist in 43 cities and towns.

The largest part of the population does not have transportation means and cannot afford to pay the public transportation fees. Moreover, transportation means are available only at specific hours of the day (mostly, there are no transportation means in the countryside after sunset), forcing the residents to go to the medical points on foot, which might be challenging under harsh weather conditions. Therefore, there is an urgent need to provide medical points (health centers) in cities and towns where the population needs a long time to reach medical points on foot or provide ambulances to serve the villages with a hotline to respond to urgent cases.

Map (1) Duration to reach hospitals on foot.

The study showed that the population of 23 cities and towns in areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor need 5-15 minutes to reach the nearest medical point using public or private transportation means; in 18 towns and cities, the residents need 20-30 minutes, and in 16 towns and cities, the residents need 32-45 minutes. Medical points existed in 43 cities and towns.
There are 73 medical points (smaller than the hospital) in areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, some clinics, and some infirmaries. 40% (29 medical points) of the medical points in general (were owned by the government and are now owned by the controlling party). 60% (44 medical points) of the medical points are private. It is mentioned that there are only three public medical points in Basira sub-district and only four in the Hajin sub-district.

Figure (8) Number/ Percentages of medical points according to their ownership
2. Civil Defense

The study showed that the civil defense centers are located in only 4 sub-districts, while there are no civil defense centers in the sub-districts of Kasra and Sosa. It is not enough to provide a single civil defense center in each sub-district. Disasters may require the presence of civil defense teams as soon as possible to respond and evacuate civilians. Rough roads constitute additional obstacles to the arrival of the vehicles of the civil defense teams, as the majority of the roads connecting the sub-district centers with cities and towns have become destroyed as a result of the military actions that have lasted for more than ten years and the absence of any entity that carries out systematic maintenance work on these roads.

Here, there is a need to provide civilian volunteer teams capable of responding to disasters and to provide these teams with adequate equipment such as fire extinguishers until the competent civil defense teams arrive to respond.

Figure (9) Number of civil defense centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thiban</th>
<th>Sosa</th>
<th>Hajin</th>
<th>Basira</th>
<th>Sur</th>
<th>Kisreh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here is a need to provide civilian volunteer teams capable of responding to disasters and to provide these teams with adequate equipment such as fire extinguishers until the competent civil defense teams arrive to respond.

Map (3) Access of civil defense teams to cities and towns
3. Bakeries

Ownership of bakeries means the entity that owns the bakery in terms of construction and machinery available in it. Private bakeries accounted for 84% (108 bakeries) of the total bakeries in the districts of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime’s control. Public bakeries owned by the Syrian government accounted for 10% (13 bakeries), and the public and private sectors jointly owned 6% (8 bakeries). ACU published the 4th edition of the 4Bakeries in Northern Syria report in September 2021, providing a detailed explanation of the reality of the bakeries in all areas outside the regime's control.

Figure (10) Number/ Percentages of bakeries by ownership

Private bakeries are owned by civilians who are free to sell the bakery and change its ownership without changing its location, as changing the location of the bakery requires a license from the Syrian government. There should be a geographical map of the distribution of bakeries within cities and villages for easy service to civilians. After the ongoing events, many civilians, and sometimes the controlling parties, changed the bakery’s locations. Public bakeries are bakeries owned by the Syrian government before the current incidents, and the Directorate of Public Bakeries assigns workers and employees. The production capacities of these bakeries are often very large and have several production lines. Joint bakeries were bakeries owned by the Syrian government before the ongoing events. Still, they were leased for several years to the private sector, which would be responsible for managing them and appointing their workers. After the war began in Syria, the controlling entities established their bakeries in some areas. Also, some humanitarian organizations or local councils received grants to establish several bakeries.

https://acu-sy.org/imu_reports/bakeries-northern-syria-04-thematic-2021/
The study showed that the residents of 11 cities and towns in the areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorates need 15-60 minutes to reach the nearest bakery on foot, in 6 cities and towns they need 90-120 minutes, and in 11 cities and towns they need 130-200 minutes. Bakeries exist in 72 cities and towns.

It is worth mentioning that the largest part of the population does not have transportation means and cannot afford to pay the public transportation fees. Moreover, transportation means are available only at specific hours of the day (mostly, there are no transportation means in the countryside after sunset) which forces the residents to go to the bakeries on foot. This might be challenging under harsh weather conditions. Therefore, there is an urgent need to have bread-selling agents in cities and towns where the population needs a long time to reach bakeries on foot. The residents need to buy food on a daily basis, so bread should be ensured at centers close to their places of residents and limit the prices to prevent the monopoly of traders.

Map (4) Reaching bakeries on foot

The study showed that residents in 14 cities and towns in the areas outside the regime’s control of Deir ez-Zor governorate need 5-15 minutes to reach the nearest bakery using private or public transportation means, in 8 cities and towns they need 18-22 minutes, and in 10 cities and towns they need 25-40 minutes. Bakeries existed in 72 cities and towns only.
Map (5) Reaching bakeries using transportation means
Eighth: Governance and Government Buildings

1. Members of the local councils

The total number of members of the local councils of the sub-districts in the areas outside the control of the regime in the east of Deir ez-Zor Governorate reached 201 members, of which 46% (92 females) were females. The full-time members comprised 76% (153 members), working full time in the local councils. Part-time members accounted for 24% (48 members) of the total members. Members of local councils work part-time only for several hours a day (less than the official working hours) or several days a week (less than the official working days). There are several town councils whose information is not included in this report.

The information indicates that all the local councils were appointed by acclamation, except the local council of Sosa sub-district, where the members of the local council were elected by the council of elders representing the sub-district. Each council is headed by two members, one male, and one female.

Within the local councils, the number of employees does not change as the members of the local councils change at each cycle of the council.
2. Offices of local councils

The number of executive offices for each of the two councils in the sub-districts of Thiban and Sosa is 5, the number of offices for the council of Hajin sub-district is 9, and the number of offices for the council of Basira sub-district is 16 offices. The number of offices for the council of Sur sub-district is 18, and the number of offices for the council of Kasra sub-district is 13. Each office is managed by an executive member of the local council, and each office has several staff.

Table (2) Offices of local councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-district Name:</th>
<th>No. of Offices</th>
<th>Names of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern countryside</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiban</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Education Office</td>
<td>Women's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Services Office</td>
<td>Tangible assets shall include real estate, infrastructure, timber, and agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Citizen Service Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajin</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Media Office</td>
<td>Women's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief Office</td>
<td>Projects Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Education Office</td>
<td>Finance Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Services Office</td>
<td>Economic Office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Office of oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tangible assets shall include real estate, infrastructure, timber, and agriculture.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basira</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Media Office</td>
<td>The Reconciliation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief Office</td>
<td>Health Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Education Office</td>
<td>Women's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Services Office</td>
<td>Logistics office</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Office of oversight</td>
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<td>Tangible assets shall include real estate, infrastructure, timber, and agriculture.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
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<tr>
<td>Photos</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Media Office</td>
<td>The Reconciliation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief Office</td>
<td>Health Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Education Office</td>
<td>Projects Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Services Office</td>
<td>Logistics office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Complaints Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tangible assets shall include real estate, infrastructure, timber, and agriculture.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bakeries Office</td>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasra</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Media Office</td>
<td>Sports Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Education Office</td>
<td>Women's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Services Office</td>
<td>Social Affairs Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>Office of Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tangible assets shall include real estate, infrastructure, timber, and agriculture.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Sources of funding for local councils

The local councils rely on a range of funding sources to provide the operating expenses of the councils, from the salaries of employees and the expenses of council members. Some local councils impose taxes and fees on the population to obtain funding and provide some services. Financial charges are levied for the building licenses and fines on the building violating the licenses. Some councils allocate paid parking on busy markets and streets and lease sidewalks to mobile vendors. The so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) funds some local councils with operational expenses. Some humanitarian organizations also fund part of the operating expenses of some local councils. Some local councils make investments through which part of the council’s operating expenses are secured.

The diversity of local council funding sources reflects the stability of the council and its ability to provide more services to the population. While local councils that rely on the support provided by SDF or organizations only are unstable and often cannot provide services to the population, as the support provided to these councils covers the salaries of employees and essential services only, and this support may be interrupted under any circumstances that the supporting bodies may face.

Figure (12) Percentages of local council funding sources

- Direct investment
- Municipal taxes and fees
- Building and reconstruction permits
- Fines for violating building permits
- Funded by SDF
- Parking lots and mobile vendors
- Support from organizations
- Freight vehicle transit charges
4. Government buildings and their conditions

ACU researchers could visit 94 government buildings in areas outside the regime's control from Deir ez-Zor Governorate and determine their status in terms of partial or total destruction and construction readiness.

Table (3) Names of government buildings and their effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-district Name:</th>
<th>Government buildings, by their readiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sosa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not damaged and fully equipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>It's not damaged, but it needs to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fully equipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partially destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Completely destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Zira’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shafa Town Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sosa Town Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baguz Local Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thiban</td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Zira’a School</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canton</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The old police station</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electricity Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basira</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canteen</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shinan Municipality</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweidan Municipality</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People’s Assembly of Thiban</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textile Factory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Hreijiyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Military Security Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hreijiyeh Police Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photos</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Western</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gharibeh</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sur Sub-district Police Station</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hreijiyeh Post Office Building</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rweished Village Police Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasra</td>
<td></td>
<td>Educational Complex</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Kasra</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-district Police Station</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Bank in Kasra</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fooder center in Kasra</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Kubar Municipal Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Ali</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Kubar post office Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Council in Zghir</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension in Al-Kubar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post office and phone center</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post office in Kasra</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Council in Jazaret Milaj</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Registry in Kasra</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abu Khashab Police Station</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Council in Jazaret Elbuhmeid</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Harmushiyeh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rural Development Center in Kasra</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agricultural Extension Unit in Hawayej Thyab</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jerwan Municipal Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Council of Jazaret Elbushams</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ali Local Council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mhemideh Phone Center</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mhemideh Local Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slaughterhouse in Kisra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

www.acu-sy.org  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  50
59 facilities were found to be undistracted and fully operational, and these buildings are often used for the same function for which they were constructed. 25 buildings are not destroyed and need to be equipped, and these buildings are often used for functions other than those that were established, and military factions or displaced people often use them. 5 buildings are partially destroyed, and 5 buildings are destroyed and need to be rebuilt.
Ninth: Economy and Sources of Income

1. Percentages of employed people

The results of the study showed male employed people constitute 56% of the males over the age of 18 are in the region, while 44% of this age group of males have not been able to get any job opportunities. Female workers over 18 years of age accounted for 27% of the total female population. 73% of this age group of females could not find any job. According to the report on the Economic Reality in northern Syria issued by ACU, in April 2021, the percentage of male workers in eastern Syria (Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor governorates) was 61%, and the percentage of female workers was 39%. Although the Economic Reality report targeted the age group ranging from 18 to 45 years, a comparison of the percentages of employed people between the two reports shows that unemployment rates in the areas of Deir ez-Zor Governorate outside the regime are higher than unemployment rates in the governorates of Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa, which are under the control of the same party (the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces SDF). According to the report on the Economic Realities in northern Syria, "The entire population in northern Syria, of all ages, need job opportunities, due to the lack of social insurance for the elderly or retired people. Many families have lost their breadwinners due to the ongoing war, or the breadwinner has become unable to find suitable work because of their disability due to the war."

Figure (13) Percentage of employed people over the age of 18

2. **Available sources of income**

The study showed that the largest sources of income available to male workers in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control are in the agricultural sector, and the percentage of workers in the agricultural sector is 23% of the total workers in all occupations. The second place came workers in the education sector with 12%, working within the government departments affiliated with SDF with 12%, and workers in livestock breeding with 10%.

**Figure (14) Percentage of sources of male income**

- Working in agriculture: 23%
- Working in the education sector: 12%
- Working in local government agencies / the controlling body: 12%
- Cattle breeding: 10%
- Freelance – day laborers: 7%
- Working in the health sector: 6%
- Small trade – mobile sellers – small shops: 6%
- Producing building materials (such as blocks, sand quarries, etc.): 5%
- Manual professions (barber, tailor, shoe reparer, machine...): 4%
- Construction works: 4%
- Working in humanitarian organizations: 3%
- Handicrafts: 2%
- Factories or workshops: 2%
- Working with the military factions: 2%
- Poultry farming – poultry: 2%

The study showed that the largest sources of income available to male workers in the areas of Deir ez-Zor outside the regime control are in the agricultural sector, and the percentage of workers in the agricultural sector is 23% of the total workers in all occupations. The second place came workers in the education sector with 12%, working within the government departments affiliated with SDF with 12%, and workers in livestock breeding with 10%.

**Figure (15) Percentage of sources of female income**

- Working in agriculture: 31%
- Working in local government agencies / the controlling body: 13%
- Working in the education sector: 12%
- Working in the health sector: 8%
- Small trade – mobile sellers – small shops: 8%
- Cattle breeding: 6%
- Handicrafts: 4%
- Working in humanitarian organizations: 4%
- Handicrafts (barber – tailor – textile .........): 3%
- Freelance – day laborers: 3%
- Factories or workshops: 2%
- Food supplies preparation (canned, dried, or iced foods): 2%
- Poultry farming – poultry: 2%
3. **Level of sources of income meeting living requirements.**

The study showed that only 42% of the total population number in areas outside the regime’s control in Deir Ez-Zor have a source of income. Working people whose income meets their daily basic requirements reached 32% of the total working people.

The study showed that the sources of income for 85% of the working people in Sur sub-district do not meet their daily basic requirements, and the percentage was 80% in Basira, 60% in Kasra, 70% in Hajin, 65 in Sosa, and 50% in Thiban.

![Percentage of working people whose income does not meet their daily requirements.](image)

4. **Coping strategies adopted by families with no source of income**

The study showed that 58% of the total families in the areas outside the regime’s control in Deir ez-Zor governorate do not have a source of income, and these families adopt coping strategies to meet some of their basic needs. 33 of the families do not have a source of income, and they rely on remittances from a family member or relatives living abroad. 24% of the families rely on assistance provided by humanitarian organizations, where the assistance is mainly provided in Hajin and Kasra. 23 of the families that do not have a source of income rely on assistance from friends and relatives living in Syria, and 7% of these families rely on child labour.
Figure (17) Coping strategies adopted by families without a source of income

- 33%: Relying on remittances from a family member/relative outside Syria
- 24%: Relying on humanitarian assistance from organizations
- 23%: Depending on aid from friends and relatives/inside Syria
- 7%: Depending on the work of children under the age of 18 (child labor)
- 6%: Relying on selling assets and property (real estate)
- 3%: Relying on the sale of jewelry and ornaments and spending savings
- 3%: Based on selling household furniture
- 2%: Relying on begging
Tenth: The Agriculture Sector

The total area of irrigated lands in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate is 1,264,961 dunams. These lands are located near the Khabur and Euphrates rivers and in some areas with artesian wells. While there is no accurate information on the area of rainfed land, information sources confirm that the area of rainfed land in Deir ez-Zor governorate is more than ten times the area of irrigated land, but these lands need to be reclaimed.

The majority of farmers refrained from relying on rainfed cultivation after the war in Syria, due to the droughts that hit the region, which lead to the failure of rainfed crops, as well as because of the high cost of agricultural inputs and the costs of farming.

1. Areas of irrigated lands

The total area of irrigated lands in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate is 1,264,961 dunams, and during the winter of 2021-2022, 1,060,685 dunams were cultivated.

Figure (18) The area of irrigated lands in dunams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total Area</th>
<th>Cultivated Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deir ez-Zor</td>
<td>1,264,961</td>
<td>1,060,685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Basira: 471,923
- Sur: 316,482
- Kisreh: 352,809
- Hajin: 170,738

The area of irrigated land that was cultivated in the winter season.
2. Irrigated crops

During the winter of 2021-2022, 1,060,685 dunams were cultivated by irrigation in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate. 83% (877,448 dunams) of irrigated lands were cultivated with the wheat crop, 15% (159,219 dunams) were cultivated with barley crop, and 1% (14,818 dunams) were cultivated with winter vegetables.

Figure (19) Percentages/ Areas of irrigated lands by crop

3. Irrigation methods

The total area of irrigated lands in areas outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate is 1,264,961 dunams, of which 41% (517,796 dunams) are irrigated through artesian wells (water lift pumps), 37% (470,465 dunams) are irrigated through the Euphrates and Khobour rivers using water pumps, and 22% (276,700 dunams) are irrigated by agricultural associations. The autonomous administration of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) distributes fuel to farmers who have obtained agricultural licenses and to farmer associations.

Figure (20) Percentages / Areas of irrigated land by irrigation methods
Eleventh: Kasra City

Kasra city is located in the Kasra sub-district of Deir ez-Zor District. The city consists of three main sectors, namely Kasra city, Kasra Tahtani village, and Hammar Kasra village. These three sectors are divided into nine neighborhoods that form Kasra city, (the southern neighborhood, the Northern neighborhood, the western neighborhood, Hammar Kasra, al-Baladiyye, al-Maruzah, Markadah, Northern Hammar Kasra, and Kasra Tahtani).

Map (6) The neighborhoods of Kasra City
1. Population and age groups in Kasra city

According to the Population Movement in Northern Syria Report issued monthly by ACU, the population of Kasra city was 18,000 in April 2022. Females constituted 55% (9,900 females) of the population of Kasra city, while males constituted 45% (8,100 males).

Through the demographic statistics of Kasra city, it is noticed that the percentage of females is greater than males, especially for the age group of 16-40 years, for several reasons. Mainly, young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. After the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) took control of the region, the majority of young people were unable to return due to the forced recruitment imposed by SDF. Among the reasons is also the migration of young men in order to improve their living conditions and seek stability and security in light of lacking security and stability in their country, and in order to secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remained in the region in light of the deterioration of living conditions.

https://acu-sy.org/periodic_imu_reports/population-movement-in-north-syria/
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Kasra city

IDPs constituted 22% (4,000 IDPs) of the total population of Kasra city. The majority of the displaced (25% of the displaced with 1,000 IDPs) managed to own some houses in Kasra city or its surroundings, where the city witnessed an expansion in urban construction as some displaced people acquired small plots of land and constructed rural houses or several rooms within them. 25% (800 IDPs) of IDPs settled in random (self-settled) camps around the city, and 15% (600 IDPs) settled in tents scattered around the city, and the majority of these IDPs are livestock breeders. 10% (400 IDPs) of the IDPs settled in rented houses. Renting houses is considered to be expensive in Kasra city compared to the rest of the cities and towns outside the regime control in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

3. Nature of residential buildings in Kasra city

Single-story houses without a garden surrounding the house accounted for 73% of the total houses in Kasra city. Single-story houses with a garden surrounding the house constituted 22% of the total houses in Kasra city, and these single-story houses with a garden were concentrated in the following neighborhoods: the western neighborhood, the northern neighborhood, the southern neighborhood, and the al-Baladiyya neighborhood. Multi-story buildings made up only 5% of the total houses in Kasra city. Multi-story buildings were concentrated in the following neighborhoods: the western neighborhood, the northern neighborhood, the southern neighborhood, the al-Baladiyya neighborhood, and Hammar Kasra.
4. The standard of living of the population in Kasra city

Information sources confirmed that 56% of the residents of Kasra city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 36% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their basic necessities, and that only 9% are from the affluent class.
5. **Bakeries in Kasra city**

There are 4 bakeries in Kasra city, all of which are operational. One of these bakeries is public and was owned by the government before the war. It is currently controlled by the Autonomous Administration of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and there are also 3 private bakeries. SDF supports all bakeries with diesel and flour.

Table (4) Bakery Information in Kasra City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of bakery:</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operationa l status</th>
<th>The neighborho od where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/ kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/ kg</th>
<th>The donor</th>
<th># of administrative staff</th>
<th># of workers</th>
<th># of technicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al-Omair</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>The southern neighborho od</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Mar’a</td>
<td>Public ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>The northern neighborho od</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Moozer</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Hammar Kasra</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Mamdouh</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>The al-Baladiyya neighborho od</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. The water network in Kasra city

The study showed that 78% of the neighborhoods of Kasra city do not have a public water network, and that in 11% of the neighborhoods, the water network is functional, but there is a leakage of water from some of its parts, and that in 11% the water network is functional, but there is a leakage of water in many of its parts.

Figure (25) Percentages of water network destruction in Kasra city

Administratively, the sub-district (Kasra city) consists of three basic residential communities, namely: Kasra city, Kasra Tahtani village, and Hammar Kasra village. There is a water network in Kasra city, but part of it suffers from malfunctions due to the ongoing war. As for the rest of the communities, there are random water networks in the main roads in the form of main water distribution points distributed in several places in the residential communities, where some residents built an irregular water line to their homes.

Before the ongoing war, water was pumped from the al-Kubr water station, but the pumping of water stopped due to the destruction of the supply lines and the al-Kubr station. Currently, water is purchased from water trucks at a price of 5,000 Syrian pounds per tank with a capacity of 1,000 liters. Two months ago, Concern NGO, in cooperation with another organization, established a water station that works to drag the Euphrates River to Kasra city. The station consists of two parts: a section located on the Euphrates River, which is a pumping station that pumps water from the river to the filter station, which is located in the city, and the water is treated in the second section, which is the filter station. One day is allocated to each of the city’s three residential communities (Kasra city, Kasra Tahtani village, and Hammar Kasra village) to pump water to it. Currently, no money is being collected from the residents because the station is being tested.

Kasra Tahtani
Northern Hammar Al-Kasra
Markadah neighborhood
Al-Marouza neighborhood
Al-Baladiyya neighborhood
Hammar al-Kasra
The southern neighborhood
The northern neighborhood
The southern neighborhood
7. The sanitation network in Kasra city

The study showed that 94% of the neighborhoods of Kasra city do not have a sewage network, and that in only 6% of the neighborhoods the sewage network works well and there is no leakage within its parts. The sewage network is available only within 50% of the al-Baladiyya neighborhood.

Figure (26) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Kasra city

- The sewage network is working, but there is leakage in many of the parts
- The sewer network is not working. It's completely destroyed.
- The sewage network is working, but there is leakage in some parts
- The sewage network is working well and there is no leakage
- There is no sewage network; no sewage network has been established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasra Tahtani</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Hammar Al-Kasra</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markada neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Marouza neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Baladiyya neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammar al-Kasra</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The southern neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The northern neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The southern neighborhood</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Electricity network in Kasra city
The study showed that the public electricity network is intact in all neighborhoods of Kasra city. There is more than one source of electricity in Kasra city.

   a. Electricity from the public network: Its source is the Euphrates Dam in al-Thawra city in ar-Raqqa governorate, and this source was divided into two parts or lines:

      • A service line was dedicated to government departments, agricultural associations, water stations, and service facilities. Electricity is available in the service line for about 18 hours a day.

      • A service line for the people (homes), and electricity is available in it from 2-4 hours a day, and electricity is often available only after midnight, while people do not benefit from regular electricity during the day.

   b. Public generators (by amperes): Public generators are distributed in residential communities, and the owners of these generators are civilians who are supported with fuel by the Civil Council in Deir ez-Zor, which is affiliated with SDF, where the Council provides fuel to them at a reduced price, and the operating period ranges from 6-8 hours per day distributed during the day and night. The cost of one ampere is 10,000 Syrian pounds per month.

   c. Solar panels: A small portion of people with good financial income benefit from this source, because their installation is expensive.

9. The public road network in Kasra city
The study showed that the public roads in all neighborhoods of Kasra city are partially destroyed as a result of military activities and lack of road maintenance for a long time, and that they need to be repaired.
Twelveth: Sur City

Sur city is in the Sur sub-district of Deir ez-Zor governorate. The city consists of 6 neighborhoods (Al-Wese’ah neighborhood, Al-Sook al-’Am neighborhood, Al-Saad neighborhood, Al-Shatri neighborhood, Al-Hawi al-Gharbi neighborhood, and Al-Hawi al-Sharqi neighborhood). The area of the city is 4 square kilometers.

Map (7) The neighborhoods of Sur City
1. Population and age groups in Sur city

According to the Population Movement in Northern Syria Report issued monthly by ACU, the population of Sur city was 8,240 in April 2022. Females constituted 55% (4,532 females) of the population of Sur city, while males constituted 45% (3,708 males).

Through the demographic statistics of Sur city, it is noticed that the percentage of females is greater than males for all age groups, for several reasons. The percentage of female births is higher than that of males, as well as the natural mortality rate of males is higher than that of females, as women live longer than males. Also, young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. After SDF took control of the area, the majority of young men were unable to return due to SDF’s forced conscription, and one of the reasons is also the death of a large number of males in the battles that took place in the area. Another reason is the migration of young males to improve their living situation and seek stability and safety in the absence of security and stability in their country, and in order to secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remained in the area in light of the deterioration of living conditions.

https://acu-sy.org/periodic_imu_reports/population-movement-in-north-syria/
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Sur city

IDPs constituted 14% (1,143 IDPs) of the total population of Sur, which is 8,240 IDPs. 74% (846 IDPs) of IDPs settled in rented houses, 24% (274 IDPs) of IDPs settled in borrowed houses whose owners left the area and lent them out to IDPs without any financial compensation, and 2% (23 IDPs) settled with host families.

Figure (28) Number/Percentages IDPs and their places of distribution in Sur city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>Place of Distribution</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,143 IDPs</td>
<td>Rented houses</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274 IDPs</td>
<td>Loaned houses (their owners are away and they lent the houses to IDPs)</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 IDPs</td>
<td>With host families</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Nature of residential buildings in Sur city

Single-story houses without a garden surrounding the house accounted for 60% of the total houses in Sur city. Single-story houses with a garden surrounding the house constituted 22% of the total houses in Sur city, and these single-story houses with a garden were largely concentrated in al-Hawi al-Gharbi neighborhoods. Multi-story buildings made up 20% of the total houses in Sur city, and they were concentrated in al-Sook al-'Am neighborhood.

Figure (29) Percentages of residential buildings in Sur city by their types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Al-Wase'ah neighborhood</th>
<th>Al-Sook al-'Am neighborhood</th>
<th>Al-Saad neighborhood</th>
<th>Al-Shati</th>
<th>Al-Hawi al-Gharbi</th>
<th>Al-Hawi Al-Sharqi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-story homes surrounded by home gardens</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villaat</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mud</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storied buildings</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. **The standard of living of the population in Sur city**

Information sources confirmed that 69% of the residents of Sur city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 22% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their basic necessities, and that only 9% are from the affluent class.

**Figure (30) Percentages of the population in Sur city by their standard of living**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>From the affluent class</th>
<th>From the middle-class</th>
<th>From the lower class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wase’ah neighborhood</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sook al–Am neighborhood</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Saad neighborhood</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shati</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hawi al–Gharbi</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hawi Al–Sharqi</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Bakeries in Sur city

There are 4 bakeries in Sur city, all of which are operational. One of these bakeries is jointly owned as it is owned by the government and invested by a private entity. It is currently controlled by the Autonomous Administration of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and there are also 3 private bakeries. SDF supports all bakeries with diesel and flour.

Table (5) Bakery Information in Sur City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of bakery:</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>The neighborhood where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/ kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/ kg</th>
<th>The donor</th>
<th># of administrative staff</th>
<th># of workers</th>
<th># of technicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Joint ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Sook al-'Am</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>al-Baraka</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>al-Hawi al-Gharbi</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>al-Fatwa</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>al-Shati</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Jalal</td>
<td>Private ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Wusee'a</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. The water network in Sur city
The study showed that 81% of the neighborhoods of Sur city have a well-functioning public water network and there is no leakage in its parts. The study also showed that 10% of the neighborhoods of Sur city do not have a public water network, and that in 4% of the neighborhoods, the water network is functional, but there is a leakage of water in some of its parts, and that in 4% the water network is functional, but there is a leakage of water in many of its parts.

Figure (31) Percentages of water network destruction in Sur city

There are 5 water stations in Sur sub-district, one of which feeds Al-Hasakeh city (Khamiyat Al-Hasakeh station is located in Sur sub-district), and the other four feed the Sur area and its villages within regular water networks, and they are (Al-Huraiji village station, Al-Huraijiyyah village station, Khamiat Sur station in the Sur sub-district, and Safia station also located in the Sur sub-district). However, these networks feed 60% of the residents of the sub-district only, and 40% of the population rely on private water trucking, where the price of one barrel is 2,000 Syrian pounds when it is transported from al-Busayrah sub-district, and 1,000 Syrian pounds when it is transported from Al-Raya channel in the Sur sub-district when water is available in the channel.

The five water stations are fed from an irrigation channel from the Euphrates River (Sabha irrigation channel), which is located in the village of Sabha, where water passes through huge concrete irrigation channels to the Sur sub-district.

As for the houses that are fed from these stations, they do not pay financial fees for access to water. Water was pumped two days a week and for 6 hours pumping a day. However, at the time of writing the report (May 2022), the water stations had stopped pumping water for more than 25 days, due to a malfunction in the basic irrigation channel. The local councils informed the residents that work is underway to repair the irrigation channel and start pumping water through the network again, but there is no diesel to operate the stations, and that the people must collect money to secure diesel for the stations because SDF will not support the stations with diesel.
7. The sanitation network in Sur city
The study showed that 39% of the neighborhoods of Sur city do not have a sewage network and that in only 1% of the neighborhoods the sewage network works well and there is no leakage within its parts.

Figure (32) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Sur city

8. Electricity network in Sur city
The study showed that the public electricity network is intact in 79% of the neighborhoods of Sur city, and the network suffers from malfunctions in 2% of the neighborhoods of the city, while there is no electricity network in 19% of the neighborhoods.

Figure (33) Percentage of electricity network destruction in Sur city

There is no electricity in the public network in Sur city, and the people rely on private generators or solar power or on the private ampere network supported by SDF, where fuel is provided to the ampere network owners at a low price, and the cost of amperes varies according to the area, where the cost of one ampere ranges between 6,000 to 8,000 Syrian pounds.
9. The public road network in Sur city

The study showed that the road network is intact in 33% of the neighborhoods of Sur city, that it needs simple repairs (restoration) in 38% of the neighborhoods, and that it is largely destroyed in 3% of the neighborhoods, while 27% of the neighborhoods have recently expanded and do not contain any paved roads (their roads are gravelled only).

Figure (34) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Sur city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Largely destroyed road network</th>
<th>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wase’ah neighborhood</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sook al-'Am neighborhood</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Saad neighborhood</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shati</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hawi al-Gharbi</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hawi Al-Sharqi</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Thirteenth: Basira City**

The city of Basira is located in the Basira sub-district of the Deir ez-Zor district. The city consists of 11 neighborhoods (Abyad Kassar neighborhood, Al-Harrat Al-Fawqaniya neighborhood, Al-Basira Al-Qadima neighborhood, Hawija Al-Fahiman neighborhood, Khatila neighborhood, Al-Wasat Street, Ta’as Al-Gamil neighborhood, Ta’ash Ghadban neighborhood, Al-20th Street, Ta’ as Al-Bu Fahd neighborhood, and Kasar Al-Battaran neighborhood). The area of the city is estimated at 3 square kilometers.
1. Population and age groups in Basira city

According to the monthly ACU Population Movement in Northern Syria report, the population of the city of Basira was 28,070 in April 2022. Females accounted for 60% (16,842 females) of the population of the city of Basira, while males accounted for 40% (11,228 males).

Figure (35) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Basira city

Through the demographic statistics of Basira city, it is noticed that the percentage of females is higher than males for all age groups, for several reasons. The percentage of female births is higher than that of males, and the natural mortality rate of males is higher than that of females, as women live longer than males. Women are considered to live longer than males. Also, young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. After SDF took control of the area, most young men could not return due to SDF’s forced conscription. A large number of youth and men from the people of the city are detained by the regime. The percentage of females among the IDPs in the city is also high. The killing of a large number of males in the fighting in the region is also a cause. Among the reasons is also the migration of young men to improve their living conditions and seek stability and security in light of lacking security and stability in their country, and to secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remain in the region.

2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Basira city

IDPs constituted 6% (1,580 IDPs) of the total population of Basira city 28,070.75% (1,185 IDPs) of IDPs settled in rented houses, and 7% (111 IDPs) of IDPs settled in collective housing. 6% (95 IDPs) of the IDPs settled in borrowed houses whose owners left the area and lent them to the IDPs without any financial compensation. 5% (79 IDPs) settled with host families, 5% (79 IDPs) settled in empty houses, and 32 IDPs settled in scattered tents around the city.

Figure (36) Number/ Percentages of displaced people and their places of distribution in Basira city

- Host community residents
- IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host community residents</td>
<td>26,490</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented houses</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective accommodations</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaned houses (their owners are away and they lent the houses to IDPs)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With host families</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty houses (abandoned by owners)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tents scattered around the city</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The nature of residential buildings in Basira city

One-story houses surrounded by a home garden accounted for 91% of the total housing stock in the city of Basira. In comparison, apartments accounted for 9%, and the apartments were concentrated in the neighborhoods of 20th Street, Al-Wasat Street, and Old Basira.

Figure (37) Percentages of residential buildings in Basira city by their types
4. The standard of living of the population in Basira city

Key informants confirmed that 61% of the residents of Basira city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 30% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their necessities, and that only 9% are from the affluent class.

Figure (38) Percentages of the population in Basira city by their standard of living
5. **Bakeries in the city of Basira**

There are six bakeries in Basira, four bakeries are functional, and two bakeries are non-functional due to construction damage or machine malfunctions. One of these bakeries is jointly owned as it is owned by the government and invested by a private entity. It is currently controlled by the Autonomous Administration of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). There are also 5 private bakeries. SDF supports all functional bakeries with diesel and flour.

Table (6) Bakery information in Basira city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of bakery</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>The neighborhood where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/kg</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th># of administrative staff</th>
<th># of workers</th>
<th># of technical staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al-Rawi</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>20th Street</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Layth</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>20th Street</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>joint ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Harat Al-Fowqaniya</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-qaysar</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al Jis Street</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Abu Ziad</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Not Working</td>
<td>Abyad Al-Kassar</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Al-Ali Al-Markazi</td>
<td>Public property</td>
<td>Not Working</td>
<td>Al-Wasat Street</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abu Ziad bakery needs to maintain the generator and stove (firehouse) to be operational. Al-Ali Al-Markazi bakery needs to be renovated after it was destroyed and equipped, as the bakery was looted after it was destroyed.
6. Water network in Basira city

The study showed that 89% of the neighborhoods of Basira city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. In 9% of the neighborhoods, the water network is operational, but there is water leakage from some parts, and in 2%, the water network is operational, but there is water leakage in large parts.

![Percentage of water network destruction in Basira city](image)

The Basira Water Station is located in the center of the city of Basira, next to the Qarqissia Park near the Basira General Hospital. It operates for approximately 15 hours a day except during power outages. The station is fed by electricity from the service line, which comes from Shiheil Town Electricity Station. The station stops working when the power goes out because the SDF Autonomous Administration does not supply it with diesel. The station entirely feeds Basira, and no fees are charged.
7. Sanitation network in Basira city

The study showed that in 75% of the neighborhoods of Basira, the sewage network is well operational, and there is no leakage within its parts. In 12% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in some parts. In 11% of neighborhoods, the sewage network is functioning well, but there is leakage in a large portion of the neighborhood. There is no sewage network in 3% of the neighborhoods, as these neighborhoods have recently expanded, and no sewage network has been established.

Figure (40) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Basira city

- The sewer network is not working. It's completely destroyed.
- There is no sewage network; no sewage network has been established
- The sewage network is working, but there is leakage in many of the parts
- The sewage network is working, but there is leakage in some parts
- The sewage network is working well and there is no leakage
8. Electricity network in Basira city

The study showed that the public electricity network is intact in 70% of the neighborhoods of the city of Basira, and the network suffers from malfunctions in 17% of the neighborhoods of the city, while there is no electricity network in 13% of the neighborhoods.

Electricity reaches the district only through the electricity network, which feeds the water stations, associations, and Autonomous Administration centers affiliated with the SDF. However, some residents draw electricity for their homes from the service network by force of arms (stealing from the service line), and they constitute 40% of the population of the city of Basira. The service line operates for 15 hours a day.

25% of the residents of the city of Basira receive electricity through public generators. The subscription value per ampere is 10,000 Syrian pounds per month, and the duration of the operation is 8 hours per day.

5% of the residents of the city of Basira have private electricity generators that feed their houses with electricity.

15% of the residents of Basira have solar panels that feed their houses with electricity.

15% of the population do not own any source of electrical energy.
9. The road network in Basira city

The study showed that the road network is intact in 32% of the neighborhoods of Basira city, that it needs simple repairs (restoration) in 47% of the neighborhoods, and is largely destroyed in 12% of the neighborhoods. In comparison, 9% of the neighborhoods have recently expanded and do not have paved roads (their roads are graveled only).

Figure (42) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Basira city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</th>
<th>Largely destroyed road network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</td>
<td>Largely destroyed road network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</td>
<td>Largely destroyed road network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47%</td>
<td>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</td>
<td>Largely destroyed road network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Only a paved road network/recently expanded neighborhoods that do not have a road network</td>
<td>Largely destroyed road network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kassar Al-Batran</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’s Albu Fahd</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Eshreen Street</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’s al-Ghadban</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’s al-Jameel</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wasal Street</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khatila Neighborhood</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawija Al-Fahiman</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Basira al-Qadeema</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper neighborhoods</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyad Al-Kassar</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Forteenth: Hajin City

The city of Hajin is located in the Hajin sub-district of Al-Bukamal district, on the east bank of the Euphrates River. The river surrounds it from three sides, where its farms and houses are scattered on a flood plain. Hajin is 172 m above sea level and 110 km east of Deir ez-Zor and about 35 km from Al-Bu Kamal. Its area is 250 square kilometers without the desert section, while its area with the desert section is about 1,250 square kilometers. The city of Hajin consists of 8 neighborhoods (Hawamah, Hawar, Hasiyat Antar al-Kabbara, Ahl al-Zar, Al-Qal’a, Salah al-Gharbi, Suq, and Bu Khater). Notably, the administrative division considers Bu Khater a town separate from the city of Hajin. Still, the proximity of this town and its connectedness to the city of Hajin made the residents consider it a neighborhood of the city.
1. Population and age groups in Hajin city

According to the monthly ACU Population Movement in Northern Syria report, the population of the city of Hajin was 99,000 in April 2022. Females accounted for 55% (54,450 females) of the population of the city of Hajin, while males accounted for 45% (44,550 males).

![Population distribution by gender and age groups in Hajin city](chart.png)

It is noticeable from the population statistics of Hajin city that the percentage of females is greater than males, especially for the age group 16-40 years. Young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. During the massacre of the Shaitat clan committed by the ISIS against the people of the area, 1,200 men were killed in field executions, and a large part of the male residents of the area fled outside the areas of ISIS control. After SDF took control of the area, most young men could not return due to SDF’s forced conscription and the arrest campaigns they conducted. Another reason is the migration of young males to improve their living situation, seek stability and safety in the absence of security and stability in their country, and secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remain in the area.

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9 [https://acu-sy.org/periodic_imu_reports/population-movement-in-north-syria/]
2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Hajin city
IDPs constituted 15% (15,000 IDPs) of Hajin's total population of 99,000. 95% (14,250 IDPs) of IDPs settled in rented houses, and 5% (750 IDPs) settled with host families.

3. Nature of Residential Buildings in Hajin City
Single-story houses without a garden surrounding the house accounted for 63% of the total houses in Hajin city. Multi-story buildings made up 13% of the total houses in Hajin city and were concentrated in the al-Sook neighborhood. The single-story house with a home garden surrounding the house constituted 2% of the total houses in Hajin. Villas accounted for less than 1% of the total housing.
4. The standard of living of the population in Hajin city

Information sources confirmed that 71% of the residents of Hajin city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 18% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their necessities, and that only 11% are from the affluent class.

Before the war in Syria, the living conditions of Hajin population were good, as there were no poor people in the sub-district, as a result of the presence of a large part of expatriates in the Gulf countries, who sent some money to their families to help them improve their standard of living. Part of the population has fertile agricultural lands that provide them with good income, as most of the people of the region work in agriculture and breeding livestock and poultry.

The population’s living conditions changed after the ongoing war, as the poverty that afflicts a large group of people in the sub-district increased. A large part of the population has become displaced, and agriculture has declined significantly due to policies adopted by the region's authorities toward farmers. As for the expatriates, their situation has worsened due to the policies adopted by the expatriate countries, which have often led to the deportation of some of them.
5. **Bakeries in Hajin city**

There are 4 bakeries in Hajin, all operational and all private. SDF supports all operational bakeries with diesel and flour.

Table (7) **Bakery Information in Hajin City**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of bakery</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>The neighborhood where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/ kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/ kg</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th>Number of administrative staff</th>
<th>Number of workers</th>
<th>Number of technical staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al-Hadith</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Hajin Al-Wasat</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Ali</td>
<td>Public property</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Hawwama</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Rasheed</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Hawi</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Dughri</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Souq</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>The controlling party is SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Water network in Hajin city

The study showed that 66% of the neighborhoods of Hajin city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. 22% of the neighborhoods have a water network, but there is water leakage from some parts. And 13% of the neighborhoods of Hajin city do not have a public water network.

There are three water stations in Hajin city: Hawamah Station, Hajin Main Station, and Abu Al-Hassan Station. These stations pump water when electricity is on through the service line, which comes from the Euphrates Dam in Ath-Thawrah within the province of Raqqa. However, the electricity is intermittently and with unstable voltage, which damaged the equipment in the stations. Houses that get water from these stations do not pay a fee for water. The controlling forces do not provide fuel support to the stations to operate the generators, and some initiatives provide diesel from the notables to pump water for several days. As for water wells, their water is not suitable for drinking due to the low level of the Euphrates River and the low levels of rainfall.
7. Sanitation network in Hajin city

The study showed that 89% of the neighborhoods of Hajin city do not have a sewage network and that in only 12% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network works well, and there is no leakage within its parts. In 1%, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in some parts.

Figure (48) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Hajin city

8. Electricity network in Hajin city

The study showed that the public electricity network is completely destroyed in all neighborhoods of Hajin city, and electricity is unavailable in the public network. Before the ongoing war, the electricity network came from the conversion stations in the town of Gharanij through cables from the Jandar generation station in Homs Governorate. It currently suffers from complete absence from the city except for the service electricity network, which comes from the Euphrates Dam in the city of Ath-Thawrah in Raqqa province. However, the electricity of this line comes intermittently and with unstable voltage. The electricity of this line is for services, including pumps of agricultural associations dedicated to the irrigation of crops and water stations. Electricity from the Omar oilfield or Al-Tanak oilfield is not available, nor from the rest of the power stations, due to the complete destruction of the networks and the significant financial cost of constructing new infrastructure.

Residents rely on many sources to obtain electricity from private generators or large generators (generators covering the neighborhood). They are distributed through a network of wires to homes in exchange for a fee for the generator owner. Some of the well-of rely on solar power systems for electricity.
9. The public road network in Hajin city

The study showed that the road network is intact in only 11% of Hajin districts, needs minor repairs (restoration) in 77% of districts, and is significantly destroyed in 13%.

Figure (49) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Hajin city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Intact Road Network</th>
<th>Largely Destroyed Road Network</th>
<th>Needs Repairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawame</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawar</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasiyat Antar al-Kabra</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl al-Zer</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qal'ah</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Salah Al-Gharbi</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The market</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Bukhater</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fifteenth: Thiban City

Thiban city is located in the Hajin sub-district of Al Mayadin district. It is located on the east bank of the Euphrates River and has an area of 30 square kilometres. Thiban city consists of 6 neighborhoods (Al-Nahiya, Al-Lutwa, Al-Zarna, Al-Hawija, the Northern, and the Southern neighborhood). The city is considered important for all the controlling forces that have rotated over the area because of the presence of the sheikhs of the Hafal Al-Akidat clan in it (Al-Hafal Al-Akidat leadership family), in addition to being an important link between the east and west of the Euphrates River at Al Mayadin city.

Map of (10) The neighborhoods of Thiban city
1. Population and age groups in Thiban city

According to the monthly ACU Population Movement in Northern Syria report, the population of Thiban city was 24,145 in April 2022. Females accounted for 55% (13,280 females) of the population, while males accounted for 45% (10,865 males).

Figure (50) Number/ Percentages of the population by gender and age groups in Thiban city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elderly (+60 yrs)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults between 26 and 59 years old</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescents (15–18 years)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth between 19 and 25 years old</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 6 and 14 years old</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 3 and 5 years old</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants (0–2 years)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noticeable from the population statistics of Thiban city that the percentage of females is greater than males, especially for the age group 16-40 years. Young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. After SDF took control of the area, most young men could not return due to SDF's forced conscription and the arrest campaigns they conducted. Another reason is the migration of young males to improve their living situation, seek stability and safety in the absence of security and stability in their country, and secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remain in the area.

2. IDPs and their places of distribution in Thiban city
IDPs constituted 5% (2,100 IDPs) of the city's total population of 24,145. 33% (693 IDPs) of the IDPs settled in borrowed houses whose owners were not present and lent to the IDPs without asking for rent. 22% (420 IDPs) live in empty houses left by their owners, are displaced outside the sub-district, or emigrated outside Syria. In this case, the IDPs did not get the approval of the owners of the houses to reside in them. 17% (357 IDPs) are settled in rented houses, 11% (231 IDPs) settled in empty buildings (government buildings or abandoned buildings), 10% (210 IDPs) settled in unfinished homes, and 9% (189 IDPs) settled with host families.

Figure (51) The number/ Percentages of displaced people and their places of distribution in Thiban city

3. Nature of Residential Buildings in Thiban City
Single-story houses without a garden surrounding the house accounted for 75% of the total houses in Thiban city. The single-story house with a home garden surrounding the house constituted 34% of the total houses. Multi-story buildings made up 7% of the total houses. Villas accounted for 3% of the total housing.
According to the results of the study, 89% of the residential buildings in Thiban city are not destroyed, 5% are slightly destroyed, including the destruction of doors, windows, and some openings in the walls, and 3% of the buildings have an average destruction medium and can be repaired without the need to demolish and reconstruct buildings, and 3% have considerable destruction and cannot be repaired and need to be demolished and reconstructed.

4. The standard of living of the population in Thiban city
Information sources confirmed that 25% of the residents of Thiban city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 63% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their necessities, and that only 13% are from the affluent class.
5. **Bakeries in Thiban city**

There are four bakeries in Thiban city, all operational, including three privately owned bakeries and one jointly owned bakery (owned by the government and invested by a private party). SDF supports all operational bakeries with diesel and flour.

**Table (8) Bakery information in Thiban city**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name of bakery</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>The neighborhood where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/ kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/ kg</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th># of administrative staff</th>
<th># of workers</th>
<th># of technical staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>joint ownership (investment)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Sub-district center</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>The controlling SDF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jamil Al-Mahmoud</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Hafel neighborhood</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>The controlling SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Jazira</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Main Street</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>The controlling SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Kharsabah</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Latwa neighborhood</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>The controlling SDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Water network in Thiban city
The study showed that 43% of the neighborhoods of Thiban city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. 5% of the neighborhoods have a water network, but there is water leakage from some parts. 2% of the neighborhoods have a water network, but there is water leakage in large parts. And 6% of the neighborhoods have a completely destroyed water network. 43% of the neighborhoods of Thiban city do not have a public water network.

![Figure (54) Percentage of water network destruction in Thiban city](image)

A water station operated by the Civil Council pumps water to the city’s neighborhoods. Still, the water of this station reaches only 50% of the city’s population due to the destruction of a large percentage of the public water network. The water station needs to be maintained to be fully operational. There is also a second water station for Al-Omar oilfield located in Al-Latwa neighborhood, and some residents get water from it. There is a random water network on the city’s main roads in the form of public water taps distributed in several places and near population centers. Some residents illegally connect water pipes from these taps to their homes. A portion of the population of Thiban buys tank water for 5,000 Syrian pounds per tank with a capacity of 1,000 litres. There is no collection of fees from the residents of the city who benefit from the public water network because the water does not reach the city’s entire population. Therefore, the water station does not operate continuously due to the lack of electricity and fuel to operate the generators in the event of power outages from the main network.
7. Sanitation network in Thiban city
The study showed that 58% of the neighborhoods of Thiban city do not have a sewage network and that in only 38% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network works well, and there is no leakage within its parts. In 3% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in some parts, and in 1%, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in large parts.

Figure (55) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Thiban

8. Electricity network in Thiban city
The study showed that the public electricity network is intact in 15% of the neighborhoods of Thiban city, and the network suffers from malfunctions in 27% of the neighborhoods of the city, while there is no electricity network in 58% of the neighborhoods.

Figure (56) Percentage of electricity network destruction in Thiban
There is more than one source of electricity in the sub-district of Thiban:

a) **Public electricity network:** Its source is the Euphrates Dam in Al-Thawra City, Ar-Raqqa Governorate. However, this network feeds the service line, which supplies only the service sectors with electricity (government departments, water stations and other service facilities). Electricity for the service line is available 8 hours a day and intermittently for service facilities only, while the service line does not increase the population’s homes by electricity.

b) **Public Generators:** Generators are distributed in residential communities. The generators’ owners are civilians whom the Civil Council supports in Deir ez-Zor, affiliated with the SDF, with fuel (it provides them with a reduced price). The operating time of the generators is 6-8 hours per day, distributed between night and day, and the price of one ampere is 10,000 Syrian pounds per month.

c) **Solar panels:** A few people with good income benefit from this source because its installation is expensive and spread significantly in light of the lack of other electricity sources.

9. **The public roads network in Thiban**

The study showed that the road network is intact in only 47% of the neighborhoods and needs simple repairs (restoration) in 27% of the neighborhoods. It is largely destroyed in 8% of the neighborhoods. In comparison, a road network has not been established in 19% of the neighborhoods because these neighborhoods have recently expanded and contain paved roads only.

Figure (57) Percentage of the destruction of the road network in Thiban city

A road network in Thiban was established before the war in Syria. There has been no maintenance on the road network for more than 11 years, so all roads need maintenance in varying proportions. The city also needs to build new roads in the newly constructed neighborhoods.
Sixteenth: Sosa City

Sosa city is located in the Sosa sub-district of Al-Bukamal district. It is located on the east bank of the Euphrates River. The desert and the Iraqi border bound the city. It covers an area of 3 square kilometers. Sosa City comprises 11 neighborhoods (Wasat Sosa, Palestine, Ali Al-Daghar, Sharqi 1, Sharqi 2, Hawi Al-Tadhamun, Al-Mafraq, Al-Fawqiyah, Al-Alyat, Al-Shuhada, and Al-Shahathat).

Map of (11) neighborhoods of Sosa city
1. Population and age groups in Sosa city

According to the report of the Population Movement in Northern Syria issued by the ACU every month, the population of Sosa city reached 35,000 in April 2022, and females accounted for 60% (21,000 females) of the population, while males accounted for 40% (14,000 males).

It is noticeable from the population statistics of Sosa city that the percentage of females is greater than males, especially for the age group 16-40 years. Young men began leaving the area after ISIS took control of the city, given that part of them joined the ranks of the revolutionary movement or fought with the Free Army, which made them vulnerable to prosecution by ISIS. During the battles against ISIS waged by SDF and supported by the International Coalition, some young males were killed due to shelling or clashes. After SDF took control of the area, most young men could not return due to SDF’s forced conscription and the arrest campaigns they conducted. Another reason is the migration of young males to improve their living situation, seek stability and safety in the absence of security and stability in their country, and secure sources of income in other countries to help their families who remain in the area. Males also migrate, but not females, to complete their university education in regime-held areas. The community refuses to send females to complete their higher education and marries them instead. Polygamy is widespread due to the high ratio of females to males. The city of Sosa has no displaced people except some families who have taken refuge with their relatives.

https://acu-sy.org/periodic_imu_reports/population-movement-in-north-syria/
2. Nature of residential buildings in Sosa city

Single-story houses with a home garden surrounding the house accounted for 54% of the total housing stock in Sosa, and single-story houses without a home garden surrounding the house accounted for 30% of the total housing stock. Apartment buildings made up 9% of the total housing stock, and villas made up 8% of the total housing stock.

According to the results of the study, 75% of the residential buildings in the city of Sosa are not destroyed, 14% are slightly destroyed, including the destruction of doors, windows, and some openings in the walls, and 6% of the buildings have average destruction medium and can be repaired without the need to demolish and reconstruct buildings, and 5% have considerable destruction and cannot be repaired and need to be demolished and reconstructed.
3. The standard of living of the population in Sosa city

Information sources confirmed that 57% of the residents of Sosa city are from the poor class, whose suffering increased with the outbreak of the war in Syria, that 28% are from the middle-income class, who can provide only their necessities, and that only 15% are from the affluent class.

Figure (60) Percentages of the population in Sosa city by their standard of living

![Circle chart showing percentages of population standard of living]

4. Bakeries in Sosa city

There are three bakeries in Sosa, all operational and all private. SDF supports all operational bakeries with diesel and flour.

Table (9) Bakery information in Sosa City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th># bakery</th>
<th>Bakery ownership</th>
<th>Operational status</th>
<th>The neighborhood where the bakery is located</th>
<th>Bakery capacity/ kg</th>
<th>Current production quantity of the bakery/ kg</th>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th># of administrative staff</th>
<th># of workers</th>
<th># of technical staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Al-Fares</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Wasat Sosa</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Aliyat</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Al-Aliyat</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Baraka.</td>
<td>Private Ownership</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Sharq 1</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>The controlling forces: SDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Water network in Sosa city

The study showed that 66% of the neighborhoods of Sosa city have a well-functioning public water network, and there is no leakage in its parts. 15% of the neighborhoods have a water network, but there is water leakage from some parts. 13% of the neighborhoods have a water network, but there is water leakage in large parts. 3% of the neighborhoods of Sosa city do not have a public water network. And 3% of the neighborhoods have a wholly destroyed water network.

Figure (61) Percentage of water network destruction in Sosa city

Drinking and other usage water: Drinking water does not reach all residents of Sosa sub-district due to the large distance between some communities and water stations or the lack of a water network in some neighborhoods. Insaf maintained some water stations, and the SDF Autonomous Administration established several stations. The number of water stations in Sosa sub-district is nine, distributed as follows: 1 in each of the towns of Sosa and Shafah and Safafnah, 2 in the town of Al-Bu Badranand, and 4 in the town of Baguz. 1,000 Syrian pounds per month is collected from every house that receives drinking water from the public network. Many inhabitants cannot drink water from the public network because it is not sterilized, as water from the river often reaches the citizen directly without sterilization. Therefore, the vast majority of the population resists buying canned drinking water through water stations that sterilize water, and the price of 25 litres of sterile water is 1,000 Syrian pounds. The residents of the neighborhoods who do not have access to the public network water buy water from water trucks at 5,000 Syrian pounds for ten barrels (1000 Liters).

Irrigation water: Each village in Sosa sub-district has a group of irrigation stations (associations), and the number of irrigation stations in Sosa sub-district is 12 because the area is agricultural. Farmers pay 5,000 Syrian pounds for irrigating one dunum of land for one time.
6. Sanitation network in Sosa city
The study showed that 63% of the neighborhoods of the city of Sosa have a well-functioning sewage network, and there is no leakage within its parts. In 14% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in some parts. In 1% of the neighborhoods, the sewage network is operational, but there is leakage in large parts. 3% of Sosa city's neighborhoods do not have a sewage network, and 5% of the neighborhoodshave a destroyed sewage network.

Figure (62) Percentage of the destruction of the sewage network in Sosa city
- There is no sewage network; no sewage network has been established
- The sewer network is not working. It's completely destroyed.
- The sewage network is working, but there is leakage in some parts
7. Electricity network in Sosa

The results of the study showed that the electricity networks within the city of Sosa are completely destroyed due to the military actions that took place in the city. Several entities provide the electricity service for Sosa. The SDF Autonomous Administration provides electricity within the service network, which supplies electricity to departments and service facilities only, such as drinking water stations, agricultural associations, local councils, and their subordinate departments, with public street lighting. Rashad Organization provided lighting for the public street in Shafah and Sosa and is still trying to lighten other villages. The electricity of the service network of the area comes through Omar oilfield, which reaches sub-stations such as the stations of the town of Granij and the station of the city of Hajin to Sosa sub-district.

The population has access to electricity through public generators, which operate about six hours a day, distributed day and night. SDF supports generator owners with diesel to operate their generators, selling diesel to them at a subsidised price. The residents pay 10,000 Syrian pounds per ampere per month.

A portion of the population has access to electricity through solar panels, which cost approximately $1,200 per house.

8. The public road network in Sosa city

The study showed that the road network is intact in only 69% of the neighborhoods and needs simple repairs (restoration) in 24% of the neighborhoods. It is largely destroyed in 4% of the neighborhoods. In comparison, a road network has not been established in 4% of the neighborhoods because these neighborhoods have recently expanded and contain paved roads only.

The SDF Autonomous Administration has rehabilitated the main road up to the town of Baguz. Still, the secondary streets are full of rubble and pits due to the military actions in the area.
THE DISPLACED POPULATION OF DEIR EZZOR DISTRICTS OUTSIDE THE SYRIAN REGIME’S CONTROL

126,924 IDPS
EASTERN DEIR EZ-ZOR GOVERNORATE
INTRODUCTORY REPORT OF THE AREA

JULY 2022